MARIA LINA P. QUIRIT-FIGARIDO v. EDWIN L. FIGARIDO [G.R. No. 259520, November 5, 2024 ]

 CASE DIGEST

MARIA LINA P. QUIRIT-FIGARIDO v. EDWIN L. FIGARIDO

[G.R. No. 259520, November 5, 2024] 

En Banc, Rosario, J.

 

DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF A BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE; LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE; A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC, SEC. 2(a); AGGRIEVED OR INJURED INNOCENT SPOUSE; CLEAN HANDS

 

Only the aggrieved or injured innocent spouse of either marriage may petition for the declaration of nullity of a subsequent bigamous marriage. The erring spouse who knowingly contracted the bigamous marriage is not an aggrieved or injured spouse and therefore has no legal personality to file the petition. Neither does the dissolution of the prior marriage by a divorce decree obtained by the innocent spouse transfer that personality to the erring spouse. The State has no absolute obligation to dissolve every bigamous marriage; the purpose of the rules is to preserve marriage, not to furnish the guilty spouses in a bigamous union a convenient means of dissolving it.

 

Maria Lina P. Quirit-Figarido was married to Ho Kar Wai, a Chinese national, on December 13, 1989 in Tsim Sha Tsui, Hong Kong, and again on August 23, 1994 before a judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City. 

In June 2000, while working as a bank teller in Hong Kong, Maria Lina met Edwin L. Figarido, an expatriate engineer and a regular client of the bank. Edwin courted her from 2002. Maria Lina at first declined because of her subsisting marriage, but Edwin, with knowledge of her marital situation, promised to wait. She nevertheless entered into a relationship with him while still lawfully married to Ho Kar Wai. 

Maria Lina resigned from her work in Hong Kong and returned to the Philippines because she became pregnant by Edwin. On February 22, 2003, while her marriage to Ho Kar Wai was still subsisting, Maria Lina and Edwin were married in Quezon City. They had two children, born in 2004 and 2007. 

On November 28, 2007 — four years after the second marriage — Ho Kar Wai obtained a Certificate of Making Decree Nisi Absolute from the District Court of Hong Kong, dissolving his marriage with Maria Lina. Maria Lina petitioned for recognition of that foreign judgment, which the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260, granted on February 5, 2009. 

Maria Lina and Edwin separated in 2014. On March 6, 2017 — fourteen years after the bigamous marriage was celebrated — Maria Lina filed before the family court a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, praying that it be declared void ab initio for being bigamous and that she be declared to have the legal capacity to remarry. Edwin, then working in Singapore, was served by publication and never appeared. 

The trial court denied the petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Office of the Solicitor General maintained before the Supreme Court that Maria Lina had no personality to file the case because she was not the spouse aggrieved or injured by the bigamous marriage.

 

 

ISSUE 1: Does Maria Lina, the spouse who knowingly contracted the subsequent bigamous marriage, have the legal personality under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of that marriage?

ANSWER: NO. Article 35(4) of the Family Code declares bigamous and polygamous marriages void from the beginning. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage “may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.” 

The Rationale of the Rules elucidates that provision: “Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.” The Court applied this in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, holding that the prior spouse is the aggrieved party, since the bigamous marriage threatens the financial and property aspects of the prior marriage and, above all, causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. 

In Fujiki v. Marinay, the Court clarified that the husband and the wife contemplated in Section 2(a) refer to the spouses of the prior subsisting marriage, because under Article 35(4) the parties to a bigamous marriage “are neither the husband nor the wife under the law.” 

Applying these rules, Maria Lina married Edwin in 2003 while her marriage to Ho Kar Wai subsisted. She is therefore guilty of contracting a bigamous marriage, cannot be deemed an aggrieved or injured innocent spouse of either marriage, and lacks the personality to petition for the nullification of her subsequent marriage. 

To hold otherwise would produce a legal absurdity: the party who contracted the illicit subsequent marriage would be permitted to invoke its bigamous nature in support of a petition to nullify it, empowering the offending spouse to dissolve the marriage at will. Bigamy would then be treated by the erring spouse not as a transgression warranting redress but as a matter of convenience.

 

 

ISSUE 2: Did the divorce decree obtained by Ho Kar Wai, which extinguished his own standing as the injured spouse, transfer to Maria Lina the personality to file the petition?

ANSWER: NO. Ho Kar Wai, as the injured spouse in the prior subsisting marriage, had the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Maria Lina and Edwin. After he secured the divorce decree, however, his marital relations with Maria Lina legally ceased; there being no longer a prior subsisting marriage, he lost his status as aggrieved spouse and can no longer file the petition. 

But the loss of Ho Kar Wai's standing did not render Maria Lina eligible to file it. The divorce decree “in no way resulted in the assignment of the right to petition the declaration of the bigamous marriage to Maria Lina.” 

There is neither legal nor factual basis to hold that the absence of persons capacitated to file the petition, or their disqualification because of supervening events, automatically confers upon other concerned parties the right to bring the action.

 

 

ISSUE 3: Is the State under an absolute obligation to dissolve a bigamous marriage regardless of the circumstances of the case and the acts of the parties?

