Ismael v. People, G.R. Nos. 234435-36, [February 6, 2023]

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Ismael v. People

 G.R. Nos. 234435-36, [February 6, 2023]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Speedy disposition of cases; Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him 

An information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information. 

 

The Municipality of Lantawanin, Basilan, has faced persistent arrears on unremitted GSIS premiums since 1997, aggravated by accumulated penalties during Mayor Ismael's term starting in 2001. Despite collection letters sent to the mayor's office for arrears from January 1999 to February 2003, the obligations remained outstanding, leading to the suspension of members' loan privileges. Vice Mayor Dalugdugan and others filed a complaint against petitioners for malversation of public funds, resulting in charges before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and violations of Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4, Rule III of the IRR of RA No. 8291. The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners. 

Petitioners attack the validity of the Informations as they alleged conspiracy but failed to implead the municipal accountant and budget officer, who are indispensable in consummating the offenses charged. Petitioners submit that they cannot be expected to discharge their respective duties in the remittance of the GSIS contributions without the issuance of the certificate of availability of funds and remittance vouchers by the municipal accountant and budget officer. Hence, for petitioners, such incomplete allegation in the

Informations violated their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them. They also argue that their right to speedy disposition of cases was also violated since the Informations were filed on June 5, 2005, but resolved only on August 2, 2017. They maintain that their failure to remit was due to several factors beyond their control, such as the terrorism activities in the area which disparaged their municipality for years, the arrearages left by the previous administration which inflated due to penalties, and the limited resources of the municipality to meet its fiscal demands. 

 

Whether or not the petitioners' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them was violated. 

NO. The non-inclusion of other conspirators in the indictment does not violate the right to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused. The Constitution mandates that the accused be informed of the accusation's nature and cause, as outlined in Section 14(2), Article III. Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court specifies necessary allegations in a criminal information, including the accused's name, offense designation, acts or omissions constituting the offense, offended party's name, approximate date of offense commission, and place of offense. Section 9 of the same Rule requires clear and concise language to inform the accused of the offense charged. In this case, the Informations against the petitioners sufficiently stated their failure to ensure the municipality's GSIS contributions' full and timely remittance. The indictment of purported conspirators and their roles is not necessary for the Informations' sufficiency. Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan affirms that an information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged, although the court cannot pass judgment on co-conspirators not charged.

Whether or not the petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated. 

NO. The mere delay in proceedings does not necessarily violate the right to speedy disposition of cases or speedy trial. The determination of whether a delay is inordinate depends on the examination of the facts and circumstances of the case. Courts assess whether the delay is reasonable considering the complexity of the case and the timely invocation of the accused's rights. In this case, although there was a lengthy delay in the proceedings, the petitioners were not blameless, as they contributed to the delay by not complying with procedural requirements. Their actions demonstrated a renunciation of their rights to speedy disposition of the case and speedy trial. Additionally, the delay did not result in significant prejudice to the petitioners, and there was no evidence of arbitrariness, vexation, or oppression in the delay. Therefore, the delay was not deemed unconstitutional as it was not objected to in a timely manner and did not cause substantial harm to the petitioners.

 

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People v. Napoles, G.R. No. 247611 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

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People v. Napoles

 G.R. No. 247611 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Posting bail pending appeal; conviction of capital offense (Plunder); provisional release on humanitarian grounds

 

OCA Circular No. 91-2020 does not mandate blanket release of Persons Deprived of Liberty (PDLs) due to the pandemic but rather emphasizes the implementation of existing policies on bail and speedy trial. Bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion post-conviction and must be carefully weighed given the determination of guilt. In cases of capital offenses, bail should typically be denied.

 

This is an Urgent Motion for Recognizance/Bail or House Arrest for Humanitarian Reason Due to COVID-19 filed by Janet Lim Napoles. The Sandiganbayan convicted Richard A. Cambe and Janet Lim Napoles of Plunder relative to the utilization of Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr.'s Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). In her Motion, Napoles alleges that she is at risk of contracting COVID-19 inside the prison due to her Diabetes, an underlying COVID-19 health condition. She is entitled to be provisionally released on humanitarian grounds. She raises that the Nelson Mandela Rules, provide the basis for the release of persons deprived of liberty (PDLs) in times of public health emergencies. 

