Villanueva v. Domingo, G.R. No. 144274, September 20, 2004

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Villanueva v. Domingo

G.R. No. 144274, September 20, 2004

THIRD DIVISION, CORONA J. 

 

Registered owner rule; Liability of Registered Owner of Motor Vehicles 

We have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the public and third persons while it is being operated.

 

Priscilla R. Domingo was the registered owner of a silver Mitsubishi Lancer (Plate No. NDW 781), which was involved in a vehicular collision along South Superhighway while being driven by her son Leandro Luis R. Domingo. The other vehicle involved was a green Mitsubishi Lancer (Plate No. PHK 201), driven by Renato Ocfemia, who was drunk and unlicensed at the time. This vehicle was registered in the name of petitioner Nostradamus Villanueva, who claimed he had already swapped it with another vehicle and that the actual owner at the time was Albert Jaucian of Auto Palace Car Exchange. Villanueva contended that he was no longer liable since he no longer had possession or control of the vehicle, and Ocfemia was not his employee. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found Villanueva liable, prompting the petition before the Supreme Court.

 

Whether the registered owner of a motor vehicle can be held liable for damages resulting from an accident even if the vehicle was already transferred to another person and operated without the registered owner's knowledge or consent.

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and held that the registered owner is directly and primarily liable for damages caused by the operation of the vehicle, regardless of actual ownership or driver authorization. The Supreme Court have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the public and third persons while it is being operated. 

To allow a registered owner to escape liability by claiming that the driver was not authorized by the new (actual) owner results in the public detriment the law seeks to avoid. The main purpose of vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible for any accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle... The protection that the law aims to extend... would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.

 

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Kucskar v. Sekito, Jr., G.R. No. 237449, [December 2, 2020]

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Kucskar v. Sekito, Jr.

 G.R. No. 237449, [December 2, 2020]

THIRD, LOPEZ, M.

 

Succession; Wills; Probate of Foreigner's Will; Doctrine of Processual Presumption 

A foreign will to be considered for probate in the Philippines, it must comply with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where it was executed or with Philippine laws. the doctrine of "processual presumption," stating that the party invoking a foreign law has the burden of proving it, and the foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved. In the absence of proof of the foreign law's content, the presumption is that the foreign law is the same as Philippine law.

 

Aida A. Bambao, a naturalized American citizen, executed a Last Will and Testament (will) in California on October 28, 1999. In the will, she nominated her cousin, Cosme B. Sekito, Jr., as a special independent executor over her assets located in the Philippines. Aida passed away on February 5, 2000, in Long Beach, California. Cosme filed a Petition for the Allowance of Will before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. Linda A. Kucskar, Aida's sister and one of the heirs, opposed the petition, claiming expenses for Aida's adopted minor child, Elsa Bambao.

 

Whether or not Aida's will, executed in California, meets the formalities required for its probate in the Philippines. 

NO. The Court, in remanding the case, held that Aida's will failed to comply with the legal formalities required for its probate in the Philippines. Philippine laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad, but such wills must conform to the formalities prescribed by the law of the place of execution or Philippine laws. Aida's will, executed in California, should have been examined based on California law. However, the petitioner failed to present a copy of the pertinent California law as required by the rules. 

The Court emphasized that the doctrine of "processual presumption" applies, and foreign laws must be pleaded and proven in accordance with the Rules of Court. The will did not meet the requirements for acknowledgment and attestation under Philippine law. Even if the substantial compliance rule was applied to the attestation clause, it could not remedy the lack of acknowledgment. The living trust presented by the proponent did not fill the void, and Linda's failure to object during the probate proceedings did not relieve the proponent from establishing compliance with legal formalities. The case was remanded to the RTC for compliance with the rules on proving foreign laws.

 

 

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Chingkoe v. Chingkoe, G.R. No. 244076, [March 16, 2022]

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Chingkoe v. Chingkoe

 G.R. No. 244076, [March 16, 2022]

THIRD, LOPEZ, M.

 

Land Titles and Deeds; Presumption of Regularity of Notarized Deed of Sale; Clear and Convincing Evidence to prove contrary

 

Notarized documents enjoy a presumption of regularity, authenticity, and due execution, which can only be overturned by clear and convincing evidence. In the absence of such evidence, the court should uphold the presumption and consider the document valid. 

