Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc., G.R. No. 190517, [July 27, 2022]

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Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc.

 G.R. No. 190517, [July 27, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Execution of Judgments; Satisfaction by levy; Escrow Funds; Garnishment

 

It is through the service of the writ of garnishment that the trial court acquires jurisdiction to bind the third person or garnishee to compliance with all its orders and processes. Courts cannot require third parties to comply with all its orders and processes absent the service of a writ of garnishment. 

 

The RTC initially rendered a judgment against Traders Royal Bank and Security Bank, ordering them to pay damages and attorney's fees to Radio Philippines Network (RPN), Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), and Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The CA, however, absolved Security Bank from liability and held Traders Royal solely responsible for the damages. Traders Royal appealed to the SC (G.R. No. 138510). 

Subsequently, the broadcasters sought a writ of execution from the RTC, targeting Traders Royal's assets and an escrow fund in Metrobank was established as part of a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) with Bank of Commerce, approved by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). The RTC granted the writ, including the escrow fund. Metrobank, where the escrow fund was deposited, objected, arguing it was not a party to the case and questioned the RTC's jurisdiction over it.

 

Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to issue the writ of execution against the escrow fund. 

NO. The RTC cannot require Metrobank to comply with all its orders and processes absent the service of a writ of garnishment. The execution process for a money judgment entails the executing officer first demanding immediate payment from the judgment debtors in cash, certified bank check, or acceptable mode of payment. If payment cannot be made using these methods, judgment debtors can select which personal properties to levy upon. If they fail to exercise this right or cannot be located, they waive it, allowing the executing officer to levy personal properties, then real properties if necessary.

Garnishment is another method, allowing the seizing of credits owed to the judgment debtors by a third party. In this case, the RTC deviated from the prescribed process by directing enforcement against all assets of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) and the escrow fund, without first demanding payment. The proper procedure involves demanding payment from TRB first, then levying properties if payment cannot be made, followed by service of a writ of garnishment to bind third parties. Service of a writ of garnishment is necessary for the court to bind third parties like Metrobank. Therefore, the RTC should deny the request for subpoena and follow the correct execution procedure to ascertain the status of the escrow account.

 

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Heirs of Tejada v. Hay, G.R. No. 250542, [October 10, 2022]

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Heirs of Tejada v. Hay

 G.R. No. 250542, [October 10, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Amendment to Pleadings; Motion to Admit Amended Answer;

 

Bona fide amendments to pleadings are allowed at any stage of the proceedings. Thus, as a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality, the paramount consideration being that it does not appear that the motion for leave was with intent to delay the proceedings. 

 

Myrna L. Hay filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against petitioners, alleging that their father, Pio, sold the disputed parcel of land to her in 1997, supported by a Deed of Absolute Sale (DoAS). Petitioners countered, claiming that the deeds of sale were falsified as their father's signature was forged. They sought dismissal of Myrna's Complaint. Later, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave for an Amended Answer, clarifying their position and asserting compulsory counterclaims, including nullification of the deeds of sale and declaration of their ownership over the property. The RTC denied the motion, citing the case's progression through preliminary and pre-trial conference. Petitioners appealed to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari, contesting the denial, which the CA dismissed.

 

Whether or not the denial of the Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer was proper. 

NO. The RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion for Leave on the ground that the case had already gone through preliminary/pre-trial conference. Sections 1 and 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court permit amendments to pleadings to ensure the speedy determination of the actual merits of a controversy, without regard to technicalities. The only limitation is if the court finds that the motion to amend was made with intent to delay. In this case, the RTC and CA denied the Motion for Leave mainly because the case had progressed through preliminary and pretrial conferences. However, there was no indication that the motion was filed with intent to delay. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored to aid in deciding cases on their merits and avoiding multiple lawsuits. The admission of the Amended Answer was warranted as it contained crucial allegations necessary for the proper resolution of the case. Therefore, the RTC had no valid reason to deny the motion for leave

 

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Sugar Regulatory Administration v. Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc., G.R. No. 253821, [March 6, 2023]

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Sugar Regulatory Administration v. Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc.