 

Whether or not the Constitution and the Rules of Court allow an accused to post bail pending the appeal of his, or her conviction of a capital offense.

NO. While the right to bail is linked to the fundamental presumption of innocence, it is not absolute after conviction for such offenses. Bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion post-conviction and must be carefully weighed given the determination of guilt. In cases of capital offenses, bail should typically be denied. In the case at hand, Napoles was convicted of Plunder by the lower court, a capital offense, making her ineligible for bail pending appeal of her conviction. Therefore, her motion for bail must be rejected.

 

Whether or not Napoles could be provisionally released on humanitarian grounds due to the risk of contracting COVID-19.

NO. There are no compelling reasons to justify granting provisional release on humanitarian grounds for Napoles. Previous cases like De La Rama and Enrile, where the Court considered special circumstances for bail, are exceptional and isolated. Napoles' claim of being at risk of contracting COVID-19 due to diabetes does not present a sufficient basis for release. OCA Circular No. 91-2020 does not mandate blanket release of Persons Deprived of Liberty (PDLs) due to the pandemic but rather emphasizes the implementation of existing policies on bail and speedy trial. Releasing an accused convicted of a capital offense goes against constitutional and legal provisions.

 

Whether or not the Nelson Mandela Rules and the international community's call for the temporary release of PDLs due to the threats of COVID-19, provide sufficient basis to grant bail post-conviction.

NO.  The Nelson Mandela Rules, which set international standards for prisoner treatment, do not justify granting bail post-conviction due to COVID-19. These rules outline standards for prisoner healthcare but do not support release on bail pending appeal of a capital offense conviction. Furthermore, the release of prisoners in other countries due to COVID-19 is limited, especially for high-risk inmates. Neither international rules nor global trends support releasing convicted individuals pending appeal for capital offenses. Additionally, Napoles is not entitled to release on recognizance, as it is only available to those who qualify for bail but cannot afford it due to poverty, as per RA No. 10389.

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Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No. 218530 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

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Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr.

 G.R. No. 218530 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Jurisdiction of Ombudsman; RA 3019; Directors of GOCC; Bad faith

 

The Ombudsman's determination of probable cause generally merits deference, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion. It is not enough to simply allege the presence of bad faith. The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith. To establish evident bad faith or manifest partiality in cases of alleged violation of anti-graft laws, there must be clear evidence of deliberate wrongdoing or corrupt motive, rather than mere speculation or hypothesis.

 

In January 2007, Estacio was elected as a member of the board of directors of Independent Realty Corporation Group of Companies (IRC), recommended by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Despite his term ending in June 2010, Estacio continued to serve on the IRC board until December 2010 and concurrently held the position of Vice-President. Before his term expired, Estacio and other IRC directors passed Resolution No. 2010-05-18 granting separation benefits to IRC officers, resulting in Estacio receiving various emoluments. Quiogue, IRC's General Manager, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that Estacio's receipt of these benefits caused undue injury to the government, violating Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. Quiogue cited Memorandum Circulars (MC) 40 and 66, limiting benefits for PCGG-nominated directors of sequestered corporations. Estacio argued that he was not a public officer, MCs 40 and 66 did not apply, and the benefits were granted in good faith under the business judgment rule. 

 

Whether or not the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint against Estacio for lack of probable cause, in violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 

NO. There being no proof that the incidental benefits received by Estacio was done with, or rooted in any corrupt intent, the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint must be upheld. The Ombudsman had jurisdiction over Estacio's case, as IRC, a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC), is subject to the government's fiscal supervision. While the Ombudsman generally has discretion to determine probable cause, exceptions exist for grave abuse of discretion. However, the petition failed to demonstrate such abuse.

The board resolution which granted separation pay benefits is a corporate act and Estacio is only one among the board of directors of IRC. Also, a simple reading of the board resolution reveals that the corporation has previously granted separation benefits to all employees of IRC exclusive of its officers. Estacio's participation in the approval of the resolution did not exhibit evident bad faith or manifest partiality, and the benefits were granted in the ordinary course of IRC's corporate activities, not to unduly favor Estacio.

Therefore, the Ombudsman's dismissal was upheld.

