Study Smart Law · Torni Dors · May batas pala diyan?
The 1936 Law That Says You Need a Court Order to Use Another Name
Commonwealth Act No. 142, An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases · approved 7 November 1936 · as amended by Republic Act No. 6085, approved 4 August 1969
CONTROLLING DOCTRINE.
Commonwealth Act No. 142 does not punish the mere use of another name. It punishes the use of an alias — a name used publicly and habitually, in addition to one’s real name, with a manifest intent to be known by it. A single or isolated use, or repeated use confined to one day or one private dealing, falls outside the Act. The statutory text is considerably wider than what the Supreme Court actually enforces, and it should never be read without Ursua and Estrada.
Your screen name. Your stage name. The name painted on your store signage. The one your suki have called you since you were a child. There is a Philippine statute that governs all of it, and it has been on the books since 1936.
It is a short Act — five sections — and it is rarely taught and rarely litigated. It is also, read literally, startlingly broad. The useful part of this post is the last third, where two Supreme Court decisions cut it back down to something sensible. But start with the text, because the text is the reason people get worried.
What the Act actually says
Section 1, as rewritten by RA 6085 in 1969, works by permission rather than by prohibition. Instead of listing forbidden names, it lists the only sources a usable name may come from. Anything outside that list is an alias, and an alias needs a court.
Permitted name 1
Registered at birth
The name registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry.
Permitted name 2
Baptized with, first time
The name with which the person was baptized for the first time. The statute says first time, which matters for anyone baptized more than once.
Permitted name 3
Bureau of Immigration
For an alien — the name registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry into the country.
Permitted name 4
Authorized by a court
A substitute name that has been authorized by a competent court, through the procedure in Section 2.
The exception — and why it is so short
Section 1, as amended — the only carve-out
A pseudonym “solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes” — and in athletic events, and there only “where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice.”
Two words in that clause do a great deal of work. “Solely” qualifies the entertainment list: the pseudonym must be used for those purposes, not as a general second identity carried into the rest of one’s life. And the athletic limb is conditional, not a blanket permission for athletes — it applies where a pseudonym is a normally accepted practice in the event concerned.
Novelist, filmmaker, broadcaster, athlete. That is the whole of it. Everything else — the market vendor, the freelancer, the content creator, the person who has simply been called something else their entire life — is outside the exception on the face of the statute.
Why the list stops where it does
The shape of that list is the clearest thing in the Act, because it is a fossil of the last time Congress looked at the question.
| When |
What the exception said |
1936
CA 142 |
“Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes” — and nothing else. Books were the entirety of it. |
1969
RA 6085 |
Widened to a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes, and to athletic events where a pseudonym is a normally accepted practice. |
| Since |
No later amendment has been found — though see the caution at the foot of this post, since a comprehensive repeal search was not possible. The list of callings in which one may lawfully go by another name is, on the text available, a 1969 list. That is the single fact that explains why this Act sits so awkwardly against the way people name themselves online. |
One alias. That is the lifetime allowance.
Section 2 sends anyone who wants a lawful alias to court, in proceedings like those for a change of name. The petition must set out the person’s baptismal name and family name, the name recorded in the civil registry if it differs, the alien immigrant’s name where relevant, and the alias sought, together with the reasons for wanting it.
And then the limit. The section provides that “no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias.” One, for a lifetime. Note what the limit attaches to: it caps the judicial authority, not the number of names other people may happen to call a person by.
What is then recorded in the proper local civil registry is, in the statute’s own words, “the judicial authority for the use of alias the Christian name and the alien immigrant’s name.” And the section does not stop there. It closes with a second, free-standing rule that is almost always overlooked: “and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.”
Section 3 then attaches a continuing disclosure duty — but its opening clause matters more than its operative one, and is the single most misquoted thing in this Act. The duty is laid on four defined categories: a person baptized with a name different from the one registered at birth; an alien registered in the Bureau of Immigration on entry; a person who obtained judicial authority to use an alias; and a person who uses a pseudonym.
For those persons — and on the text, only those persons — there may be no representing oneself in any public or private transaction, and no signing or executing any public or private document, without stating or affixing the real or original name together with all names, aliases or pseudonyms the person is or may have been authorized to use. The Act never lets the alias replace the real name. It only ever lets the alias accompany it.