 G.R. No. 253821, [March 6, 2023]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Petition for Certiorari; Pure Questions of Law; Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.

 

The following entail pure questions of law—jurisdiction of an administrative agency; whether a litigant is a real party-in-interest; and whether a statute or administrative regulation repealed another. 

The Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) issued Sugar Orders that allocated Class "D" world market sugar to accredited Class "F" ethanol producers. Central Azucarera, questioning the legality of these orders, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). After the parties agreed that there were no factual issues, Central Azucarera moved for summary judgment. The RTC ruled in favor of Central Azucarera, declaring the Sugar Orders null and void, stating that ethanol manufacturers fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy (DOE), not the SRA. The SRA appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but Central Azucarera argued for dismissal, claiming that the appeal raised purely legal issues and should have been directly filed with the Supreme Court. The CA agreed and dismissed the appeal, noting that the controversy involved purely legal questions and thus should have been addressed through a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

 

Whether or not the controversy in the case at bar is purely legal and the SRA should have directly filed an appeal with the SC. 

YES. The SRA raised pure questions of law in its appeal. Thus, it availed of the wrong mode of appeal. The Rules of Court outline three modes of appeal from Regional Trial Court (RTC) decisions: ordinary appeal, petition for review, and appeal by certiorari. Each mode corresponds to specific circumstances and allows for different types of questions to be raised. A question of law pertains to doubts about applicable laws or jurisprudence, without requiring an assessment of evidence's probative value, while a question of fact involves disputes over the truth of alleged facts.

In this case, the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) raised pure questions of law in its appeal regarding the validity and interpretation of its orders. The issues raised, including the real party-in-interest status and mootness of the case, are questions of law and do not necessitate an examination of factual evidence. Therefore, the Court of Appeals (CA) correctly dismissed the appeal, as the proper mode of review should have been a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.

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Puregold Price Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 244374 (Resolution), [February 15, 2022]

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Puregold Price Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 244374 (Resolution), [February 15, 2022]

FIRST, LOPEZ, M.V 

Certiorari; 60-day period in Petition for Certiorari (rule 65); Notice

 

When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon such counsel. Notice to the client or to any other lawyer other than the counsel of record, is not notice in law. 

 

Puregold Price Club, Inc. (PPCI) hired Renato M. Cruz, Jr. as a probationary store head, later appointing him as a store officer/manager at Puregold Extra. Renato filed an illegal dismissal case against Puregold Extra and its officers. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Renato's favor due to the respondents' absence, prompting PPCI to seek annulment of the decision, alleging improper joinder and lack of summons. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) remanded the case to the LA, but Renato's subsequent appeal was denied. He then petitioned for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that his filing was timely filed on March 13, 2017. Meanwhile, the LA found that PPCI dismissed Renato for just cause, a decision upheld by the NLRC. While Renato's CA petition was granted, PPCI contends it was filed beyond the 60-day period. PPCI argues that Renato's counsel received the NLRC Resolution on December 29, 2016, requiring a petition by February 27, 2017 to avail a petition for certiorari. 

 

Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to Renato's petition despite being filed out of time. 

YES. The CA erred in giving due course to Renato's petition for certiorari for being filed out of time. The court emphasized the strict filing deadline of sixty (60) days for petitions for certiorari from the notice of judgment or denial of a motion for reconsideration. Renato argued that the period commenced on January 12, 2017, when he purportedly received the NLRC resolution. However, the court ruled that the period began on December 29, 2016, the date Renato's counsel received the resolution, per Rule III of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon such counsel. Hence, it was on December 29, 2016 when the notice was received by Renato’s counsel that the 60-day reglementary period starts to accrue.

Consequently, the March 13,2027 petition should have been dismissed for being time-barred. Court of Appeals should have dismissed it outright.