Faustino Chingkoe (Faustino) and his wife, Gloria Chingkoe (Gloria), owned a parcel of land in Quezon City. In 1990, Faustino allowed his brother, Felix Chingkoe (Felix), to occupy the property. At the request of their mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino signed an undated Deed of Sale conveying the property to Felix, who claimed to have been in possession since 1989. In 1994, a notarized Deed of Sale was executed, but Faustino refused to surrender the Owner's Duplicate of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), hindering its transfer to Felix. Felix filed a complaint for specific performance, leading to an RTC decision in his favor, upheld on appeal, ordering Faustino to surrender the TCT. The CA later reversed the decision, finding the contract void for lack of consideration.

 

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's decision and declaring the Deed of Sale void for lack of consideration. 

YES. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reinstating the RTC's decision, which affirmed Felix's entitlement to the property based on the validly executed Deed of Sale. The notarized Deed of Sale carried a presumption of regularity, which could only be overturned by clear and convincing evidence. The CA relied on Tan Po Chu's testimony, but it was insufficient to contest the regularity of the document. Tan Po Chu admitted her incompetence to attest to the sale's validity. The trial court correctly found her testimony insufficient. The court emphasized the trial court's unique position to evaluate witness credibility. The CA erred in declaring the contract void due to Felix's failure to prove payment, as actual payment is not an essential requisite of a valid contract. The Deed of Sale's terms attested to full payment. Faustino's claims were considered flimsy, and Felix's unrealized profits claim lacked evidentiary support. The court upheld the RTC's decision, emphasizing the principle of not relieving parties from voluntarily assumed obligations despite unfavorable contracts. The claim for actual damages was denied due to lack of competent proof. The CA decision was reversed, and the RTC decision was reinstated.

 

 

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Mutya-Sumilhig v. Sumilhig, G.R. No. 230711, [August 22, 2022]

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Mutya-Sumilhig v. Sumilhig

 G.R. No. 230711, [August 22, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.

 

Nullity of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity; Tong-its and Mahjong addict 

The totality of evidence rule should be applied in evaluating Article 36 petitions. Even without a personal examination of the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, the court may consider expert testimony and the narratives of the petitioner and witnesses to establish the psychological condition of the respondent and the failure of the marriage.

 

Carolyn met Joselito T. Sumilhig in February 1984 when they both worked at Daungan Restaurant. They developed a romantic relationship, leading to marriage on October 20, 1987. Despite Carolyn's hopes for reform, Joselito's vices, including gambling, drinking, and physical abuse, persisted after marriage. Their first child, Jay, was born on April 6, 1988, but Joselito displayed little concern. Their second child, Jennalyn, born on May 24, 1989, was premature due to stress from constant quarrels. Joselito's behavior worsened, and Carolyn eventually left in September 1990 due to his vices and abuse. Joselito did not provide for their children, and they never reconciled. Carolyn filed a petition for the nullity of marriage on October 18, 2010, based on Joselito's alleged psychological incapacity.

 

Whether or not Joselito's psychological incapacity, as claimed by Carolyn, justifies the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 

YES. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially denied Carolyn's petition, citing insufficient evidence to prove the gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence of Joselito's psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, stating that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decisions, finding that the evidence presented, including expert opinions from Dr. Soriano and Dr. Benitez, established Joselito's psychological incapacity. Dr. Soriano diagnosed him with Antisocial-Dependent Personality Disorder, comorbid with alcohol dependence and pathological gambling, with the disorder existing before marriage. Dr. Benitez confirmed his chronic alcoholism and gambling, concluding that reconciliation was unlikely. The Court ruled that the totality of evidence clearly and convincingly proved Joselito's psychological incapacity, justifying the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

 

 

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OCHOA VS. ALANO [G.R. NO. 167459, January 26, 2011]

OCHOA VS. ALANO

G.R. NO. 167459,  January 26, 2011

FIRST DIVISION, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J

 

Psychological Incapacity of Any Party (Art. 36, Family Code)

 

Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa sought the nullity of his marriage to Bona J. Alano due to her psychological incapacity to fulfill marital obligations. Bona had engaged in extramarital affairs throughout their marriage, which continued even when they lived together. In 1987, while Jose was incarcerated, he confronted Bona about rumors of her affair with his driver, which both admitted. They separated, and their child lived with Bona until 1994 when she went to live with Jose. A psychiatrist's evaluation concluded that Bona suffered from histrionic personality disorder, which was attributed to her family history.

 

Whether Psychological Incapacity is clearly established to declare marriage as null and void.

