Chingkoe v. Chingkoe, G.R. No. 244076, [March 16, 2022]

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Chingkoe v. Chingkoe

 G.R. No. 244076, [March 16, 2022]

THIRD, LOPEZ, M.

 

Land Titles and Deeds; Presumption of Regularity of Notarized Deed of Sale; Clear and Convincing Evidence to prove contrary

 

Notarized documents enjoy a presumption of regularity, authenticity, and due execution, which can only be overturned by clear and convincing evidence. In the absence of such evidence, the court should uphold the presumption and consider the document valid. 

Faustino Chingkoe (Faustino) and his wife, Gloria Chingkoe (Gloria), owned a parcel of land in Quezon City. In 1990, Faustino allowed his brother, Felix Chingkoe (Felix), to occupy the property. At the request of their mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino signed an undated Deed of Sale conveying the property to Felix, who claimed to have been in possession since 1989. In 1994, a notarized Deed of Sale was executed, but Faustino refused to surrender the Owner's Duplicate of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), hindering its transfer to Felix. Felix filed a complaint for specific performance, leading to an RTC decision in his favor, upheld on appeal, ordering Faustino to surrender the TCT. The CA later reversed the decision, finding the contract void for lack of consideration.

 

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's decision and declaring the Deed of Sale void for lack of consideration. 

YES. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reinstating the RTC's decision, which affirmed Felix's entitlement to the property based on the validly executed Deed of Sale. The notarized Deed of Sale carried a presumption of regularity, which could only be overturned by clear and convincing evidence. The CA relied on Tan Po Chu's testimony, but it was insufficient to contest the regularity of the document. Tan Po Chu admitted her incompetence to attest to the sale's validity. The trial court correctly found her testimony insufficient. The court emphasized the trial court's unique position to evaluate witness credibility. The CA erred in declaring the contract void due to Felix's failure to prove payment, as actual payment is not an essential requisite of a valid contract. The Deed of Sale's terms attested to full payment. Faustino's claims were considered flimsy, and Felix's unrealized profits claim lacked evidentiary support. The court upheld the RTC's decision, emphasizing the principle of not relieving parties from voluntarily assumed obligations despite unfavorable contracts. The claim for actual damages was denied due to lack of competent proof. The CA decision was reversed, and the RTC decision was reinstated.

 

 

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ALEXANDER V. SPOUSES ESCALONA [G.R. No. 256141, July 19, 2022]

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ALEXANDER V. SPOUSES ESCALONA

G.R. No. 256141, [July 19, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Conjugal properties; Alienation after the effectivity of Family Code; Spouse' Written Consent

 

Any alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code  requires the other spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the transaction, otherwise, the disposition is void. 

Spouses Jorge and Hilaria Escalona were married on November 14, 1960, or during the effectivity of the Civil Code, owned two unregistered parcels of land. During the effectivity of the Family Code, one was transferred to their son Reygan, through the consent of Jorge. Reygan then sold both parcels to Belinda Alexander, claiming validity on the assertion that Jorge exclusively owned the lots. 

The Escalonas contested the sale, alleging Reygan's lack of authority and Hilaria's non-consent. Escalonas filed a complaint for annulment of documents against Belinda and Reygan in the RTC, which dismissed the complaint as time-barred and upheld the contracts. On appeal they argue that prescription do not apply in action to nullify void contracts.

 

Whether action to nullify the transaction has already prescribed. 

NO. Any alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code requires the other spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the transaction, otherwise, the disposition is void. The action to nullify the void alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse, is imprescriptible.

 

Whether the alienation the land is void under Article 124 of the Family Code because it was made without Hilaria's consent. 

YES. The Court declared the transaction void and held that the applicable law is Article 124 of the Family Code, not Article 173 of the Civil Code, because the alienation of the conjugal property transpired after the effectivity of the Family Code even if the spouses were married under the Civil Code. Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code. The absence of the written consent of one spouse renders the alienation void. Consequently, Spouses Escalona remained the lawful owners of the land. The Court likewise agrees with the findings that Belinda can hardly qualify as a buyer in good faith as she merely stepped into the shoes of Reygan whose rights were anchored on ineffective instruments.

Summary of the applicable laws and jurisprudence in transactions involving alienation or encumbrance of conjugal properties:

(1) The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the wife's consent, made before the effectivity of the Family Code, is not void but merely voidable. The wife may file an action for annulment of contract within 10 years from the transaction; and 

(2) The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse, made after the effectivity of the Family Code is void. 

 

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SPOUSES VELARDE V. HEIRS OF CANDARI [G.R. No. 190057, October 17, 2022]

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SPOUSES VELARDE V. HEIRS OF CANDARI

G.R. No. 190057, [October 17, 2022]

SECOND DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Fraud; Quieting of Title; Accion Reivindicatoria 

Physical intrusion over the parcel of land is not a ground for quieting of title. An action that seeks to recover full possession of the properties as an element of their ownership, the action is deemed accion reivindicatoria.

