Nepomuceno v.CA [139 SCRA 206]

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Nepomuceno v.CA
139 SCRA 206
October 9, 1985

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

TOPIC: Intrinsic Validity on Probate Order

FACTS: Martin Jugo died with last Will and Testament with all the formalities required by law. In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace.

 

The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the CFI Rizal and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary. The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition.

 

The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.

 

The case reached the CA and the respondent court set aside the decision of the CFI of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The CA declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028.

 

ISSUE: WON the probate court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

 

HELD Yes, as an exception. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

 

In Nuguid v. Nuguid, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.

 

The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

  

Here, the will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner. The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. Thus, the devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

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Pastor v. CA [G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983]

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Pastor v. CA

G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Intrinsic Validity and Ownership on a Probate Order; 

 
FACTS: Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance.

 
The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon.

 
Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.

 
Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedent’s estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being ―immediately executory‖, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment.

 
The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositor’s motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

 
ISSUE: Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.
 

RULING: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
 
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will ―with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.‖ It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties.
 
The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

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Maninang v. CA [G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982]

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 Maninang v. CA

G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982

 

 SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Preterition

 

FACTS: Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will saying that all her real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all her personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she have lived with. Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the CFI. Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.

 

Bernardo contends that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case.

 

ISSUE: WON the Courta quoa quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case.

 

HELD: YES. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.- The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate."

 

Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded. Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator.

 

In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.

 

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.  Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

 

By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable.  Such preterition is still questionable.  The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.

 

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De la Cerna v. Potot [G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964]

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De la Cerna v. Potot

G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Probate of Joint Wills

 

FACTS: Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament whereby they willed that their two parcels of land acquired during their marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece. Bernabe died and the will was probated in 1939 after due publication as required by law and there being no opposition. By order of Oct. 31, 1939, the Court admitted for probate the said will but only for the part of Bernabe.

 

Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed by Manuela but the court dismissed it for failure of Manuela to appear.

  

Paula de la Cerna questioned for the nullity of the joint will of Bernabe being prohibited in the Philippine law. The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament. Hence, this appeal.

  

ISSUE: Whether or not the joint will is valid as to the share of Gervasia who died later than Bernabe.

 

RULING: NO.

 

The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world. However, this is only with respect to the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife; considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator.The probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue.

 

Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime. It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs’ intestate, and not to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist.

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Gallanosa v. Arcangel [G.R. No. L-29300; June 21, 1978]

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Gallanosa v. Arcangel

G.R. No. L-29300; June 21, 1978

 

 SUBJECT: Law on Wills and Succession

Topic/Doctrine: Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

 

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis executed a will in 1938 when he was eighty years old wherein he instituted as his only heirs his stepson Pedro Gallanosa and the latter’s wife Corazon Grecia. He died in 1939, survived by his brother Leon Hitosis and several nephews and nieces.

 

A petition for probate was duly filed by the testamentary heirs. Opposition to the probate was registered by the legal heirs. After hearing, the probate court admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as executor. In 1943, a project of partition of sixty-one (61) parcels of land constituting the bulk of the testator’s estate was finally approved. There was no appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of partition and distribution.

 

In 1952, the testator’s legal heirs instituted an action for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land on the ground of acquisitive prescription. The action was dismissed. Again, there was no appeal from the order of dismissal. In 1967, said legal heirs instituted another action in the same court against the testamentary heirs for the “annulment” of the will and the recovery of the 61 parcels of land, alleging that the Gallanosa spouses caused the execution of the will through fraud and deceit. Upon motion of defendants, the court dismissed the action. Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondent Judge granted it and set aside the order of dismissal. From this order of dismissal, defendants went up to the Supreme Court by certiorari.

 

Petitioners (defendants) contend that private respondents (plaintiffs) do not have a cause of action for the “annulment” of the will and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of landby reason of res judicata and of prescription. On the other hand, private respondents contend that the will is void, and therefore their right of action is imprescriptible.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action for the annulment of the will of Florention Hitosis and for the recovery of the parcels of land.

  

HELD: No.

 

The lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering its order of dismissal and in ignoring the testamentary case. It is evident from the allegations of the complaint that the action is barred by res judicata. The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will. The decree of adjudication rendered by the trial court in the testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis having been rendered in a proceeding in rem, is binding upon the whole world.

 

Speaking through Justice Aquino, the Supreme Court held:

“It is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from defendants’ motion to dismiss that plaintiffs’ 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense, and by prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile and the jus gentium as usucapio, longitemporispossesio and praescriptio" (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).

 

Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the “annulment” of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory

 

The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will.That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.

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Union Bank of the Phil. vs. Santibanez [G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005]

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Union Bank of the Phil. vs. Santibanez

G.R. No. 149926,  February 23, 2005

452 SCRA 228

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Probate of Wills

FACTS: Efraim Santibanez obtained a loan First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC; Unionbank is its successor) in two instances. This is for the payment of [2] tractors that he purchased. He executed loan agreements and promissory notes (PNs). Edmund, his son, was co-maker in the PNs. Efraim eventually died without having these obligation being fully paid. He left a holographic will which was then probated before the court. Subsequently, Edmund and his sister Florence (heirs of Efraim) executed a Joint Agreement whereby they distributed to themselves certain properties, including the tractors that were financed by the subject loans. The Agreement also provides that the heirs agree to assume the indebtedness pertaining to the properties allotted to them.

 

Unionbank then sent demand letters to Edmund and Florence for the payment of the balance of the obligations but these remained unpaid.

 

In defense, Florence argued that:

• Unionbank should have filed its claim before the probate court in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court; and
• The Joint Agreement executed by her and her brother were null and void since there can be no distribution of the estate of the deceased until the will was probated first, and that at the time of the execution of the agreement, the proceedings for the probate of her father’s will is still pending.

