TEOLOGO AND DELOS SANTOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 238383, April 2, 2025]

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TEOLOGO AND DELOS SANTOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. 238383, April 2, 2025]

SECOND DIVISION, KHO, JR., J.

 

Theft; Qualified Theft; Grave Abuse of Confidence; Service Charges; Constructive Possession; Continuous Crime; Employees' Benefits

Employees acquire constructive possession over their respective shares in service charges once the amounts due them are determined, allocated, and reflected in the payroll. The unlawful withholding and appropriation thereof constitute theft. However, qualified theft through grave abuse of confidence cannot be appreciated where the trust relationship relied upon exists between the accused and their employer, while the persons actually deprived of the property are co-employees. The abuse of confidence contemplated by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code must exist between the offender and the offended party.

 

Janice Teologo and Jennifer Delos Santos were store managers of Shakey's Angono, Rizal, owned by Big G Philfoods & Entertainment, Inc. Together with two other managers, they were responsible for distributing employees' salaries and shares in service charges. From June to September 2009, Big G issued checks intended for the payment of employees' shares in collected service charges. 

The anomaly was discovered when management received information that certain employees were not receiving their service charge shares despite having signed payrolls indicating receipt. An internal investigation revealed that several employees had been required to sign payrolls although they never actually received the corresponding amounts. Employees Mark Christopher Quetua and Ingimar Buenaventura specifically testified that their shares in the service charges were withheld pursuant to an alleged company policy communicated by the store managers. 

Petitioners claimed that the service charges were merely recomputed and redistributed because some employees allegedly failed to submit required documents. However, they failed to identify who supposedly received the recomputed amounts and admitted that such recomputation was never reported to management. 

The RTC convicted petitioners of qualified theft. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modification as to the penalty. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

 

Whether petitioners are criminally liable for theft arising from the withholding of employees' service charges.

YES. The Supreme Court partly granted the petition. While it sustained the finding of criminal liability, it modified the conviction from qualified theft to simple theft.

The Court held that all the elements of theft were established. The service charges rightfully belonged to the employees. Once the service charges were computed, allocated, reflected in the payroll, and the employees affixed their signatures acknowledging the amounts due them, the employees acquired constructive possession over their respective shares. Although actual cash had not yet been physically delivered, the employees already had a vested right to control and receive the amounts earmarked for them.

Petitioners deprived the employees of these amounts by implementing an unauthorized policy withholding payment. The employees never consented to such withholding and were misled into believing that it was company policy. Petitioners likewise failed to account for the missing funds, thereby demonstrating intent to gain. The unlawful taking was accomplished without violence, intimidation, or force. Thus, all the elements of theft were present.

 

 

Whether the crime committed is qualified theft by reason of grave abuse of confidence.

NO. Although petitioners occupied managerial positions that enjoyed the trust and confidence of their employer, Big G, the Court emphasized that the property stolen did not belong to Big G. Rather, the persons actually deprived of the property were Quetua and Buenaventura, whose service charge shares were withheld. 

The qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence requires that the relationship of trust exist between the offender and the offended party. In this case, while petitioners occupied positions of trust vis-à-vis their employer, no similar fiduciary or confidential relationship existed between them and the rank-and-file employees whose service charges were withheld. Consequently, the qualifying circumstance could not be appreciated. Petitioners were therefore liable only for simple theft, not qualified theft.

 

Whether conspiracy existed among the accused.

YES. The Court found conspiracy sufficiently established. Both Quetua and Buenaventura testified that all four managers, including petitioners, uniformly implemented the policy withholding service charges from employees allegedly lacking certain requirements. Their coordinated actions demonstrated a common design and concerted effort to deprive the employees of their service charge shares. The acts of one conspirator were therefore attributable to all.

  

Whether the successive withholdings constituted separate crimes or a single continuous offense.

The Court further ruled that only one crime of theft was committed despite the repeated monthly withholdings. Applying the doctrine on continuous or continued crimes, the Court held that the successive takings were all motivated by a single criminal intent and constituted part of one continuing scheme to deprive employees of their service charges. Although the amounts were withheld over several months and affected more than one employee, the acts arose from a singular criminal resolution and therefore constituted only one continuing offense.