 

 

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Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 247787, [March 2, 2021]

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Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 247787, [March 2, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V 

Immutability of Final Judgment; Petition for Review; Remedy against COA Decisions;Legal Standing; real party in interest

 

The term "aggrieved party" presupposes that the movant or appellant is a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the assailed decision, order, or ruling. The question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

 

The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) granted salary increases to its senior officers totaling P17 million, which the supervising auditor initially disallowed for lack of prior approval from the Office of the President. However, the DBP cited a memorandum from former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approving the compensation plan from 1999 onwards, leading the Commission on Audit (COA) to lift the disallowance. Subsequently, Pagaragan, the Vice President/Officer-In-Charge of DBP's Program Evaluation Department submitted confidential letters to the COA arguing that President Arroyo's approval, made within 45 days before the May 10, 2010 elections, was void under Section 261(g)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code. Treating these letters as a motion for reconsideration, the COA reopened the case and reversed its decision, prompting DBP to seek reconsideration, which was partly granted. While sustaining the disallowance, the COA exempted the approving officers and the recipients from liability based on the presumption of good faith. 

 

Whether or not Pagaragan is a real party in interest.

NO. Pagaragan is not a real party in interest or an aggrieved party who is entitled to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. The question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Pagaragan questions the validity of former President Arroyo's approval of the DBP's compensation plan but failed to establish that he has the requisite personal and substantial interest. Pagaragan did not sustain any direct injury or is in danger of suffering any damages from the assailed salary increases. To be sure, the allowance or disallowance of the salary increases will not affect Pagaragan. Verily, Pagaragan was not a party to the original proceedings and merely came into the picture when the COA lifted the notice of disallowance.

 

Whether or not the COA Decision is already final and executory.

YES. The COA's Decision dated February 1, 2012 is already final and executory absent a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal. The COA Rules of Procedure is explicit that the Commission's Decision or Resolution shall become final and executory after 30 days from notice unless a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Supreme Court is filed.

Here, the COA lifted the notice of disallowance on February 1, 2012. The DBP received a copy of the COA's Decision on February 6 and it has 30 days or until March 7 to move for a reconsideration or file a petition to the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Pagaragan's letters which the COA treated as a motion for reconsideration was filed only on March 27 or beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Hence, the COA has no more jurisdiction to entertain Pagaragan's letters. Taken together, the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing a final and executory judgment and reopening a settled account beyond the legal period. Nothing is more settled that a definitive final judgment is no longer subject to change or revision.

 

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Thomas v. Trono, G.R. No. 241032 (Resolution), [March 15, 2021]

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Thomas v. Trono

G.R. No. 241032 (Resolution), [March 15, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Annulment of Judgment; Due Process; Finality of Judgment

 

A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. There is no need for any judicial declaration or performance of an act before the finality takes effect. Finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected, or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed.

  

The case revolves around the dismissal of Charnnel Shane Thomas's petition for annulment of judgment, which challenges the validity of her father's marriage to her mother, Rachel Trono. After Earl Alphonso Thomas's marriage to Rachel was declared void due to bigamy, Alphonso later married Jocelyn C. Ledres, Charnnel's mother. Following Alphonso's death, Jocelyn requested documents from the RTC to settle his affairs, leading to the discovery that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was not furnished with a copy of the 1997 Decision declaring Alphonso's marriage to Rachel as void. The RTC, upon the OSG's motion for reconsideration, reversed its decision, declaring Alphonso's marriage to Rachel as valid. 

Charnnel filed a petition for annulment of judgment, alleging denial of due process, which the Court of Appeals dismissed, citing the RTC's retained jurisdiction due to the failure to furnish the OSG with the decision. Charnnel argues lack of due process as she was not allowed to participate in the reconsideration proceedings, while the OSG contends that due process was observed as Jocelyn filed a manifestation and special appearance. 

 

Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment was proper. 

NO. The dismissal was improper. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction, or through extrinsic fraud. However, jurisprudence recognizes a third ground – denial of due process of law.

Here, Charnnel, as an heir of Alphonso, is vested with the legal standing to assail the marriage of Alphonso and Rachel by seeking the annulment of the RTC's Order dated June 28, 2011.Charnnel was neither made a party to the proceedings nor was she duly notified of the case. Also, she was a minor at the time the RTC granted the OSG's motion.