 

 

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Angeles v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 228795, [December 1, 2020]

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Angeles v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 228795, [December 1, 2020]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Administrative Law; Robbery of Payroll Money; Accountability of Municipal Treasurer 

The accountability for government funds involves the diligence of a good father of a family. The absence of a security escort alone does not indicate negligence, and a balanced approach is necessary to prevent injustice to government employees not guilty of negligence. The decision rejects the idea that a higher degree of diligence is required merely due to the substantial amount involved and emphasizes the need for a reasonable assessment of the circumstances surrounding the loss of government funds. 

On March 12, 2010, Lily De Jesus (cashier) and Estrellita Ramos (revenue collection officer) of the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal, along with driver Felix Alcantara, withdrew P1,300,000.00 payroll money from Land Bank. While returning to the office, an armed man shot Felix, resulting in injuries, and later another man forcibly took the payroll money from Lily, causing her death. The suspects were later arrested and indicted for Robbery with Homicide. Estelita, the officer-in-charge municipal treasurer, sought relief from accountability for the lost money, citing the absence of specific regulations on safeguarding payroll money while in transit. The COA denied her petition for review, emphasizing the necessity of a higher degree of precaution due to the substantial amount involved.

 

Whether or not Estelita should be held accountable for the lost payroll money due to the absence of a security escort during the bank transaction. 

NO. The Court reversed the Commission on Audit's (COA) decision, granting Estelita relief from accountability. The Court held that Estelita and Lily had exercised reasonable care and caution under the circumstances. They followed the standard procedure, using the municipal service vehicle and obtaining a travel pass. The robbery was unexpected, occurring in broad daylight on a public street. The Court emphasized that the absence of a security escort alone does not indicate negligence, and it criticized the COA's stringent condition for requiring one. The COA's conclusion, in hindsight, that a security escort should have been requested was insufficient to establish negligence. The Court stressed the need for a balanced approach to prevent injustice to government employees not guilty of negligence.

 

 

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Trinidad, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 227440 (Resolution), [December 2, 2020]

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Trinidad, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman

 G.R. No. 227440 (Resolution), [December 2, 2020]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Administrative Law; Administrative case against DPWH Engineer; Gross Neglect of Duty

 

The unjustified reliance on a subordinate constitutes inexcusable negligence. Public officials are not granted a blanket authority to depend on their subordinates, and even minor tasks, no matter how minuscule, must be diligently accomplished. 

Ricardo served as Engineer II in the Department of Public Works and Highways - Quezon City Second Engineering District (DPWH-QCSED). He was responsible for overseeing laborers of the DPWH-QCSED's Oyster Program, designed to provide jobs to Filipinos as gardeners or cleaners. Subsequently, an administrative case was filed against Ricardo for dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The case arose from the approval of daily time records (DTRs) for certain laborers who were found to be simultaneously employed in other government agencies, resulting in double or triple compensations. Ricardo relied solely on his subordinate's logbook in signing the workers' DTRs.

  

Whether or not Ricardo's reliance on his subordinate's logbook in signing the workers' DTRs constitutes gross negligence. 

NO. The Court rejects Ricardo's argument that his reliance on the logbook is justified due to the minor nature of his duties with the Oyster Program. While good faith may exculpate a public official from criminal liability, it does not necessarily relieve him from administrative liability. The Court distinguishes between criminal and administrative gross negligence, emphasizing that the purpose of administrative proceedings is to protect the public service. Ricardo's negligence, although not gross, is deemed simple negligence. Simple negligence is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a required task due to carelessness or indifference, as opposed to gross negligence characterized by a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness to perform a duty. The penalty imposed is a two-month suspension without pay, considering that supervising the Oyster Program's workers is not Ricardo's primary task, and this being his first infraction. Ricardo is warned of more severe consequences for any repetition of the offense.

 

 

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AES Watch v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246332 (Resolution), [December 9, 2020]

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AES Watch v. Commission on Elections

 G.R. No. 246332 (Resolution), [December 9, 2020]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V 

Appeal to COA's decision; Separation pay of Dismissed Employees; Rules on the Refund of Benefits received under Disallowed amounts 

While COMELEC has the authority to regulate election procedures, including the use of capturing devices, such regulations should be narrowly tailored to address specific concerns without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of poll watchers and voters. SC underscores the importance of balancing the discretionary powers of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) with the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights during the electoral process. 