ANSWER: NO. Maria Lina anchored her arguments on the erroneous presumption that the State is burdened with the obligation to declare bigamous marriages null and void. The Court held that the State does not have an absolute responsibility to dissolve bigamous marriages irrespective of the circumstances of the case and the acts and omissions of the parties involved. 

The intention behind the rules and jurisprudence is to preserve marriage, not to provide the guilty spouses in a bigamous marriage a convenient means to dissolve their illegitimate union. The Rationale explicitly declares that the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 

Maria Lina correctly observed that there is no longer a legitimate marriage to protect, the prior marriage having been dissolved by divorce. She failed to realise, however, that in the absence of such a legal union as an object of protection, there exists no compelling reason for the State to dissolve her illegitimate marriage with Edwin. 

The Court also noted that Maria Lina appears to have benefited from the second union — she had two children with Edwin, and filed the petition only in 2017, fourteen years after the bigamous marriage was contracted.

 

 

ISSUE 4: For purposes other than remarriage, is a judicial declaration of nullity of the bigamous marriage indispensable before its nullity may be invoked?

ANSWER: NO. Granting that a marriage is void ab initio for being bigamous, it must still be judicially declared void in order that the parties-in-interest may avail of the right to remarry. Such legal capacity to remarry is the only benefit solely ensuing from the rectification of civil status through a declaration of nullity. 

For all other legal intents and purposes, a bigamous marriage is void and its absolute nullity may be invoked by any concerned person. As settled, “for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.” For other purposes — the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of the property regime, or a criminal case — the court may pass upon the validity of the marriage even after the death of the parties, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question it, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage that is void ab initio subsists only for purposes of remarriage. It thus became apparent that the ultimate objective of Maria Lina's petition was to attain the capacity to remarry.

 

 

ISSUE 5: May the Court exercise its equity jurisdiction to relieve Maria Lina of her resulting inability to remarry?

ANSWER: NO. Maria Lina implored the Court to exercise its equity jurisdiction, arguing that no one else could legally file the petition — Ho Kar Wai having been granted a divorce, and Edwin having been aware of the bigamous nature of their marriage. 

The Court declined, applying Alcantara v. Alcantara, where it refused to extricate an erring husband from a void marriage he had himself willfully contracted. Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, a party cannot benefit from his own act and “be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle.” 

Under the current rules and jurisprudence, there exists no legal recourse for Maria Lina to redress her inability to remarry, which she inflicted on herself to begin with.

 

 

ISSUE 6: Does the denial of the petition have the effect of legalising the bigamous marriage?

ANSWER: NO. The Court addressed this directly. The denial of Maria Lina's petition is not a refusal to declare her bigamous marriage void, but a repudiation of her legal personality to file the petition. It is not tantamount to legalising bigamous marriages, considering that erring and offending parties may still be held civilly and criminally liable for bigamy. 

Other legal incidents related to the nullity of the marriage — the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, and dissolution of the property regime, among others — may still proceed independently and in the absence of a declaration as to the invalidity of the bigamous union. 

As to Maria Lina's claim that no one would be hurt, the Court found it bereft of merit. Allowing the offending spouse to file the petition, even when that spouse intentionally caused the illegitimacy and benefited from its convenience for a considerable length of time, would inevitably bastardise the institution of marriage to the prejudice of the State.

 

DISPOSITION. The Petition for Review on Certiorari was DENIED, and the Decision dated June 21, 2021 and the Resolution dated November 16, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 114777 were AFFIRMED. The Decision was rendered by the Court En Banc, with separate concurring opinions by Chief Justice Gesmundo, Justice Caguioa and Justice Singh, and with Senior Associate Justice Leonen and Justices Lazaro-Javier and Zalameda dissenting.



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Tan-Andal v. Andal | Psychological Incapacity [Bar Exam Study Notes]

Bar Study Note · Civil Law · Family Code, Article 36

Tan-Andal v. Andal

G.R. No. 196359 · May 11, 2021 · En Banc · Leonen, J.

THE HOLDING IN ONE LINE. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 is a legal concept, not a medical one. It need not be a mental disorder, it need not be proved by a psychiatrist or psychologist, and it is “incurable” only in the legal sense. What must be proved, by clear and convincing evidence, is an enduring personality structure that makes a spouse unable to understand and comply with the essential marital obligations.

How the doctrine moved

Three cases, twenty-six years. The third one undid part of the second.

1995

Santos v. CA

First defined psychological incapacity as a mental (not physical) incapacity, confined to the “most serious cases of personality disorders.” Adopted the three criteria: gravity, juridical antecedence, incurability.

1997

Republic v. Molina

Laid down eight guidelines. The second required the root cause to be medically or clinically identified and proven by experts. In practice this made Article 36 nearly impossible to invoke without a psychiatric diagnosis.

2021 · Controlling

Tan-Andal v. Andal

En Banc categorically abandons the second Molina guideline and amends the third. Expert opinion is no longer required. Incurability is legal, not medical. The standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.

The requisites as they now stand

1.Juridical antecedence

RETAINED — it is an explicit requirement of the law. Article 36 says the incapacity must exist “at the time of the celebration” of the marriage, even if it becomes manifest only afterwards. Proof may consist of testimony describing the environment the spouse grew up in, or past experiences that produced the behaviour. This is what separates Article 36 from divorce, which severs a marriage for causes arising after the wedding.