Anent, the jurisdiction of the RTC to rule on the OSG's motion for reconsideration, the CA overlooked the fact that the OSG's motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed. Considering that the OSG received a copy of the 1997 Decision on March 8, 2011, it had until March 23 to file its motion for reconsideration. However, the motion was filed only on March 28, beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, the 1997 Decision became final.

 

 

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City Government of Tacloban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 221554 (Resolution), [February 3, 2021]

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City Government of Tacloban v. Court of Appeals

 G.R. No. 221554 (Resolution), [February 3, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Civil Procedure; Doctrine of Res Judicata; Compromise Agreement; Wit of Execution 

One and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. Case law explained that if there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If, as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.

 

The case involves Spouses Sacramento's land in Tacloban City, subject to an eminent domain complaint by the City Government. A Compromise Agreement between the parties was initially ratified but later withdrawn by the City Council. Spouses Sacramento sought enforcement, leading to conflicting court decisions. The RTC eventually granted their motion, issuing a Writ of Execution, which is upheld by the CA. When the RTC ordered the enforcement without an alias writ, the City Government appealed again, but the CA dismissed the petition citing res judicata. 

 

Whether or not it was proper for the CA to dismiss the petition applying the principle of res judicata. 

YES. The CA correctly applied the principle of res judicata in dismissing the petition for certiorari. It bears emphasis that a compromise agreement is in the nature of both a contract and a judgment on the merits. Spouses Sacramento and the City Government of Tacloban freely and voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement. The terms and conditions of the agreement are likewise clear. Moreover, the RTC approved the agreement and the Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified it. As such, the City Government of Tacloban cannot, later, relieve itself of liability simply because the city council changed its position. Thus, the CA correctly applied the principle of res judicata in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

Case law explained that if there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If, as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.

Here, as opposed to the CA's conclusion, all the requisites of res judicata under the concept of "bar by prior judgment" and not "conclusiveness of judgment" are present. The two cases involve similar causes of action. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical, is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.

The fact that two cases involve different RTC resolutions does not prevent the application of res judicata. Suffice it to say that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.

 

 

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Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. v. TIG Insurance Co., G.R. No. 256177, [June 27, 2022]

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Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. v. TIG Insurance Co.

 G.R. No. 256177, [June 27, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Civil Procedure; Verification and Non-forum shopping; ADR Rules 

The enforcement of a foreign arbitral award will not be refused on the grounds of public policy unless the award violates fundamental principles of justice and morality or is blatantly injurious to public interests. Additionally, failure to attach a secretary's certificate or special power of attorney authorizing the person who signed the verification and certification against forum shopping does not invalidate a petition filed under the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution.

 

Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation (Pioneer), a domestic corporation, entered into an agreement with Clearwater Insurance Company (Clearwater), a foreign entity, regarding reinsurance contracts. Clearwater filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City to confirm, recognize, and enforce an arbitral award issued in its favor. The arbitral award stemmed from Pioneer's failure to pay Clearwater certain outstanding amounts, leading Clearwater to initiate arbitration proceedings in New York. The arbitral panel awarded Clearwater a substantial sum, which Pioneer failed to pay despite receiving the final award.

 

Whether or not the Philippine courts should confirm, recognize, and enforce the arbitral award in favor of Clearwater despite Pioneer's objections regarding procedural irregularities, prescription of claims, and violation of public policy.

 

YES. The Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and confirmed, recognized, and enforced the arbitral award in favor of Clearwater. It found that Clearwater's petition complied with the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) regarding verification and certification against forum shopping, and failure to attach a secretary's certificate did not invalidate the petition. The Court also dismissed Pioneer's arguments regarding prescription of claims, noting that Pioneer failed to prove the illegality or immorality of the arbitral award. Enforcement of the award was deemed not contrary to public policy, as it did not violate fundamental principles of justice and morality or injure public interests. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts and upheld the enforcement of the arbitral award in favor of Clearwater.

 

 

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Republic v. Salinas, G.R. No. 238308 (Resolutions), [October 12, 2022]

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Republic v. Salinas

 G.R. No. 238308 (Resolutions), [October 12, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Notice of Appeal; Filing of Pleading 

The filing date of a pleading submitted to the court through registered mail is proved by the post office-stamped date appearing on the envelope of the pleading or that stated in the registry receipt.