 

The legal heirs of Isagani Velarde (petitioners) claimed ownership of parcels of land located in Aklan based on deeds of conveyances, including a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase executed by Concepcion Candari (Concepcion) in favor of Isagani. Concepcion later executed a Deed of Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights acknowledging Isagani's and the petitioners' ownership of the properties. After Isagani's death, Concepcion began asserting ownership and collected rents from the lands that clouds their title, prompting the heirs to file a complaint for quieting of title and damages. 

Concepcion denied the validity of the deeds, accused Isagani and the heirs of fraud, and asserted that she never sold or relinquished ownership of the properties. She claimed that Isagani was her lessee who held the tax declarations for safekeeping and payment of realty taxes. Whereas petitioner invoke the OCTs and TDs under their names, and argue that their legal title cannot be collaterally attacked in an action for quieting of title by unsupported allegations of fraud. 

 

Whether the action for quieting of title is proper. 

NO. Petitioners' complaint actually constitutes an accion reivindicatoria. Here, petitioners' cause of action is grounded upon their claims of ownership, which they argue to have been clouded by Concepcion's exercise of proprietary rights — instituting tenants and collecting rentals and products. What they perceive as clouds over their title were Concepcion's intrusive acts of dominion over the properties. Physical intrusion is not a ground for quieting of title. Ultimately, they seek to recover full possession of the properties as an element of their ownership, which was disturbed by Concepcion's physical intrusion. Thus, petitioners' claims and arguments clearly speak of an accion reivindicatoria — a suit to recover full possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. The true nature of the action is not determined by the caption of the pleading, but by the allegations it contain.

 

 

Whether the heirs of Isagani Velarde are the rightful owners of the disputed properties.

YES.  The Court held that the heirs of Isagani Velarde are the true and rightful owners entitled to the possession of the disputed properties. The Court rejected Concepcion's unfounded allegations of fraud, emphasizing that fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, which Concepcion failed to provide. The Court noted that the deeds of conveyances were duly executed and notarized, and Concepcion's claims lacked specificity and proof. Hence, as Isagani's heirs, petitioners are entitled to full ownership over the disputed properties.

 

 

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RAMA V. SPOUSES NOGRA [G.R. No. 219556, September 14, 2021]

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RAMA V. SPOUSES NOGRA

 G.R. No. 219556 [September 14, 2021]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Right of Redemption; 30-day written notice requirement 

The written notice of sale is mandatory. For the right of legal pre-emption or redemption to be exercised, written notice by the seller is indispensable for the 30-day redemption period to commence.

 

The case involves a disputed property, an undivided portion of Lot No. 6034-C-2-H-4, registered under the Heirs of Felix Rama. Ricardo Rama sold his one-fourth undivided share to Spouses Nogra in 2001, but other co-owners, including Hermelina Rama, claim they were not aware of this sale until 2007 when it was revealed during barangay conciliation proceedings. Ricardo admitted the sale, but the copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale was only given to Rama on September 26, 2007. Rama attempted to redeem the property, but her offer was rejected by Spouses Nogra claiming that the right to redeem had lapsed. 

Rama filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Redemption, and Other Reliefs in 2007 and consigned the redemption price on October 16, 2007, asserting that a written notice was essential for the redemption period to start under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.

 

Whether Hermelina validly exercised her redemption right by the filing of the complaint before the RTC on October 16, 2007.

 

YES. The 30-day written notice requirement under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code is mandatory for the commencement of the redemption period. The Court has upheld the principle that even if a co-owner has actual knowledge of the sale, the written notice is still indispensable. In this case, there is no evidence of sufficient knowledge of the sale before Hermelina's receipt of the Deed of Absolute Sale on September 26, 2007. Hermelina's exercise of her redemption right by filing the complaint on October 16, 2007, and consigning the redemption price on October 26, 2007, falls within the 30-day period under Article 1623.

 

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. T.A.N. Properties [G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008]

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. T.A.N. Properties

G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008

FIRST DIVISION, CARPIO, J.

 

Property; Land Titles; Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title; Proof of Alienable and Disposable Land under RA 11573 

The burden of proving land's alienable and disposable status lies with the applicant. Certifications from DENR are insufficient; DENR Secretary's approval and survey verification are necessary. 

 

The case involves an application for the registration of a land parcel filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. for Lot 10705-B, covering 56.4007 hectares in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Support its claim that land is alienable and disposable, TAN Properties submitted two certifications; certification from CENRO stating that the subject land as within the Alienable and Disposable Zone and certification from Forest Management Services of the DENR) which stated that the subect area falls within an alienable and disposable land.

