Molo v. Molo [G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951]

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Molo v. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: principle of dependent relative revocation

 

FACTS: Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

 

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

 

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

 

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will

 

RULING: Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

 

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

  

The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will.

 

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