In 1997, Republic Act (RA) No. 8436 empowered the COMELEC to adopt an automated election system (AES). RA No. 9369 in 2007 amended provisions allowing the use of paper-based or direct recording electronic election systems. The COMELEC implemented a paper-based AES with optical mark reader machines in the 2010, 2013, 2016, and 2019 National Elections. The COMELEC implemented this directive and issued guidelines that the VVPAT must be printed in the form of paper receipts and that the voters can verify their votes through these receipts. This petition challenged the constitutionality of COMELEC's actions in the 2019 National Elections, specifically on the prohibition of capturing devices including digital cameras or cellular phones, for any purpose inside the polling place during the casting of votes. The petitioners, AES-WATCH, et al., contested this prohibition, arguing that it was inconsistent with Section 179 of the Omnibus Election Code. They contended that the sweeping nature of the prohibition, encompassing proceedings during the counting of votes, as well as the transmission and printing of election returns.

 

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in prohibiting of capturing devices purpose inside the polling place. 

YES. The court, while acknowledging the discretionary powers of COMELEC, delved into the constitutional implications of the prohibition on capturing devices. It underscored that the use of such devices during the counting of votes was allowed under Section 179 of the Omnibus Election Code. The court emphasized the importance of allowing poll watchers to record any irregularities and voters to object to discrepancies promptly. However, it also recognized COMELEC's authority to regulate the use of such devices to ensure the orderly conduct of elections. The court ruled that the prohibition, as stated in Resolution No. 10460, was unconstitutional in its broad scope, as it encompassed legitimate activities. While the court affirmed COMELEC's discretion, it clarified that restrictions on capturing devices should be narrowly tailored to address specific concerns without unduly infringing on constitutionally protected rights. The decision aimed at striking a balance between the need for secure and transparent elections and the preservation of constitutional rights during the electoral process.

 

 

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National Transmission Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 246173, [June 22, 2021]

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National Transmission Corp. v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 246173, [June 22, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Appeal to COA's decision; Separation pay of Dismissed Employees; Rules on the Refund of Benefits received under Disallowed amounts

 

The power of GOCCs to grant additional benefits, including rounding-off fractional lengths of service to one whole year for separation pay, is subject to limitations and requires presidential approval. However, officers who relied on board resolutions in approving and certifying the release of separation pay, and who implemented policies set by the Board of Directors (BOD), were absolved from solidary liability for the refund. Good faith was recognized in the absence of controlling jurisprudence on the rounding-off issue at the time.

 

The petitioner, National Transmission Corporation (TransCo), is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) to assume the electrical transmission function of the National Power Corporation (NPC). TransCo was initially wholly-owned by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM). Pursuant to the EPIRA's directive, TransCo underwent privatization, and a 25-year concession contract was awarded to the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP). As a result, certain TransCo employees were separated from service effective June 30, 2009. The separated employees were granted separation pay based on specific board resolutions and circulars issued by TransCo. 

The COA disallowed the excess payment of separation pay amounting to P1,488,278.00, resulting from rounding off the fractional length of service equivalent to six months or more to one whole year, and also holding the approving and certifying officers solidarily liable for the return of such excess payment. 

 

Whether or not COA Proper gravely abused its discretion in disallowing the excess separation pay and holding the approving and certifying officers solidarily liable. 

NO. The Court partially granted the petition. It affirmed the COA Proper's decision on the disallowance of the excess payment but modified the ruling on the liability for the refund. The Court agreed with COA Proper's disallowance of the excess separation pay resulting from the rounding-off method, which results in an undue increase in separation pay for government employees, stating that it lacked a legal basis. The Court emphasized that TransCo did not have unbridled discretion to increase benefits without presidential approval.

However, the Court absolved the approving and certifying officers from solidary liability, citing good faith. The Court recognized that these officers merely relied on board resolutions in approving and certifying the release of separation pay. It was the Board of Directors (BOD) that determined the policy for separation pay, and the officers had the duty to implement these resolutions. The Court considered that at the time of disbursements in 2009 and 2010, there was no definitive ruling on the rounding-off issue, making it difficult for the officers to foresee its illegality.

