TAÑADA, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. No. 217012, [March 1, 2016]

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TAÑADA, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

 G.R. No. 217012, [March 1, 2016]

EN BANC, CARPIO, J.

 

HRET Jurisdiction; Nuisance Candidate

 

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disclaiming jurisdiction over the protest filed by herein petitioner Wigberto "Toby" R. Tañada, Jr. (Wigberto). the HRET lacks the authority to rule on whether or not Alvin John is indeed a nuisance candidate. The latte is not considered a "Member" of Congress, as a non-member of Congress, the HRET could not therefore assume jurisdiction over the issues concerning his eligibility, e.g. the issue on whether he is a nuisance candidate.

 

Wigberto "Toby" R. Tañada, Jr. (Wigberto) filed an election protest ad cautelam before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) contesting the 2013 election results for the Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Quezon. Wigberto's protest stemmed from the 2013 elections where three candidates, including himself, contested the position. For the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, the name of candidate Alvin John remained in the ballots. After the canvass of the votes, the following results indicated that Tan was the winning candidate, to wit: Tan (84,782), Tañada, Wigberto (80,698) and Tañada, Alvin John (7,038). The Quezon PBOC then proclaimed Tan as the winning candidate.  

He filed petitions with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking the cancellation of Alvin John's Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), on the basis of his material misrepresentations under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but not on being a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC dismissed the petitions, but later, on Wigberto's motion for reconsideration, cancelled Alvin John's CoC based on Section 78. While Wigberto's petition for certiorari was still pending in the Supreme Court, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the action of the COMELEC Second Division annulling Tan's proclamation. However, Tan had by then taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation moot. 

Wigberto, after the election, filed an election protest before the HRET, alleging fraud in the fielding of Alvin John as a nuisance candidate, resulting in the miscounting of votes. The HRET dismissed the protest, asserting it lacked jurisdiction to declare Alvin John a nuisance candidate. 

 

Whether or not HRET had jurisdiction to declare Alvin John a nuisance candidate. 

NO. The Supreme Court found that the HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring that it lacked jurisdiction to determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. Wigberto committed procedural errors by filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Banc's ruling, which is expressly prohibited by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The ruling had become final and executory, barring him from raising the issue in another forum. If Wigberto had timely filed a petition before the Supreme Court to question Alvin John's nuisance candidacy, the Court could have assumed jurisdiction. The COMELEC En Banc's resolution on Alvin John's alleged nuisance candidacy had already become final and executory by the time Wigberto filed his petition before the Supreme Court.

The SC reasoned that it appears that Wigberto's petition challenging Alvin John's nuisance candidacy filed before the HRET, and now before this Court, is a mere afterthought. It was only after Tan was proclaimed a winner that Wigberto renewed his zeal in pursuing Alvin John's alleged nuisance candidacy. It is not enough for Wigberto to have Alvin John's COC cancelled, because the effect of such cancellation only leads to stray votes. Alvin John must also be declared a nuisance candidate, because only then will Alvin John's votes be credited to Wigberto.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed Wigberto's petition, affirming the HRET's Resolutions and emphasizing the importance of timely and proper legal procedures in election cases.

 

 

 

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 Concurring Opinion, Jose Portugal Perez, [J]

Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan v. Commission on Elections En Banc, G.R. No. 225152, [October 5, 2021]

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Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 225152, [October 5, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Election Law; Constitutionality of COMELEC resolution extending deadline submission of SOCE 

The Supreme Court En banc says the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the deadline of submission of the Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) beyond the 30-day period mandated by RA 7166 or the Synchronized Elections Law. The COMELEC has exceeded its delegated rule making authority which amounts to usurpation of legislative power.

 

A Petition for certiorari was filed by Partido Demokratiko Pilipino–Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) against the COMELEC. PDP-Laban challenged the COMELEC’S Resolution No. 10147, which extended the filing of Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) until June 30, 2016, despite being originally set at June 8,2016 which is thirty (30) days after the May 9, 2016 national elections. PDP-Laban argued that the COMELEC exceeded its limits and violated section 14 of RA 7166 due to the said order.

 

Whether or not the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10147 which extended the SOCE submission after the 2016 elections is unconstitutional. 