2.Gravity

RETAINED BUT REFRAMED — not in the sense that the incapacity must be a serious or dangerous illness, but to exclude “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts.” It cannot be mere “refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.” It must be caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

3.Incurability — in the legal sense

AMENDED — the incapacity is incurable not in the medical but in the legal sense. It means the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner that the couple's personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

4.Clear and convincing evidence

THE STANDARD OF PROOF — more than preponderance of evidence, less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is the quantum required to overcome the presumption in favour of the validity of marriage. Note that this is higher than the ordinary civil standard.

What happened to the Molina guidelines

Guideline	Status	What Tan-Andal did
2nd — root cause medically or clinically identified and proven by experts	Abandoned	“This Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline.” Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. Ordinary witnesses who knew the spouse before the marriage may testify to behaviours they consistently observed; the judge decides.
3rd — incurability	Amended	Incurable in the legal, not the medical sense. Justice M. Lopez's concurrence supplied the clinching argument: if it were truly incurable, the law could not allow the spouse to remarry.
1st — burden of proof on the plaintiff	Retained	Now expressly quantified as clear and convincing evidence.
Juridical antecedence and gravity	Retained	Retained, but redefined as above — behavioural and legal, not clinical.

Quotes worth memorising

To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion is not required. Leonen, J., for the Court En Banc

There must be proof… of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family… Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. On abandoning the second Molina guideline

A psychologically incapacitated person need not be shamed and pathologized for what could have been a simple mistake in one's choice of intimate partner, a mistake too easy to make as when one sees through rose-colored glasses. The dignity rationale — quotable in any essay on Article 36

The case itself

Facts. Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married in December 1995. Mario was a drug user; he was often absent, financially unreliable, and behaved erratically. Rosanna eventually separated from him and petitioned for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Dr. Valentina Garcia, a psychiatrist, testified that Mario suffered from a narcissistic antisocial personality disorder that was grave, juridically antecedent and incurable — an opinion formed without interviewing Mario himself.

Trial court. Declared the marriage void ab initio, awarded custody of the child to Rosanna, and declared her the sole owner of the Parañaque property.

Court of Appeals. Reversed. It discounted Dr. Garcia's opinion wholesale as “unscientific and unreliable” because she never examined Mario, and held the marriage valid and subsisting.

Supreme Court. Petition GRANTED. The Court of Appeals decision was reversed and set aside and the trial court's decision reinstated. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in discarding the expert opinion — expert witnesses do not testify from personal knowledge but from special knowledge, skill, experience or training. In any event, expert opinion is no longer required; it was considered here only because it had been offered in evidence.

How this gets asked in the Bar

The clean question. “A files a petition under Article 36 but presents no psychologist or psychiatrist, offering only the testimony of A's sibling and a childhood friend of B. The OSG moves to dismiss for failure to prove the root cause through expert evidence. Rule.” → Deny the motion. Tan-Andal abandoned the second Molina guideline; ordinary witnesses who knew the spouse before the marriage may testify to consistently observed behaviours, and from there the judge decides.

Trap 1 — “so Tan-Andal made it easy.” It did not. The Court raised the standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence, above the ordinary civil standard of preponderance. What was relaxed is the kind of evidence, not the quantum.

Trap 2 — “expert testimony is now inadmissible.” Wrong. It is no longer required. If offered, it is still received and weighed — exactly what the Court did with Dr. Garcia's opinion.

Trap 3 — treating Article 36 as divorce. Juridical antecedence survives. The incapacity must have existed at the celebration of the marriage. A cause that developed after the wedding is not psychological incapacity — that distinction is the whole reason antecedence was retained.

Trap 4 — reciting all eight Molina guidelines as still controlling. The second is abandoned and the third amended. An answer that recites Molina wholesale is answering a 1997 question in a 2026 exam.

Read with this one. Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) — the original definition. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) — the eight guidelines. Tortona v. Gregorio — the standards for admitting expert opinion, applied in Tan-Andal. Note also the separate concurring opinions, especially Justice M. Lopez on why “incurable” cannot have been meant medically.

Disclaimer. This note is for general information and educational purposes only. It is not legal advice and does not create a lawyer-client relationship. Always read the decision in full before relying on it.

BIGAMY DOCTRINE TIMELINE [1935–2026]: When a Void Marriage Became a Defense Again

Doctrinal Timeline · Article 349, Revised Penal Code

Bigamy Doctrine, 1935–2026

Ninety-one years of Supreme Court rulings on bigamy — a doctrine that reversed itself four times before Pulido v. People settled it in 2021, and what controls today.

48 rulings traced 4 reversals 1935 → 2026

A void marriage may be raised as a defense without a court decree A judicial declaration of nullity is required before the second marriage

FIG. 1 — Position of the Court on whether an accused may attack the validity of the prior marriage in the bigamy case itself. Four reversals: 1970, 1977, 1986 and 2021.

The controlling doctrine

Where the law stands today

Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021, En Banc, stands unmodified and was applied by the Court as recently as 26 February 2026. A marriage void ab initio is a valid defense in bigamy even without a judicial declaration of nullity, whenever obtained.