Do not read Section 3 as a general rule. It is commonly paraphrased as “no person may sign any document without stating his real name,” which drops the qualifying clause and turns a class-specific duty into a universal one. If you quote the section, quote its opening clause with it.
And a fourth section nobody cites
RA 6085 also inserted a wholly new Section 4 into CA 142, which is why the amended Act still has five sections while containing different ones. It is transitory and long spent: six months from the approval of the amending Act, and subject to Section 1, all persons who had been using any name or alias different from those authorized in Section 1 and duly recorded in the local civil registry were prohibited from continuing to use it. That six-month deadline is a different thing from the one-year registration window in Section 1 — the two are easily confused.
The penalty, and the 1969 jump
CA 142, as enacted 1936
One to six months
Imprisonment of from one month to six months, and no fine at all.
As amended by RA 6085, 1969
One to five years, and a fine
Imprisonment of from one year to five years and a fine of ₱5,000 to ₱10,000. The fine is conjunctive with the imprisonment, not an alternative to it.
A note on the peso figures. Those amounts were fixed in 1969 and have not been adjusted. RA 10951, which reset the values and fines throughout the Revised Penal Code in 2017, does not reach CA 142 — this is a special law and sits outside that statute. The confusion usually comes from Article 178 of the Revised Penal Code, using a fictitious name, whose fine RA 10951 did raise. That is a different offense in a different statute. Confirm against the Official Gazette before relying on the figures in a live matter.
Before anyone panics: what the Supreme Court did to all this
Read on its own, Section 1 would make a criminal of most of the country. It does not, and the reason is two decisions that define the operative word so narrowly that the Act reaches only what it was built for.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals · G.R. No. 112170 · 10 April 1996
A government officer went in person to the Office of the Ombudsman to collect a copy of a complaint filed against him, his lawyer’s messenger being unavailable that day. He signed the visitors’ logbook with the messenger’s name instead of his own, and signed the acknowledgment of receipt of the complaint the same way. Two uses, one afternoon — which is why Estrada later had to reason about repetition within a single day. He was convicted under CA 142. The Supreme Court, through Bellosillo, J., First Division, reversed and acquitted him.
“A name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name”
The Court’s working definition of “alias” under CA 142 · Ursua v. Court of Appeals
“the use of a fictitious name… in a single instance without any sign… that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth… does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142”
Ursua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, 10 April 1996
The Court also traced the Act back to the legislative concern of its own era — a business practice of adopting many different names, producing what the decision calls “tremendous confusion in the field of trade.” That stated purpose is why the operative idea is a name held out to the public in one’s dealings, and not simply any name a person uses. (The passage in Ursua names a particular community as the practice Congress had in mind; it is quoted here only for the confusion-in-trade purpose, which is the part that still explains the statute’s shape.)
People v. Estrada · G.R. Nos. 164368–69 · En Banc · 2 April 2009
The charge concerned the use of the name “Jose Velarde” in opening a bank trust account on 4 February 2000. The Sandiganbayan acquitted on the alias count. The Supreme Court, through Brion, J., sitting En Banc, affirmed the acquittal, applying Ursua by stare decisis.
“The repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed ‘habitual,’ as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.”
People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368–69, 2 April 2009
“In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name.”
People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368–69, 2 April 2009. The much-quoted sentence “The intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest” appears separately in the decision, with another sentence between the two — they are often run together, and should not be.
The bank secrecy point is worth keeping. The Court reasoned that the privacy and secrecy guaranteed to bank deposits by RA 1405 negated the conclusion that the transaction had been done publicly, or with an intent to use the alias publicly. Where the law itself makes a dealing confidential, that confidentiality cuts against the “public” element of the offense.
So what does the offense actually require?
Read what follows as a synthesis, not a holding. Neither Ursua nor Estrada lays down a numbered element test. The list below is a working frame drawn from the two decisions. Cite the decisions, not the list.