YES. The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot extend the deadline for submission by candidates of their Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE). Under section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 or the Synchronized Elections Law, candidates are required to file their full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election within 30 days after the conduct of election. The language in RA 7166, Section 14 is not ambiguous; the law is clear that SOCEs must be filed within 30 days after the latest polls. Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the SOCE deadline and exempted candidates and political parties from administrative liabilities in violation of the clear language of the law and legislative intent. The COMELEC likewise cannot conveniently invoke the exigency of public service to justify its actions. The COMELEC’s task is to administer the law, not supplant them. For these reasons, the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10147 is declared void for being repugnant to the law. Applying the doctrine of operative fact, however, the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the COMELEC’s Resolution shall be applied prospectively. Thus, the Statements of Contributions and Expenditures for the May 9, 2016 national and local elections that were submitted within the extended period (on or before June 30, 2016) are deemed timely filed. 

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De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, [March 22, 2022]

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DE ALBAN V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 243968, [March 22, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Election Law; Nuisance Candidate; Senatorial Candidate Qualification 

The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the COMELEC's authority to refuse to give due course to or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of a nuisance candidate, under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). However, the court emphasizes that this authority must be exercised in accordance with procedural due process, and the COMELEC must provide a fair and reasonable opportunity for the candidate to clarify their position and present evidence in their defense.

  

Angelo Castro De Alban filed a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for senator in the May 13, 2019, elections as an independent candidate. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law Department, motu proprio, filed a petition to declare him a nuisance candidate, alleging lack of bona fide intent, financial capacity, and political machinery. COMELEC First Division declared De Alban a nuisance candidate, emphasizing his failure to establish financial capacity. The COMELEC En Banc upheld this decision, stating the need for evidence of a solid financial capacity for a nationwide campaign. 

 

Whether or not COMELEC's authority, under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), to motu proprio refuse due course to or cancel the CoC of a nuisance candidate is not unconstitutional. 

YES. The Court declares the case moot due to the conclusion of the 2019 elections. However, exceptions apply, and the case falls under the fourth exception since issues related to nuisance candidates are capable of repetition in future elections, yet evading review. In this case, the Court affirms COMELEC's authority to motu proprio refuse due course to or cancel the CoC of nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the OEC, emphasizing that the OEC governs all elections of public officers, including senators. The Court also rejects the argument that RA No. 6646 impliedly repealed Section 69 of the OEC, affirming the coexistence of both laws. COMELEC's motu proprio authority remains intact. Lastly, the Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 69, OEC rejecting De Alban's claim that it violates due process and the equal protection clause. The Court emphasizes the importance of preventing confusion and frustration in the electoral process. Therefore, the provisions of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code are not unconstitutional.

 

Whether or not COMELEC has gravely abused its discretion in declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate.

YES. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)'s motu proprio authority under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) is subject to procedural due process requirements. In this case, the COMELEC abused its discretion by declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate based on an incorrect interpretation of the law and a lack of substantial evidence. The COMELEC's motu proprio authority under Section 69 of the OEC must not result in the denial of the candidates' opportunity to be heard, which must be construed as a chance to explain one's side. The Court underscores that due process requires a fair opportunity for candidates to present evidence and disputes the COMELEC's premature dismissal of De Alban's capacity to wage a nationwide campaign.

In this case, the Court criticizes the COMELEC's reliance on general allegations without specifying the acts or circumstances indicating De Alban's lack of bona fide intention to run. It rejects the notion that financial capacity alone justifies declaring a candidate a nuisance, emphasizing the absence of legal requirements for financial qualifications in Senatorial Elections. Financial capacity to sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign, cannot be used, by itself, to declare a candidate as nuisance.  In the same vein, the Court finds that non-membership in a political party or being unknown nationwide, or the low probability of success do not by themselves equate to the absence of bona fide intention to run for public office.

The Court reminds the COMELEC that the candidate's bona fide intention to run for public office is neither subject to any property qualifications nor dependent upon membership in a political party, popularity, or degree of success in the elections. Therefore, while upholding the constitutionality of COMELEC's authority under Section 69, the Court sets aside the COMELEC's resolution declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate.

 

 

 

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