✓

First marriage void ab initio — no licence, no ceremony, no authority of the solemnizing officer, Art. 36, incest. A valid defense, with or without a decree, obtained at any time, including during trial. Element (1) fails.Pulido (2021) · Lapira (2026)

✓

No prior suit for nullity is needed. Nullity may be proved by testimonial or documentary evidence in the criminal case itself — a collateral attack.Pulido · Niñal v. Bayadog

✓

Second marriage void ab initio for a reason other than being bigamous. A valid defense — element (3) fails, there being no second marriage to speak of.Pulido

×

Second marriage void because bigamous. Not a defense. On this narrow point the result in Tenebro survives.Pulido

×

Either marriage merely voidable (Art. 45). Not a defense; an annulment decree does not retroact for penal purposes.Pulido

✓

Marriages celebrated before the Family Code. Same rule — no distinction any more between Civil Code and Family Code marriages.Pulido

✓

Article 40 vis-à-vis Article 349. Article 40 governs remarriage only; it did not amend Article 349.Pulido

×

Pending petition for declaration of nullity. Not a prejudicial question. The criminal case proceeds and the trial court itself resolves validity.Natividad-Florentino (2025) · Marbella-Bobis survives on this point

•

Absent spouse. A judicial declaration of presumptive death under Art. 41 remains indispensable — the first marriage there is valid, not void, so Pulido does not reach it.Manuel v. People (2005)

•

Divorce obtained abroad. Must be pleaded and proved — the decree plus the foreign law. Art. 26(2) applies whether the alien or the Filipino spouse obtained it.Sarto (2018) · Republic v. Manalo (2018)

✓

Proving the first marriage. The marriage certificate is only prima facie. A civil registrar's certification of no licence or no application, unrebutted, creates reasonable doubt.Cariaga · Genio · Lapira — displacing Vitangcol's stricter treatment

•

Prescription. Fifteen years from actual discovery by the offended party or the authorities — not from registration.Sermonia (1994) · Bonbon (2025)

×

Fallback offense. Article 350, RPC — contracting marriage knowing the legal requirements were not met or in disregard of a legal impediment.Pulido; applied in Genio (2024)

•

Who may sue to void a bigamous marriage. The injured spouse of either marriage — not the spouse who knowingly contracted it.Quirit-Figarido (2024, En Banc)

ELEMENTS OF BIGAMY (Capili v. People, 713 Phil. 256, 262 [2013]): (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he or she contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid but for the existence of the first.

1935 – 1988 Phase 1 · Civil Code era A pendulum, but no decree required. Five swings in fifty years — and a civil action attacking the second marriage could even halt the criminal case.

1935

People v. Mora Dumpo

62 Phil. 246

The accused was allowed to prove, in the criminal case itself, that the second marriage was void. Acquittal.

Defense allowedVoid marriage

1954 · 1955 · 1957

People v. Mendoza · People v. Lara · People v. Aragon

95 Phil. 845 · 51 O.G. 4079 (14 Feb. 1955) · 100 Phil. 1033

No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void prior marriage as a defense in bigamy — as distinguished from merely annullable marriages. The rule Pulido would return to sixty-seven years later.

Defense allowedVoid marriage

1960 · 1962

Merced v. Diez · Zapanta v. Montesa

109 Phil. 155 · 114 Phil. 428

“[D]etermination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy.”

An action to annul the second marriage was recognised as a prejudicial question; in Zapanta the bigamy proceedings were suspended outright.

Case suspendedPrejudicial question

1968 · 1988

Landicho v. Relova · Donato v. Luna

130 Phil. 745 · 243 Phil. 584

Narrows Zapanta: it must be the accused's own consent that was vitiated. Parties may not judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage — the sentence the Family Code drafters would later quote when writing Article 40.

NarrowedPrejudicial question

1970 · 1971

Gomez v. Lipana · Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS

144 Phil. 514 · 147 Phil. 269

First deviation: a judicial declaration of nullity is necessary even for a second marriage presumed void because contracted during a subsisting first.

Decree requiredVoid marriage

1975

De la Cruz v. Judge Ejercito

160-A Phil. 669

Bigamy case dismissed as “moot and untenable” once the annulment of the second marriage became final.

Case dismissedPrejudicial question

1977 · 1983

Odayat v. Amante · Tolentino v. Paras

168 Phil. 1 · 207 Phil. 458

The Court reverts to Mendoza and Aragon.

Defense allowedVoid marriage

1986

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy · Yap v. Court of Appeals

227 Phil. 457 · 229 Phil. 251

In the same year the Court held both ways: Wiegel required a declaration of nullity before entering another marriage; Yap held otherwise. Wiegel is the rule the Family Code would codify two years later.

Decree required… then not

1988 – 2018 Phase 2 · Article 40 migrates into the penal law The Family Code took effect 3 August 1988. Article 40 — “[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” — was read into Article 349, and for twenty-one years the only recognised defense was a decree obtained before the second marriage.

1993 · 1995

Domingo v. Court of Appeals · Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.

297 Phil. 642 · 312 Phil. 939

Article 40 codifies Landicho: parties “should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact.” Atienza then holds Article 40 procedural, and therefore retroactive under Article 256, “insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights” — the hinge on which pre-1988 marriages were pulled into the new regime.

Decree requiredRetroactivity

1994

Sermonia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 109454, 14 June 1994

“The prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.”

Registration of the second marriage is not constructive notice — bigamous marriages are contracted in secret, and the property-law doctrine does not transfer. Still controlling.