 

NO. The SC said that the totality of Bona’s acts did not constitute psychological incapacity and that there was inadequate evidence that her “defects” were already present at the inception or prior to the marriage. The persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage. Therefore, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the requisite of “juridical antecedence”. The evaluation report by Dr. Rondain was gathered from Jose and witnesses. These was no personal exam conducted on the respondent. The alleged spouse’s psychological incapacity was fed by only one side, similar to hearsay.

 

 

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Lim vs. Lim [G.R. No. 176464 February 24, 2010]

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Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 176464

February 24, 2010

THIRD DIVISION, NACHURA, J

 

Psychological Incapacity of Any Party (Art. 36, Family Code) 

In order for a marriage to be declared null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity, certain criteria of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability must be met.

 

Edward Lim and Maria Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim got married in 1979 after a brief courtship. They lived with Edward's family in Makati and had three children. Their marriage faced turmoil, including an embarrassing incident involving Edward and his mother’s caregiver. In 1990, Cheryl left Edward and filed a support case against him. In 1999, Edward sought the nullity of their marriage on the grounds of both parties' psychological incapacity. He later included his psychological incapacity in his amended petition. Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist, provided a psychiatric report diagnosing both parties with personality disorders, while Cheryl waived her right to present evidence.

 

Is the marriage between Edward and Cheryl null and void due to their psychological incapacity? 

NO. The marriage is not null and void. Psychological incapacity for the annulment of a marriage requires the incapacity to be grave, have juridical antecedence, and be incurable. In this case, the psychiatric report presented lacks specific links between the parties' acts and the criteria for the diagnosed personality disorders. Additionally, the report was unsupported by proper psychological tests. A judge must base rulings on law and jurisprudence, and the expert opinion, unsupported by tests, cannot prevent the judge from making factual findings. Therefore, the marriage remains valid.

  

Criterion of Psychological Incapacity:

 1.    Gravity: The psychological incapacity must be serious or grave, rendering a party incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.

2.    Juridical Antecedence: The psychological incapacity should have existed prior to the marriage, although it may only become evident after the marriage has taken place.

3.     Incurability: The psychological incapacity must be permanent and incurable. It should be deeply ingrained in the individual's personality structure and beyond the means of correction or treatment.

 

 

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Georfo vs. Republic [G.R. No. 246933, March 6, 2023]

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Georfo vs. Republic 

(G.R. No. 246933, March 6, 2023)

SECOND DIVISION, LEONEN J.

Psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not an illness which has to be medically or clinically identified.

Agnes and Joe-Ar got married after a brief courtship and had a son. Their marriage quickly deteriorated due to conflict, infidelity, and abuse. Agnes filed for the nullity of their marriage, claiming Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerong, a clinical psychologist, provided an expert opinion, citing Joe-Ar's narcissistic personality disorder and other issues as causes of incapacity. Joe-Ar’s sister also testify regarding his abusive behavior, as she once saw how Joe-ar and his family mistreated Agnes. 

Was there sufficient evidence to prove Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity as the basis for the nullity of the marriage?

YES. In proving psychological incapacity doesn't necessitate a psychiatric examination and that it's based on legal standards, not medical diagnoses. The totality of evidence, including expert opinions, testimonies, and behavior patterns, can establish psychological incapacity. The court ruled that Agnes had successfully proven Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerong's psychological assessment, based on testimonies from Agnes and her sister, supported this claim. The court emphasized that psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not a specific illness, and psychiatric evaluation is no longer a requirement. Therefore, their marriage was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

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Tan-Andal vs. Andal (G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021)

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Tan-Andal vs. Andal

(G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021)

EN BANC, J. LEONEN

EXPERT WITNESS NOT NEEDED IN PROVING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS LIBERALLY INTERPRETED; NEW GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CASES

In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married each other. Earlier in their marriage, Rosanna also observed Mario to be emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable, and psychologically imbalanced. Rosanna later learned that Mario was a drug addict. Rosanna filed a petition to have her marriage declared void on the ground that Mario was psychologically incapacitated. To prove her case, she presented a psychologist (Dr. Fonso Garcia) who, after interviewing Rosanna, Rosanna’s daughter, and Rosanna’s sister, concluded that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia did not interview Mario as the latter, despite invitation, refused an interview. In her assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to be suffering from Narcissistic Antisocial Personality Disorder.