One more distinction first, because it is almost always collapsed. As amended, CA 142 contains at least three separate prohibitions: Section 1 (using a name outside the four permitted sources, without judicial authority and outside the pseudonym exception); the closing clause of Section 2 (using any name other than the real one unless it is duly recorded in the local civil registry); and Section 3 (for the four categories it names, failing to state the real name alongside an authorized alias or pseudonym). What follows concerns the Section 1 offense, which is the one both decisions construe.
- The accused used a name other than one of the names Section 1 permits — characteristically a second name carried alongside the real one.
- The use was public — the accused held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name, and, on Estrada, the intent to use it publicly was manifest.
- The use was habitual — a customary practice, not a single instance, and not repetition confined within a single day.
- The use fell outside the pseudonym exception and was not authorized by a competent court.
On the element you may have expected to see. Ursua’s definition describes an alias as a name used “in addition to his real name.” That is descriptive of what the word means, and promoting it to a required element produces an absurdity — a person using a false name instead of his real one would fall outside the Act entirely. Keep it as part of the definition, not as something separately to be proved.
A caution in both directions. Because the public and habitual requirements are so fact-intensive, this offense is hard to prove. That is a reason to advise carefully — not a reason to treat the statute as a dead letter. No later repeal has been found, and the penalty is a serious one.
Three regimes get conflated with CA 142 constantly. They do different work.
| Route |
What it actually does |
| Rule 103, Rules of Court |
Judicial change of name. It replaces the name, where CA 142 is about using a second name alongside the real one. The two are not unrelated in procedure, though: Section 2 routes an alias petition through proceedings like those for a change of name. |
| RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 |
Administrative correction before the civil registrar — clerical or typographical errors, change of first name or nickname, and, RA 10172’s own addition, the day and month of birth and the sex in the record. Again a correction of the record — not an authority to use an alias. |
| Business or trade name registration |
A separate regime altogether, governed by Act No. 3883, the Business Name Law, administered by the DTI. Whether a registered business name engages Section 3 at all is an open question on the text, since Section 3 binds only the four categories it names. Treat it as unsettled rather than assuming either answer. |
Questions people actually ask
Q
Is my handle an alias?
On the bare text, arguably. On the authorities, almost certainly not — unless you use it publicly and habitually to transact in addition to your real name, with a manifest intent to be known by it.
Q
Are pen names allowed?
Yes. The exception expressly covers a pseudonym solely for literary purposes, and since 1969 for cinema, television, radio and other entertainment purposes.
Q
How many can a court grant?
One. Section 2 provides that no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias — and it must be duly recorded.
Q
May I sign with the alias alone?
If you fall within Section 3’s four categories, no — the real or original name must appear together with every authorized alias, in any public or private transaction and on any public or private document.
Q
Did RA 10951 update the fine?
No. RA 10951 adjusted Revised Penal Code figures. CA 142 is a special law and falls outside it, so the 1969 amounts stand as printed. You may be thinking of RPC Art. 178, using a fictitious name — a different offense.
Q
Does it reach corporations?
Its terms speak of civil registry, baptismal and immigration entry names — features of natural persons. Do not extend it to juridical entities without authority.
How to cite it. “Commonwealth Act No. 142 (1936), as amended by Republic Act No. 6085 (1969),” then the section. Always flag the amendment — the unamended Act carries a different penalty and a much narrower exception, and the sections were renumbered.
Two checks before relying on this. First, confirm that no statute after RA 6085 has amended or repealed CA 142. The text consulted carries no amendment annotation and RA 10951 does not touch it, but no comprehensive repeal search was possible — treat “still in force” as unverified until checked against the Official Gazette. Second, confirm the current standing of Ursua and Estrada — both are long established and Estrada is En Banc, but check for later En Banc treatment before citing them as settled in a filing.
Legal information, not legal advice. Whether a particular use of a name is “public and habitual” is a question of fact. Anyone with a live concern — particularly anyone transacting, invoicing or signing under a name other than their registered one — should consult counsel.
Sources. Commonwealth Act No. 142 (7 November 1936); Republic Act No. 6085 (4 August 1969); Ursua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, 10 April 1996; People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368–69, En Banc, 2 April 2009.
Study Smart Law · Torni Dors, “May batas pala diyan?” · Episode 12