PrescriptionStill controlling

1997 – 2001

Apiag v. Cantero · Ty v. CA · Niñal v. Bayadog · Cariño v. Cariño

335 Phil. 511 · 399 Phil. 647 · 384 Phil. 661 · 403 Phil. 861

Two counter-currents that Pulido would later build on: Article 40 was not applied to pre-Family Code marriages, and Niñal held a void marriage open to collateral attack —

“[O]ther than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity… or a criminal case for that matter.”

Collateral attack preserved

31 July 2000

Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis

G.R. No. 138509 · 391 Phil. 648

A pending petition for nullity of the first marriage does not suspend the bigamy case: “respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.” This holding survives Pulido.

No prejudicial questionStill controlling

1 August 2000

Mercado v. Tan

G.R. No. 137110 · 391 Phil. 809

“That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then.”

The turn against the accused. Conviction affirmed although the first marriage was later declared void for want of a licence; Mendoza and Aragon treated as set aside by Article 40.

Decree requiredAbandoned in 2021

6 February 2004

Morigo v. People

G.R. No. 145226 · 466 Phil. 1013

Acquittal on a narrow ground: no ceremony was ever performed — the parties merely signed a contract — so there was “no first marriage to speak of.” An anomaly beside Mercado for seventeen years; after 2021 its reasoning becomes the general rule.

AcquittalOutlier, later vindicated

18 February 2004 · En Banc

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150758 · 467 Phil. 723

“[A] declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws are concerned… [Article 349] penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.”

Criminal liability was treated as one of the surviving legal effects of a void marriage. Justice Carpio dissented on strict construction — and was vindicated in 2021.

Nullity irrelevantAbandoned in 2021

29 November 2005

Manuel v. People

G.R. No. 165842 · 512 Phil. 818

The present spouse must first obtain a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41. A good-faith belief that the absentee is dead is no defense. Conviction affirmed, with P200,000 moral damages. Untouched by Pulido: the first marriage here is valid, not void.

Presumptive deathStill controlling

2010 – 2014

Jarillo · Antone · Teves · Nollora · Montañez · Odtuhan · Capili · Lasanas

636 Phil. 25 · 652 Phil. 151 · 671 Phil. 825 · 672 Phil. 771 · G.R. No. 181089, 22 Oct. 2012 · 714 Phil. 349 · G.R. No. 183805, 3 July 2013 · 736 Phil. 735

Eight rulings in five years, all to the same effect: a decree obtained after the second marriage — of either marriage, on any ground including Article 36 — is no defense; the date of filing matters only for prescription; a pending nullity case is not a prejudicial question.

The hard lineAbandoned in 2021

15 July 2015

Santiago v. People

G.R. No. 200233

“It will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.”

The accused could not invoke the nullity of the second marriage for want of a licence where she had procured it by a false affidavit of cohabitation. Convicted as an accomplice. Pulido did not list this case among those it abandoned — see the open questions below.

Clean handsNot expressly abandoned

13 January 2016

Vitangcol v. People

G.R. No. 207406 · 778 Phil. 326

High-water mark of the strict line. A registrar's certification that it could not locate the licence “does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license” — and absent a decree the accused remained liable in any case. Both halves of that holding have since given way.

Decree requiredEvidence

2018

Sarto v. People · Republic v. Manalo

G.R. No. 206284, 28 Feb. 2018 · G.R. No. 221029, 24 Apr. 2018, En Banc

An accused invoking a divorce obtained abroad must plead and prove both the decree and the foreign law — “Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws.” Manalo then held Article 26(2) applies whether the alien or the Filipino spouse obtained the divorce.

Foreign divorceStill controlling

2021 Phase 3 · The reversal First marriage 1983, licence doubtful; second marriage 1995; nullity of the first decreed only in 2015–2016, while the criminal case was pending. Acquitted.

27 July 2021 · En Banc · Hernando, J.

Pulido v. People

G.R. No. 220149 · 908 Phil. 573

“[A] judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured.”

1. Scope of Article 40

Retroactive “but only for the purpose of remarriage”; it “did not amend Article 349 of the RPC, and thus, did not deny the accused the right to collaterally attack the validity of a void ab initio marriage.” The rule “now applies to all marriages celebrated under the Civil Code and the Family Code.”

2. Elements

“Article 349 should be construed to pertain only to valid and voidable marriages.” A void first marriage means element (1) is absent — and nothing exists to be “dissolved” under element (2).

3. Void second marriage

“[W]hen the accused contracts a second or subsequent marriage that is void ab initio, other than it being bigamous, he/she cannot be held liable for bigamy.” Nullity because bigamous is no defense — which is why Pulido could not rely on the nullity of his marriage to Baleda.

4. Voidable marriages excluded

An annulment decree is no defense; “the voidable first marriage is considered valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.”

5. Rule of lenity

Requiring a prior decree “interprets Article 349 too liberally in favor of the State and too strictly against the accused.” In dubio pro reo.

6. The safety valve

Deliberately contracting void marriages is “already penalized under Article 350 of the RPC.”

Abandoned

The Mercado · Marbella-Bobis · Abunado · Tenebro · Jarillo · Antone · Teves · Nollora · Montañez · Odtuhan · Capili · Lasanas · Vitangcol line, to the extent it required a prior decree or treated a later decree as immaterial.