  

A Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by respondent Teresita I. Salinas was granted by the RTC. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) but was denied in an Order which it received on August 4, 2015. It, thus, had until August 19, 2015 to file an appeal. However, the RTC received a Notice of Appeal via registered mail, contained in an envelope rubber stamped with the date "October 5, 2015," which it found to be imprinted by the postmaster. Thus, the RTC denied the Republic's Notice of Appeal for being filed late. 

The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the Notice of Appeal for being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The CA considered the OSG Inner Registered Sack Bill akin to a registry receipt. However, the CA observed that the Republic failed to present an affidavit of the person who purportedly mailed the Notice of Appeal as required under Section 12, Rule 13 of the Rules. 

 

Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it denied the Republic's Notice of Appeal for being filed late. 

NO. No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the RTC in considering the date stamped on the envelope of the Republic's Notice of Appeal, which was October 5, 2015, as the date of the pleading's filing.

The pleading's filing date can be proved either by:

2.1. the post stamp on the envelope, which is considered part of the records; or

2.2. the registry receipt 

Contrary to the CA's ruling, the photocopy of the OSG Inner Registered Sack Bill cannot be equated to a registry receipt nor given probative value. Unlike a registry receipt, the OSG's Inner Registered Sack Bill was not issued or signed by the postmaster or any authorized receiving personnel of the concerned post office; hence, unverified to be authentic.

In addition, the Republic could have conveniently presented the registry receipt corresponding to its Notice of Appeal, which would have constituted the best evidence of its claim that it filed its Notice of Appeal on August 18, 2015, even if a different date appears on the envelope. Unfortunately, the Republic failed to present such original receipt nor has it offered any explanation for its failure to do so, which only leads to a conclusion that such evidence would operate to its prejudice and support the case of the adversary.

 

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Cacdac v. Mercado, G.R. No. 242731, [June 14, 2021]

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Cacdac v. Mercado

 G.R. No. 242731, [June 14, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Civil Liability despite Acquittal; Demurrer to Evidence without Leave of Court; Estafa 

When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court and is granted, the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence on both the criminal and civil aspects. In such cases, the trial court is called upon to decide the entire case based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. The required quantum of proof, preponderance of evidence, to establish civil liability, even when the criminal action is dismissed. 

On December 8, 2004, Roberto Mercado, a gasoline station owner, delivered 10,000 liters of diesel fuel worth P235,000.00 to Byron Express Bus Company through its clerk, Jaivi Mar Juson. Juson executed a trust receipt, committing to remit the proceeds on December 15, 2004. However, Juson failed to fulfill this obligation, prompting Mercado to file an estafa complaint against Juson and Byron Cacdac, the alleged owner of Byron Express. Mercado claimed that Cacdac ordered the fuel, while Juson received the delivery. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) instituted criminal charges against Cacdac and Juson under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. At the trial, Mercado testified that Cacdac owned Byron Express but did not present supporting evidence. Cacdac, through a demurrer to evidence, argued that he was not criminally and civilly liable. The RTC dismissed the criminal case against Cacdac but held him civilly liable for P235,000.00. Dissatisfied, Cacdac moved for reconsideration, and the RTC clarified that his civil liability was only civil in nature. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's findings with a modification in the interest computation.

 

Whether or not Byron Cacdac's civil liability was validly adjudged despite his demurrer to evidence and acquittal in the criminal aspect. 

NO. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the CA's decision. It ruled that Cacdac's civil liability was not validly adjudged. The Court held that the trial court properly decided the civil aspect of the case as Cacdac filed a demurrer without leave of court. However, the evidence did not preponderantly establish Cacdac's civil liability. There was no conclusive proof that Cacdac ordered the diesel fuel or that Juson acted as his agent. The trust receipt agreement and demand letter implicated only Juson and Byron Express. The burden of proof rested on Mercado, and without adequate evidence, Cacdac could not be held liable for corporate obligations. The Court emphasized the need for preponderant evidence to establish civil liability, and since it was lacking, Cacdac's civil liability was deleted.

 

 

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