Whether or not marriage is void due to psychological incapacity. (YES) 

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CASES

Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion is not required. As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

DRUG ADDICTION

That Drug addiction as a ground of legal separation will not prevent the court from voiding the marriage. So long as the party can demonstrate that the drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage, this should be enough to render the marriage void under Article 36 (Psychological Incapacity)

NEW SET OF GUIDELINES:

1. The burden of proof in proving psychological incapacity is still on the plaintiff. The Supreme Court however clarified that the quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence.

2. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert testimony. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse.

3. Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense;

4. As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

5. Juridical antecedence. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

6. The decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines has persuasive effect on nullity cases pending before secular courts

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ALEXANDER V. SPOUSES ESCALONA [G.R. No. 256141, July 19, 2022]

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ALEXANDER V. SPOUSES ESCALONA

G.R. No. 256141, [July 19, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Conjugal properties; Alienation after the effectivity of Family Code; Spouse' Written Consent

 

Any alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code  requires the other spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the transaction, otherwise, the disposition is void. 

Spouses Jorge and Hilaria Escalona were married on November 14, 1960, or during the effectivity of the Civil Code, owned two unregistered parcels of land. During the effectivity of the Family Code, one was transferred to their son Reygan, through the consent of Jorge. Reygan then sold both parcels to Belinda Alexander, claiming validity on the assertion that Jorge exclusively owned the lots. 

The Escalonas contested the sale, alleging Reygan's lack of authority and Hilaria's non-consent. Escalonas filed a complaint for annulment of documents against Belinda and Reygan in the RTC, which dismissed the complaint as time-barred and upheld the contracts. On appeal they argue that prescription do not apply in action to nullify void contracts.

 

Whether action to nullify the transaction has already prescribed. 

NO. Any alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code requires the other spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the transaction, otherwise, the disposition is void. The action to nullify the void alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse, is imprescriptible.

 

Whether the alienation the land is void under Article 124 of the Family Code because it was made without Hilaria's consent. 

YES. The Court declared the transaction void and held that the applicable law is Article 124 of the Family Code, not Article 173 of the Civil Code, because the alienation of the conjugal property transpired after the effectivity of the Family Code even if the spouses were married under the Civil Code. Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code. The absence of the written consent of one spouse renders the alienation void. Consequently, Spouses Escalona remained the lawful owners of the land. The Court likewise agrees with the findings that Belinda can hardly qualify as a buyer in good faith as she merely stepped into the shoes of Reygan whose rights were anchored on ineffective instruments.

Summary of the applicable laws and jurisprudence in transactions involving alienation or encumbrance of conjugal properties:

(1) The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the wife's consent, made before the effectivity of the Family Code, is not void but merely voidable. The wife may file an action for annulment of contract within 10 years from the transaction; and 

(2) The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse, made after the effectivity of the Family Code is void. 

 

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SPOUSES VELARDE V. HEIRS OF CANDARI [G.R. No. 190057, October 17, 2022]

 CASE DIGEST

SPOUSES VELARDE V. HEIRS OF CANDARI

G.R. No. 190057, [October 17, 2022]

SECOND DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Fraud; Quieting of Title; Accion Reivindicatoria 

Physical intrusion over the parcel of land is not a ground for quieting of title. An action that seeks to recover full possession of the properties as an element of their ownership, the action is deemed accion reivindicatoria.

 

The legal heirs of Isagani Velarde (petitioners) claimed ownership of parcels of land located in Aklan based on deeds of conveyances, including a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase executed by Concepcion Candari (Concepcion) in favor of Isagani. Concepcion later executed a Deed of Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights acknowledging Isagani's and the petitioners' ownership of the properties. After Isagani's death, Concepcion began asserting ownership and collected rents from the lands that clouds their title, prompting the heirs to file a complaint for quieting of title and damages. 

Concepcion denied the validity of the deeds, accused Isagani and the heirs of fraud, and asserted that she never sold or relinquished ownership of the properties. She claimed that Isagani was her lessee who held the tax declarations for safekeeping and payment of realty taxes. Whereas petitioner invoke the OCTs and TDs under their names, and argue that their legal title cannot be collaterally attacked in an action for quieting of title by unsupported allegations of fraud. 

 

Whether the action for quieting of title is proper. 

NO. Petitioners' complaint actually constitutes an accion reivindicatoria. Here, petitioners' cause of action is grounded upon their claims of ownership, which they argue to have been clouded by Concepcion's exercise of proprietary rights — instituting tenants and collecting rentals and products. What they perceive as clouds over their title were Concepcion's intrusive acts of dominion over the properties. Physical intrusion is not a ground for quieting of title. Ultimately, they seek to recover full possession of the properties as an element of their ownership, which was disturbed by Concepcion's physical intrusion. Thus, petitioners' claims and arguments clearly speak of an accion reivindicatoria — a suit to recover full possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. The true nature of the action is not determined by the caption of the pleading, but by the allegations it contain.