Restored

Dumpo · Lara · Mendoza · Aragon · Odayat, together with Niñal's collateral-attack principle. Morigo ceases to be an anomaly.

ControllingEn Banc

2021 – 2026 Phase 4 · Consolidation Five years of application: what the accused must show, what the prosecution must now prove, and where the criminal case is decided.

7 December 2021

Cariaga v. Republic

G.R. No. 248643 · 918-A Phil. 770

“[F]or a marriage to be considered void due to the lack of a marriage license, the absence of such license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.”

Evidence

24 January 2024

Genio v. People

G.R. No. 261666 · 950 Phil. 311

The prima facie weight of a marriage certificate is rebuttable by substantial evidence; once rebutted, “the burden shifts back to the prosecution to prove it with evidence beyond reasonable doubt.” The bigamy conviction was set aside — and the accused convicted instead under Article 350, exactly as Pulido contemplated.

Acquitted of bigamyConvicted under Art. 350

5 November 2024 · En Banc

Quirit-Figarido v. Figarido

G.R. No. 259520

The civil counterweight: only the injured spouse may sue to declare a bigamous marriage void. Otherwise “bigamy will be treated by the erring spouse as a matter of convenience.” The marriage nonetheless remains void for all other legal purposes, and criminal liability is unaffected.

Standing to sue

24 February 2025

Bonbon v. People

G.R. No. 272844

Fifteen years from actual discovery, not registration — dating it from registration “would make prosecution almost impossible.” Discovered 2020, filed 2021, second marriage 1999: within the period.

Justice Caguioa, concurring, proposes recalibration now that the PSA Civil Registry Database (R.A. No. 11909, operational 2022) makes multiple registrations detectable — discovery for pre-database marriages; the database's establishment for pre-database marriages discovered later; registration for marriages contracted after it.

Prescription

27 August 2025

Natividad-Florentino v. Florentino

G.R. Nos. 255335 & 255636

“Such defense… must be established through evidence in the criminal proceedings and shall be competently resolved by the trial court without awaiting the resolution of a pending civil case for declaration of nullity.”

The Court of Appeals had suspended the bigamy case; reversed. Justice Caguioa's concurrence supplies the reason: after Pulido the third requisite of a prejudicial question fails, because the criminal court itself has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the marriages.

No prejudicial questionControlling

26 February 2026 · Caguioa, J.

Lapira y Tungol v. Fariscal and People

G.R. No. 233512

The most recent application. A certification that the civil registrar “has no record of application for marriage license,” coupled with proof that that year's records were intact in the archives, rebutted the marriage certificate for the first marriage to a Japanese national.

“There being no other proof of the validity of the marriage between Takahiko and Imelda, then there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of a prior marriage, which is one of the elements of Bigamy.”

AcquittedLatest word

Before and after

What actually changed

Question	2000–2021	2021 onwards
Nature of the defense	Procedural — when did the accused get a decree?	Substantive — was the marriage void at all? A fact triable in the criminal case.
Decree obtained after the second marriage	Immaterial; the crime was already consummated.	A valid defense, irrespective of when secured.
Collateral attack in the criminal case	Barred by Article 40.	Allowed; Article 40 governs remarriage only.
Void second marriage (not bigamous)	Irrelevant to liability (Tenebro).	Element (3) fails — no liability.
Pre-Family Code marriages	Article 40 applied retroactively even in criminal cases.	Retroactive for remarriage only; one rule for all marriages.
Proving the first marriage	Marriage certificate practically conclusive (Vitangcol).	Prima facie only; a registrar's certification can raise reasonable doubt.
Deliberate abuse	Answered by refusing the defense.	Answered by charging Article 350.
Procedure	Parallel civil action, no suspension.	No suspension; the criminal court decides validity itself.

WHAT DID NOT CHANGE — Where the first marriage is valid, Article 349 still requires no proof of criminal intent beyond contracting the second marriage. Article 41 declarations of presumptive death remain mandatory. Foreign divorces must still be recognised and the foreign law proved. Prescription still runs from discovery. And Article 40 still governs remarriage: an undeclared void marriage still cannot support a valid remarriage — Pulido changed the criminal consequence, not the civil rule.

Unsettled

Open questions

Does Santiago v. People (2015) survive?

Pulido did not list it among the cases abandoned. Santiago refused, on clean-hands grounds, to let an accused invoke the nullity of a second marriage she had procured by a false affidavit of cohabitation — which collides with Pulido's rule that a void second marriage, other than bigamous, is a defense. Expect prosecutors to invoke it wherever the accused authored the defect.

The evidentiary line between Vitangcol and Lapira

Vitangcol demanded a categorical certification that no licence exists; Lapira accepted a certification of “no record of application” plus proof that the year's records were intact. The difference may be evidentiary rather than doctrinal — so secure a certification that is categorical and proof that the archive is complete.

Acquittal is not capacity to remarry

A collateral finding of nullity in a criminal case produces no decree for civil purposes — property, legitimacy, remarriage. A separate Article 40 petition is still required.

Prescription may be recalibrated

If Justice Caguioa's Bonbon framework is adopted, second marriages contracted after 2022 would prescribe from registration — a significant shortening.