 

 

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Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218068, [March 15, 2022]

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Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 218068, [March 15, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Notice of Disallowances by COA; PDIC's power to compromise, condone or release claims and settle liability

 

Solidary liability to settle the disallowed amount attaches to public officers upon a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence in the performance of official duties. Parenthetically, well-settled is the rule that the palpable disregard of laws and established directives amounts to gross negligence.

 

The case involves disputes related to Westmont Bank (formerly Associated Bank, now United Overseas Bank of the Philippines) and KMSB (formerly Monte de Piedad Savings Bank and Keppel Monte Bank). The controversy arose from the PDIC Corporate Auditor's 1st Indorsement dated August 24, 2000, which revealed that PDIC had provided financial assistance to Westmont Bank, including the waiver of a buyback agreement, early buyback incentives, deferred regular interest, refund of regular interest, and abolition of PDIC interest spread. The Corporate Auditor opined that these measures amounted to a release or condonation of Westmont Bank's principal obligation and accrued interests, prejudicial to PDIC. The matter was referred to COA for recommendation. The COA, through various levels of its structure, concurred with the Corporate Auditor's findings. The COA Proper, in Decision No. 2012-120, denied the recommendation for condonation and also directed the issuance of a notice of disallowance for KMSB's account, holding PDIC Board of Directors and officers liable for disallowed amounts. The PDIC, in its petition, argued that the COA's delay in resolving the issues amounted to grave abuse of discretion. Substantively, PDIC asserted its authority to condone or release claims and argued that the COA erred in its findings.

 

Whether or COA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Notices of Disallowance (NDs) and holding PDIC BOD liable for disallowances.

 

NO. The court held that the petition lacked merit. It ruled that the issuance of NFD was proper, rendering the present petition not moot. The COA has the authority and duty to issue recommendations on condonations and release of claims. The COA's authority to do so emanates from Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 1445. Additionally, the court emphasized that the COA's factual findings must be respected unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion. The COA correctly ruled that its recommendation was mandatory, and PDIC cannot motu proprio compromise a claim or liability. The authority of PDIC to condone applies only to ordinary receivables, penalties and surcharges, and must be submitted to the [COA] before it is implemented. This procedure would enable the [COA] to inquire into the propriety of the condonation and to determine whether the same will not prejudice the government's interest.

In this case, the COA found that the disallowed condonation and write-off were implemented without Congressional approval in patent disregard of the mandatory requirements under the Administrative Code. The COA's, factual findings must be respected absent grave abuse of discretion. The court also held that public officers, specifically the Board of Directors (BOD) of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), can be held liable for disallowed amounts if there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence in the performance of official duties. In authorizing the condonation and write-off, the PDIC BOD acted with gross negligence, amounting to bad faith, which justifies their liability for the disallowances. The patent illegality of the condonation and write-off indubitably countermands PDIC's invocation of good faith. There is no justification to legitimize the palpable lapse of the PDIC BOD in simply ignoring the mandatory provisions of the Administrative Code, which had long been in effect before the condonation and write-off were implemented.

 

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Abella v. Commission on Audit Proper, G.R. No. 238940, [April 19, 2022]

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Abella v. Commission on Audit Proper

 G.R. No. 238940, [April 19, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Administrative Law; Disallowances by COA against extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses to LGU Officials 

The appropriation of Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) separate from discretionary funds in a local government's budget, in violation of Section 325(h) of the Local Government Code, is impermissible. The decision underscores the principle that local government units must adhere to limitations set by law, and any attempt to circumvent these limitations through separate appropriations is subject to disallowance. Additionally, the court affirmed that the good faith or bad faith of the recipients is inconsequential when disbursements are without legal basis, and recipients are liable to refund the amounts received.

 

The case involves the disapproval by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Regional Office No. XIII of the separate item for Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) appropriation in the City of Butuan's annual budget for the fiscal year 2000. The disapproval was based on the violation of Section 325(h)4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 71605 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), which prohibits appropriations with the same purpose as discretionary funds. Despite seeking reconsideration, the disapproval was affirmed by the DBM. Subsequently, the City Government of Butuan continued to appropriate and grant EME to its officials until 2010, leading to several Notices of Disallowance (NDs) being issued for lack of legal basis. The petitioners, as recipients held liable to settle the disallowances, appealed the NDs, arguing violations of their right to speedy disposition, contesting the propriety of the NDs, and invoking good faith. 