ISSUE: May a creditor of a deceased for a money claim collect directly from the heir on the ground that obligations of the deceased transmit to said heirs from the moment of death of the decedent?

 

 RULING: NO. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.

 

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

 

At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.

 

Moreover, the joint agreement is invalid. The partition is nullity absent the mandatory probate of the will. It provides that the heirs as parties thereto “have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp.” The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.

 

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Lipana v. CFI of Cavite [G.R. No. 47174, June 28, 1940]

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Lipana v. CFI of Cavite

G.R. No. 47174, June 28, 1940

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Probate of a destroyed or lost Will

 

FACTS: One Eliodora Lipana filed in the respondent court an application for the probate of a will supposedly executed by the deceased, Manuela Lipana, a carbon copy of which was attached to the application. Natividad Lipana filed an opposition, she claimed that evidence was unnecessary upon the facts alleged in the application, the copy of the will attached thereto showing, in itself, that the will had not been executed in accordance with law. The respondent court, after inspecting the copy of the will but without a hearing, dismissed the application on the ground that such copy could not be admitted to probate, it not having been signed by the testatrix and the attesting witnesses at the end thereof and on the left margin of each page. It is against this order of dismissal that the petition for certiorari has been filed with this court.

 

 

ISSUE: WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction?

 

HELD: Yes. There can be no doubt that the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in rendering a judgment upon the merits of the case without a previous hearing. The pronouncement made by the respondent court that the will had not been executed in accordance with law, is founded undoubtedly on the erroneous assumption that the probate of the carbon copy of the will was being applied for.

 

It is apparent from the application that what is sought to be admitted to probate is the original of the will. It is alleged therein that the original was in the possession of a third person or that it was either lost or destroyed by some person other than the testatrix. Such copy was attached to the application merely to corroborate the allegation as to the existence of its original and not to establish a full compliance with the requirements of the law as to the execution of the will.

 

Under section 623 of Act No. 190, if a will is shown to have been torn by some other person without the express direction of the testator, it may be admitted to probate, if its contents, due execution and its unauthorized destruction are established by satisfactory evidence. The applicant, therefore, was entitled to hearing to prove the due execution of the original will and its loss or destruction, and the respondent court had no statutory authority to dismiss the application without such hearing.

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Gago v. Mamuyac [G.R. No. 23317 Jan 29, 1927]

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Gago v. Mamuyac

G.R. No. 23317 Jan 29, 1927

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Revocation of a Will

 

Facts: Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will.

 

Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

 

 ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will.

  

HELD: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.

Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan [G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006]

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Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan

 G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006

510 SCRA 496

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: An Unprobated Will Does Not Pass Any Right

 

FACTS: There was a complaint for unlawful detainer alleging that the plaintiffs were the owners of the property. The defendants were allegedly possessing the property by mere tolerance. In their defense, they alleged that they have a better right because they inherited it from their father, showing a Last Will and Testament which has not yet been probated. The lower courts (MTC and RTC) ruled that with the will they have a better right, but the CA reversed on the ground that the will has not yet been probated, hence, it has no passed any right.

 

In this case, both parties were claiming to have better right of possession due to ownership. One party claiming that there was conveyance; the other, having inherited it, hence, claiming a better right of possession following the law on succession.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Heirs can claim better right of possession following the law on succession, based upon a will which has not yet been probated.

  

Held: NO. The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to establish the right of possession without having been probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.

Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:

 

Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

 

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s death shall govern.  Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

 

In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) it was ruled that: “a will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: ‘No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.’”

 

Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceedings to establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.

 

Since the will has not yet been probated, it has no effect whatsoever and it cannot be the basis of any claim of any right of possession. The defendants have a better right of possession based on the deed of conveyances executed by the owner.

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Province of North Cotabato v. GRP [GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008]

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 Province of North Cotabato v. GRP

GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION

Topic: Creation of Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE); Concept of Associative State; Expansion of territory of ARMM

Facts: In pursuit of peace in Mindanao, the Philippine Government and MILF agreed to undergo peace talks. The fruit of the talks is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The parties were about to sign the agreement but petitioners filed for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued the TRO.

The MOA-AD essentially would create a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), which would result to an associative relationship (a state within a state).

ISSUE: Whether or not the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution and laws.

RULING:  UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The provisions of MOA-AD establishes an associative relationship with the Philippine Government and the BJE resulting to the latter as a separate independent state or a juridical, territorial, political subdivision not recognized by law. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship (a state within a state) envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President, dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

In sum, upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

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League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC

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League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION

Topic: RA 9009 on income requirement for cities; Cityhood Laws exemption

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

 

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.

 

ISSUE: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution on the creation of LGUs in accordance with the criteria in the local government code, and not in any other law.

 

RULING:

• ·   1^st ruling – unconstitutional (2008)
• ·       2^nd ruling – valid (2009)
• ·       3^rd ruling – unconstitutional (2010)
• ·       4^th ruling – valid (2011 FINAL RULING)

RATIO on FINAL RULING: Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11^th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of 100 million imposed by RA 9009. The exemption clause found in the individual cityhood bills are the express articulation of that intent of Congress to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009.

It cannot be denied (based on the exchange of Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel during the deliberation of RA 9009) that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting the municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement (from 20Million to 100 Million) imposed by the LGC as amended by RA 9009. Indeed these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledge that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to mention that this distinctive traits, makes it’s a self-sufficient cities.

 

Molo v. Molo [G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951]

 - CASE DIGEST -

Molo v. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: principle of dependent relative revocation

 

FACTS: Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

 

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

 

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

 

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will

 

RULING: Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

 

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

  

The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will.

 

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