No absolute divorce law

As of late August 2026 divorce bills remain pending in Congress, so recognition of a foreign divorce and actions for nullity remain the only exits from a valid marriage — the practical driver of most bigamy cases.

Practice note

Screening a bigamy complaint — complainant's side

• Secure PSA/LCR copies of both marriage certificates — and certifications on the licence and the application for the first marriage. The case now turns on proving the first marriage, not on the absence of a decree.
• Anticipate the void-marriage defense: the solemnizing officer's authority, the licence number and register entry, witnesses to the ceremony.
• Plead Article 350 in the alternative where the first marriage's validity is vulnerable.
• Fix and document the date of actual discovery.

Practice note

Assessing exposure — respondent's side

• Classify each marriage: void, voidable or valid. Only void helps.
• Identify the ground — no licence, no ceremony, no authority, Article 36, Article 35(4). The last does not help if it is the second marriage.
• A decree obtained now is still worth having: evidence in the criminal case, and indispensable for any remarriage.
• Do not expect a suspension on prejudicial-question grounds.
• If the impediment was known, weigh Article 350 exposure even after acquittal under Article 349.

Sources. Full texts of Pulido v. People (G.R. No. 220149), Lapira y Tungol v. Fariscal (G.R. No. 233512), Natividad-Florentino v. Florentino (G.R. Nos. 255335 & 255636), Mercado v. Tan, Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, Morigo, Tenebro, Manuel, Montañez, Capili, Santiago, Vitangcol, Sarto, Republic v. Manalo, Sermonia and Genio; Supreme Court E-Library and the Office of the Spokesperson's press releases for Lapira (17 Aug. 2026), Bonbon (11 July 2025) and Quirit-Figarido (14 Feb. 2025). Phase 1 citations are as recited and quoted in Pulido, 908 Phil. 573 (2021).

Note. This timeline is a study aid. Quotations are taken from the official texts, but verify against the full decisions before citing them in a pleading. Nothing here is legal advice.

Bigamy Doctrine, 1954–2026 [From People v. Mendoza (1954) to Pulido v. People (2021) and Tungol (2026)]

 

Article 349, Revised Penal Code  ·  Philippine Supreme Court

Bigamy: seventy-two years of a rule that kept changing its mind

One question has governed almost every bigamy prosecution in Philippine history: must an accused first obtain a judicial declaration that the earlier marriage was void, before that nullity can be used as a defense? The Court has answered it both ways — repeatedly. In 2021 it reversed itself again, and this time abandoned twenty-eight years of contrary doctrine.

1954first ruling in the line 7×the answer flipped 2021the current rule

Upper track — nullity is a defense, no prior declaration needed Lower track — prior judicial declaration required

FIG. 1 — The answer to one question, 1954–2026. Every step is a reversal. The shaded band marks the Mercado line, the longest stretch of settled doctrine.

Controlling doctrine today

Pulido v. People

A void ab initio marriage may be raised as a defense in a bigamy prosecution without any prior judicial declaration of its nullity. Article 40 of the Family Code did not amend Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code; the judicial declaration it requires is for purposes of remarriage, not an element of the crime and not a precondition to the defense. The accused may prove nullity by testimonial or documentary evidence, including a declaration obtained after the fact.

G.R. No. 220149 · July 27, 2021 · EN BANC · Hernando, J.
Concurring opinions: Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, JJ. · Petitioner ACQUITTED.

✓

A void ab initio first marriage is a defense — no prior declaration required.

✓

A void ab initio subsequent marriage may likewise be raised.

✓

The rule applies to marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and the Family Code.

✕

A second marriage void only because it is bigamous is not a defense.

✕

A merely voidable first marriage is not: an annulment decree cannot be interposed, because the marriage was valid and subsisting when the second was contracted.

1954 — 1957 The permissive rule Civil Code. A void marriage needs no decree to be treated as void.

1954

People v. Mendoza

95 Phil. 845

No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void prior marriage as a defense in bigamy — as distinguished from voidable marriages. The accused, whose second marriage was void for bigamy and whose first wife had died, did not commit bigamy by contracting a third.

Defense allowed

1957

People v. Aragon

100 Phil. 1033

Reaffirmed Mendoza on materially identical facts. For three decades this was understood as the settled rule.

Defense allowed

1970 — 1986 The oscillation Four reversals in sixteen years. The Court could not hold a position.

1970

Gomez v. Lipana

144 Phil. 514

Deviated from Mendoza and Aragon: a judicial declaration of nullity is necessary even though the marriage is presumed void for having been contracted during a prior subsisting marriage.

Declaration required

1971

Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS

147 Phil. 269

Followed Gomez.

Declaration required

1977 · 1983

Odayat v. Amante · Tolentino v. Paras

168 Phil. 1  ·  207 Phil. 458

The Court reverted to Mendoza and Aragon.

Defense allowed

1986

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy

227 Phil. 457

Reversed course again: a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is required before one may enter another. This reasoning would later be codified in Article 40 of the Family Code.

Declaration required

1986

Yap v. Court of Appeals

229 Phil. 251

In the same year as Wiegel, the Court held otherwise once more.

Defense allowed

1997

Apiag v. Cantero · Ty v. Court of Appeals

335 Phil. 511

Clarified the confusion by drawing a line at the statute: the requirement of a judicial decree does not apply to marriages celebrated before the Family Code, which remain governed by Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat.