 

Whether there was a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.

NO. The court held that the constitutional guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is not violated merely by the length of time taken for resolution. It emphasized the need to consider factors such as the complexity of the case, number of transactions involved, and other relevant circumstances. The court found that the delay in this case was not arbitrary or oppressive, considering the thorough audit required for 94 disallowances dating back to 2004-2009, and challenges faced by the COA, including the destruction of records in a fire.

 

Whether the issuance of the Notice of Disallowance was proper.

YES. The court upheld the disallowance, stating that EME and discretionary funds have the same purpose and cannot be made separate items of appropriation, as per Section 325(h) of the LGC. The court noted that COA Circulars consistently characterized Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) as similar to discretionary expenses. It also highlighted that the local ordinance circumvented limitations in the LGC and the General Appropriations Acts by appropriating separate amounts for discretionary purposes.

 

Whether good faith can exonerate petitioners' liability to settle the disallowances.

NO. The court rejected petitioners' argument that good faith. It clarified that the recipients' good faith or bad faith is inconsequential, applying principles of solutio indebiti and unjust enrichment. Recipients are liable to refund if the disbursement is without legal basis. The court also explained that local autonomy does not preclude national government intervention, emphasizing compliance with laws and regulations. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petition, affirming the COA's decision on the disallowances.

 

 

 

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National Power Corp. Board of Directors v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218052, [January 26, 2021]

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National Power Corp. Board of Directors v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 218052, [January 26, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Powers of COA;Commission on Audit Disallowances; Liability of approving and certifying officers and recipients of the disallowed amounts 

Public officials, specifically approving and certifying officers, who act in bad faith, malice, or gross negligence in the performance of their official duties, are jointly and severally liable to the government for the full amount of disallowed payments. The court clarified that the essence of due process is satisfied when individuals are afforded an opportunity to be heard, and the court may excuse the return of disallowed amounts based on undue prejudice, social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions on a case-to-case basis. The absence of legal basis or justification for disallowed payments may result in individual liability for recipients.

 

On February 1, 2010, the NPC Board of Directors confirmed and ratified Board Resolution No. 2009-72, granting Calendar Year (CY) 2009 Performance Incentive Benefits (PIB) to NPC Non-Operation and Maintenance Agreement (NMA)-Small Power Utility Group (SPUG)/Watershed and Operation and Maintenance (OMA) Head Office and Engineering officials and employees. The PIB, equivalent to five and one-half monthly basic salaries, was implemented through NPC Circular No. 2009-585, approved by NPC President and CEO, Froilan A. Tampinco. The total amount released was P327,272,424.91. The COA later issued a Notice of Suspension and disallowed the PIB due to lack of presidential approval and its extravagance, considering NPC-SPUG's net loss in CY 2009.

 

Whether or not the Commission on Audit (COA) Proper is correct in affirming the disallowance, and holding petitioners liable to refund the disallowed amounts.

YES. The court found that the COA properly gave notice of disallowance (ND) through constructive service to Tampinco, who had the duty to inform all involved parties. Despite the late filing of the appeal to the COA Proper, the essence of due process was satisfied as petitioners were given an opportunity to be heard. On the merits, the court held that MO No. 198 did not authorize the PIB for CY 2009, and the grant violated the specific requirements of MO No. 198, including the lack of a Productivity Enhancement Program (PEP). The court rejected the argument that the NPC Board's approval was deemed presidential authorization and emphasized the non-compliance with statutory provisions.

The court ruled that petitioners, both approving and certifying officers, are solidarily liable to refund the disallowed amounts. It affirmed the COA decision, stating that the ND was not void, unjust, or inequitable, and petitioners failed to show entitlement to the PIB or any special circumstances justifying non-refund. The court applied Section 43 of the Administrative Code, holding that officers acting in bad faith are liable, and emphasized the absence of genuine justifications for the recipients. The NPC Board of Directors was specified as solidarily liable, while individual recipients were held individually liable for the amounts received. The Petition was dismissed, and the COA decision was affirmed.

 

 

 

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