Whether the land is alienable and disposable.

NO. The rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. Anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming otherwise.

In this case, TAN submitted two certifications issued by DENR. The certifications, however, are not sufficient.

A. CENRO – issues certificates of land classification status for areas below50 hectares. (It is the PENRO that issues certificates for lands covering 50hectares). Here, the area of the subject land covers over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

B. FMS-DENR - has no authority under DAO (DENR-Admin Order) to issue certificates of land classification.

 

Moreover, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that:

               i.    The DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.

              ii.    In addition, the applicant for land registration must (4) present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. TAN failed to do so. As the respondent failed to prove the land's alienable and disposable nature, its application for registration was denied.

 

 

Whether TAN or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorios possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner?

(Update: Under the new law, RA 11573 effective July 16, 2021 – the required period of possession is 20 years prior to the application of the petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title)

NO. The Court find’s TAN’s uncorroborated witness testimony insufficient to prove that TAN’s predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. Moreover, the tax declarations presented were only for the years starting1955. TAN did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945.

Doctrine allowing private corporations to apply for registration doesn't apply when land was not already private when acquired. In this case, TAN acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30years since 12 June 1945. Hence, TAN failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when it acquired it from Porting in 1997.

 

What is the required proof that Land is Alienable and Disposable under RA 11573:AN ACT IMPROVING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS FOR IMPERFECT LAND TITLES

Under the new law, for purposes of judicial confirmation of imperfect titles, a duly signed certification by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer that the land is part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain is sufficient proof that the land is alienable; and the certification shall state the applicable Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, Proclamations and the Land Classification Project Map Number covering the subject land.

If such documents has no available copy, present a sworn statement declaring that said land classification map is existing in the inventory of LC Map records of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is being used by the DENR as land classification map.

Moreover, said Geodetic Engineer shall be presented in the witness stand during trial and hearing of the Petition for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Titles.

 

 

 

AQUINO V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN [G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014]

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AQUINO V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN

G.R. No. 211356  [September 29, 2014]

THIRD DIVISION, VELASCO, JR.

 

Property; Nuisance; Demolition of Property in “no build zone”

LGC authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

 

Crisostomo Aquino is the president of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). The company applied for a zoning compliance for the construction of a three-story hotel on a parcel of land in Boracay Island. Despite already operating a resort in the area, the application was denied due to the proposed construction site being within the "no build zone" as per a municipal ordinance. The municipal government issued a Cease and Desist Order and later, Executive Order No. 10 was issued, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove's hotel. Aquino argued that proper judicial proceedings should have been conducted before the demolition and that the municipality lacks jurisdiction over the forestland area. Aquino filed to certiorari petition on the validity of EO10 and the acts of concerned municipality.

Whether the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10, that leads to the demolition of Hotel Property valid, absent prior judicial proceedings.

 

YES. It finds that the hotel was not a nuisance per se, but a nuisance per accidens due to its location. The mayor's power to order the demolition of illegal constructions is upheld, since the property was clearly build under a “no build zone”. In establishing no build zone through a municipal ordinance, the LGU effectively decided that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No build zones are intended for the protection of the public because the stability of the ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of water.

Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.

 

 

Whether the respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions?

YES. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. Moreover, the LGC authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel. Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

 

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Rana v. Wong [G.R. No. 192861-62. June 30, 2014]

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Rana v. Wong

G.R. No. 192861-62. [June 30, 2014]

SECOND DIVISION, PERLAS-BERNABE

 

Property; Nuisance; Abatement of Nuisance

Unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it cannot be summarily abated.

 

Teresita Lee Wong and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong co-own a residential land in Cebu City. Across the road, Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the road and backfilled near the property of Spouses Wilson and Rosario Uy, without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling materials.

This led to a legal case where Wong, et al., claimed the actions of Sps. Rana constituted a nuisance affecting road access and safety, through a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with Damages against Sps. Rana before the RTC. The RTC ruled that the backfilling was a nuisance. The backfilling done by Sps. Rana on their property exerted pressure on the perimeter fence of the Uy property, thereby constituting a nuisance. The Court of Appeals upheld these rulings.

 

Whether the elevated and cemented road portion created by Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana considered a nuisance per se.

  

NO. The court discusses the legal definitions of nuisances and clarifies that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it cannot be summarily abated. The court rules that the elevated road portion is not a nuisance per se, as it does not inherently endanger health, safety, or obstruct passage, and thus, its demolition was unwarranted.  Consequently, its summary abatement without judicial permission is not justified. 

The court also addresses the subject backfilling, deeming it a nuisance and ordering Linda Rana to construct a retaining wall to rectify the issue.

 

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