Defense allowed — pre-Family Code

1993 — 2016 Article 40 hardens Twenty-three years of consistent doctrine against the accused.

1993

Domingo v. Court of Appeals

297 Phil. 642

A declaration of absolute nullity is required, whether pleaded as a cause of action or as a defense. Parties may not judge for themselves whether their marriage is void; only a competent court may say so.

Declaration required

2000

Mercado v. Tan

391 Phil. 809

Expressly abandoned Mendoza and Aragon as superseded by Article 40. A declaration of nullity obtained after the second marriage is immaterial — the crime was already consummated. To hold otherwise would let an accused file a nullity petition and invoke it to stall the prosecution.

Declaration required

2000

Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis

384 Phil. 661

A pending petition to nullify the first marriage is not a prejudicial question that suspends the bigamy case.

Declaration required

2004

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

467 Phil. 723

Extended the rule to the second marriage: its later declaration of nullity for psychological incapacity is "of absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws are concerned." Article 349 punishes the mere act of contracting a second marriage during a subsisting valid one.

Declaration required

2004

Morigo v. People

466 Phil. 1013

The outlier. The parties merely signed a marriage contract with no ceremony and no solemnizing officer — so there was no first marriage at all, and the first element of bigamy was missing. Acquittal. Pulido would later note that Morigo and Mercado were "at variance" on the effects of a void marriage.

Acquitted — no marriage existed

2005 — 2016

The consolidation

Manuel · Jarillo · Nollora · Montañez · Lasanas · Vitangcol

Manuel v. People (512 Phil. 818), Jarillo v. People (617 Phil. 45), Nollora, Jr. v. People (672 Phil. 771), Montañez v. Cipriano (697 Phil. 586), Lasanas v. People (736 Phil. 735) and Vitangcol v. People (778 Phil. 326) each reapplied the rule. Jarillo held Article 40 applies even to marriages governed by the Civil Code; the line held that even a first marriage void for want of a licence left the accused liable absent a prior decree.

Declaration required

2021 — present The reversal En Banc. The Court abandons its own twenty-eight-year line.

July 27, 2021 · EN BANC

Pulido v. People

G.R. No. 220149 · Hernando, J. · ACQUITTED

"It is time to abandon the earlier precedents and adopt a more liberal view that a void ab initio marriage can be used as a defense in bigamy even without a separate judicial declaration of absolute nullity." The parties need not obtain a declaration to raise nullity of either the first or the subsequent marriage; the rule now applies to marriages under both Codes; and Article 40 did not deny the accused the right to collaterally attack a void marriage in a criminal prosecution. The Court rested this on the retroactive effects of a void marriage, the legislative intent behind Article 40, and the rule that penal laws are construed strictly against the State.

Defense allowed

February 26, 2026

Lapira-y-Tungol v. Fariscal

G.R. No. 233512 · Third Division · Caguioa, J. · ACQUITTED

The first squarely on-point application. The accused raised the nullity of her first marriage for want of a licence without any prior declaration, invoking Pulido, and rebutted the presumption of validity with a civil registrar's certification that no licence was ever issued. One element of bigamy therefore failed. The case supplies the evidentiary standard Pulido left open for this ground of nullity.

Defense allowed

The analysis

What actually changed

Question	Mercado line (2000–2016)	Pulido (2021– )
Void first marriage, no prior decree	Not a defense. Crime already consummated.	A defense. No decree needed.
Decree obtained after the second marriage	Immaterial.	Admissible as evidence of nullity.
Void second marriage	Immaterial (Tenebro).	May be raised — unless void only for being bigamous.
Voidable first marriage	Not a defense.	Still not a defense. Unchanged.
Marriages under the Civil Code	Article 40 applied retroactively (Jarillo).	Same rule for both Codes — now the permissive one.
Function of Article 40	A precondition to the defense.	A requirement for remarriage only. It did not amend Article 349.
Rule of construction	Protect the institution of marriage; deter evasion.	Penal laws construed strictly against the State.

Unsettled

What Pulido did not decide

Retroactive benefit to final convictions

Pulido is favourable to the accused, and penal rules favourable to the accused ordinarily apply retroactively. Whether that reaches convictions already final — and by what remedy — is not resolved in any decision I could verify.

Prejudicial question

Pulido records that Merced, Zapanta and De la Cruz — which had treated a nullity action as a prejudicial question — were abandoned, and that under the rule it was reviewing, nullity of the second marriage was neither a defense nor a prejudicial question. Having restored the defense, the Court did not squarely say whether the prejudicial-question doctrine returns with it.

Morigo's continuing role

Morigo turned on the absence of any ceremony, not on the absence of a decree. Under Pulido that distinction may no longer carry weight, since nullity on any ground is now available as a defense — but Morigo has not been expressly superseded.

Citations verified against the primary text of Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149 (July 27, 2021), including the Court's own account of the doctrinal history and its footnoted citations, and against the reported text of Lapira-y-Tungol v. Fariscal, G.R. No. 233512 (February 26, 2026). Philippine Reports citations are given as cited by the Court. Cases mentioned in passing in Pulido but not independently examined here have been described only as Pulido describes them.

Prepared for research purposes. General legal information, not legal advice.