 

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ANTONINO v. BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK, INC. [G.R. No. 273446 and G.R. No. 273493, (2025)]

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ANTONINO v. BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK, INC.

[G.R. No. 273446 and G.R. No. 273493, (2025)]

THIRD DIVISION, GAERLAN, J.

 

 Banking Law; Time Deposit Certificates (TDCs); Possession of Original TDCs; Burden of Proof; Laches; Bank's Fiduciary Duty; Damages

The possession of the original Time Deposit Certificates by the depositor is compelling evidence that the deposits have not been redeemed where the certificates themselves require surrender upon redemption. Banks, because of the fiduciary nature of their business, are held to the highest degree of diligence in verifying withdrawals and preserving records. Failure to observe such diligence renders the bank liable not only for the unpaid deposits and accrued interest but also for damages. Banks may be held liable for moral damages suffered by depositors due to negligence, even if there is no proof of bad faith or malice.

 

Remedios and Angelita Antonino made several US Dollar time deposit placements with Banco de Oro (BDO) San Lorenzo Branch, evidenced by various Time Deposit Certificates (TDCs). They claimed that the deposits were subject to an agreement for automatic rollover if left unredeemed because they resided most of the time in the United States.

Years later, after recovering the original TDCs from a safety deposit box kept in Banco Filipino, they demanded payment from BDO. The bank refused, claiming that the deposits had already been redeemed in 2001 and presented internal transaction records and a demand draft allegedly signed by Angelita as proof of withdrawal.

Angelita denied redeeming the deposits and presented a Bureau of Immigration certification and passport records showing that she was outside the Philippines on the date of the alleged withdrawal. A handwriting expert likewise testified that the signature on the demand draft was probably not hers.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Remedios and Angelita, ordering BDO to pay the proceeds of the time deposits covered by four TDCs. BDO elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

  

1. Whether Remedios and Angelita sufficiently proved their entitlement to payment of the deposits covered by TDC Nos. 1117687, 1193123, 1193124, and 1193125 despite BDO’s claim that these had already been redeemed.

YES. The evidence preponderantly established that the four TDCs had not yet been redeemed. The Supreme Court sustained the factual findings of the RTC and CA. It emphasized that possession of the original TDCs by Remedios and Angelita strongly indicated that the deposits had not been redeemed because the terms and conditions of the TDCs expressly required surrender of the certificates upon redemption. If redemption had truly occurred, the original certificates should have been in the possession of BDO.

The Court found BDO’s evidence less persuasive. Its computer-generated transaction histories were merely internal records. More importantly, the alleged redemption through Angelita was contradicted by official BOI records and passport entries showing that she was not in the Philippines on the date of the supposed withdrawal. The Court gave full evidentiary weight to the BOI Certification as a public document enjoying the presumption of regularity.

The handwriting expert’s testimony further reinforced the conclusion that Angelita likely did not sign the demand draft. Consequently, BDO failed to establish that the deposits had already been paid.

 

 

2. Whether Remedios and Angelita were barred by laches due to their long delay in claiming the deposits.

No. Remedios and Angelita were not guilty of laches. The Court rejected BDO’s argument that the claim was stale due to the passage of time. The TDCs contained a provision stating that if not redeemed, renewed, or rolled over on maturity, they would automatically earn interest as savings deposits. Moreover, BSP regulations provide that matured time deposits not withdrawn or renewed shall be treated as savings deposits earning interest until actual withdrawal or renewal.

Given these contractual and regulatory provisions, the deposits remained active and interest-bearing. There was therefore no abandonment, neglect, or unreasonable delay that could justify the application of laches. To rule otherwise would undermine the very nature of investment instruments intended to appreciate over time.

 

 

3. Whether BDO was liable for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and interest.

Yes. BDO was liable for damages and attorney’s fees. The Court reiterated that banks are engaged in a business impressed with public interest and are required to observe a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. BDO failed to exercise such diligence when it allegedly allowed redemption by a person whose identity and authority were not properly verified, failed to require surrender of the original TDCs, and could no longer produce critical documents supposedly supporting the redemption.