 

 

Whether the heirs of Isagani Velarde are the rightful owners of the disputed properties.

YES.  The Court held that the heirs of Isagani Velarde are the true and rightful owners entitled to the possession of the disputed properties. The Court rejected Concepcion's unfounded allegations of fraud, emphasizing that fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, which Concepcion failed to provide. The Court noted that the deeds of conveyances were duly executed and notarized, and Concepcion's claims lacked specificity and proof. Hence, as Isagani's heirs, petitioners are entitled to full ownership over the disputed properties.

 

 

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Bank of the Philippine Islands v. LCL Capital, Inc. [G.R. Nos. 243396 & 243409, September 14, 2021]

 CASE DIGEST

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. LCL Capital, Inc.

G.R. Nos. 243396 & 243409, [September 14, 2021]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Foreclosure; Redemption price; Interest

 

Section 78 of the General Banking Act governs redemption price computation in cases where the mortgagee is a bank, which states that redemption price should include the principal loan amount, the stipulated interest rate, and foreclosure expenses.

 

 

In 1997, LCL Capital obtained a loan from Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC) secured by a real estate mortgage on two condominium units, with a 17% annual interest. When LCL failed to repay the loan, BPI, which had absorbed FEBTC, foreclosed on the properties and acquired them at a public auction. LCL contested the foreclosure, claiming it was premature and filed a case. The later court ruled that the consolidation of ownership by BPI was void, ordering the restoration of LCL's certificates of title, subject to the right of redemption. 

The parties now in disarray as to the proper computation of redemption price, particularly the interest rate to be applied (17% stipulated by the mortgage vs. 6% imposed by the court), the inclusion of real estate taxes in the redemption price. 

 

What should be the correct calculation of the redemption price in cases where the mortgagee is a bank? 

The Supreme Court ruled that in cases involving banking institutions like BPI, the computation of the redemption price should be based on Section 78 of the General Banking Act, and not the Rules of Court. As part of the redemption price, said law is explicit that the principal obligation shall earn interest at the rate specified in the mortgage contract. Thus, the Court affirms the imposition of interest rate at 17% per annum which the parties specified in the contract of loan and the mortgage deed.

Therefore, the redemption price shall consists of the principal obligation (P3,000,000.00) with the stipulated 17% interest rate, including foreclosure expenses, but excluding real estate taxes. Such real estate taxes must be paid by the party having actual possession and should not be included in the redemption price. The case was remanded to the trial court for an accurate computation of the redemption price based on these principles.

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RAMA V. SPOUSES NOGRA [G.R. No. 219556, September 14, 2021]

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RAMA V. SPOUSES NOGRA

 G.R. No. 219556 [September 14, 2021]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Right of Redemption; 30-day written notice requirement 

The written notice of sale is mandatory. For the right of legal pre-emption or redemption to be exercised, written notice by the seller is indispensable for the 30-day redemption period to commence.

 

The case involves a disputed property, an undivided portion of Lot No. 6034-C-2-H-4, registered under the Heirs of Felix Rama. Ricardo Rama sold his one-fourth undivided share to Spouses Nogra in 2001, but other co-owners, including Hermelina Rama, claim they were not aware of this sale until 2007 when it was revealed during barangay conciliation proceedings. Ricardo admitted the sale, but the copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale was only given to Rama on September 26, 2007. Rama attempted to redeem the property, but her offer was rejected by Spouses Nogra claiming that the right to redeem had lapsed. 

Rama filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Redemption, and Other Reliefs in 2007 and consigned the redemption price on October 16, 2007, asserting that a written notice was essential for the redemption period to start under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.

 

Whether Hermelina validly exercised her redemption right by the filing of the complaint before the RTC on October 16, 2007.

 

YES. The 30-day written notice requirement under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code is mandatory for the commencement of the redemption period. The Court has upheld the principle that even if a co-owner has actual knowledge of the sale, the written notice is still indispensable. In this case, there is no evidence of sufficient knowledge of the sale before Hermelina's receipt of the Deed of Absolute Sale on September 26, 2007. Hermelina's exercise of her redemption right by filing the complaint on October 16, 2007, and consigning the redemption price on October 26, 2007, falls within the 30-day period under Article 1623.

 

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