The Court found that Remedios and Angelita suffered mental anguish and anxiety from being deprived of their investments. Accordingly, it awarded:

• USD 100,000.70 plus accrued interest on the four valid TDCs;
• ₱100,000.00 moral damages;
• ₱300,000.00 exemplary damages;
• ₱150,000.00 attorney’s fees;
• Costs of suit; and
• 6% legal interest per annum on the total judgment award from finality of judgment until full payment.

 

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PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK v. SPOUSES CASTAÑEDA [G.R. No. 185110, August 19, 2024]

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PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK v. SPOUSES CASTAÑEDA

[G.R. No. 185110, August 19, 2024]

THIRD DIVISION, CAGUIOA, J.

 

 Obligations and Contracts; Application of Payments (Arts. 1252 and 1254, Civil Code); Separate Juridical Personality; Suretyship; Banking Law; Good Faith

The rule on application of payments under Article 1252 of the Civil Code applies only when the same debtor owes several debts to the same creditor. A creditor cannot apply the payment of an individual debtor to the separate obligations of a corporation merely because the debtor is a corporate officer, stockholder, or surety. The separate juridical personality of a corporation must be respected. Moreover, even where a creditor is contractually authorized to determine the application of payments, such authority must be exercised in good faith and cannot be used to prejudice the debtor by diverting payments to obligations of other persons or entities. A surety does not become the same juridical person as the principal debtor, and the suretyship relationship does not justify applying the surety’s personal payments to the corporation’s debts.

 

Spouses Engracio and Lourdes Castañeda obtained a personal loan from Premiere Development Bank (PDB) in the amount of ₱2.6 million, covered by Promissory Note (PN) No. 717-X. To secure the loan, a Manila Polo Club membership certificate was assigned and pledged as collateral.

Separately, two corporations connected with Engracio Castañeda had outstanding loans with PDB: Casent Realty and Development Corporation and Central Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. These corporate loans were secured by separate collateral and mortgage agreements. Engracio was an officer of both corporations and had executed surety agreements for certain corporate obligations.

When the spouses’ personal loan matured, they tendered a ₱2.6 million check intended as full payment of their personal loan. At around the same time, Central Surety tendered a separate ₱6 million check intended to pay one of its own corporate loans. Instead of applying each payment to the respective obligation for which it was tendered, PDB combined the two payments amounting to ₱8.6 million and distributed the amount among four different loan accounts belonging to the spouses, Central Surety, and Casent Realty.

PDB justified its action based on a provision in the promissory notes authorizing the bank to apply deposits and payments to any obligations of the borrower. The spouses objected and filed an action for specific performance, insisting that their ₱2.6 million payment should have been applied exclusively to their personal loan and that the collateral should consequently be released.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the spouses. PDB elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

 

Whether PDB validly applied the spouses’ ₱2.6 million payment to the separate loan obligations of Casent Realty and Central Surety on the theory that Engracio Castañeda was an officer and surety of the corporations and had authorized the bank to apply payments among obligations.

NO. The Supreme Court denied the petition and ruled that PDB improperly applied the spouses’ payment to the corporate obligations of Casent Realty and Central Surety. The Court held that Article 1252 of the Civil Code on application of payments presupposes a single debtor who owes several debts to the same creditor. In this case, the debtors were different persons: the spouses were debtors of the personal loan, while Casent Realty and Central Surety were debtors of the corporate loans. Because corporations possess a personality separate and distinct from their officers and stockholders, the obligations of the corporations could not be treated as the personal obligations of the spouses. Consequently, the spouses’ payment could not be applied to debts belonging to the corporations, nor could corporate payments be applied to the spouses’ personal loan.

The Court further explained that the contractual waiver authorizing the bank to apply payments to “any obligations” referred only to obligations of the same debtor. The provision did not authorize PDB to transfer payments between distinct juridical entities.

The Court likewise rejected PDB’s reliance on the surety agreements. Although the spouses had acted as sureties for certain corporate loans, a suretyship arrangement does not merge the legal personalities of the surety and the principal debtor. The surety remains a separate person whose liability arises only upon the principal debtor’s default and only within the limits expressly agreed upon. Thus, the existence of surety agreements did not authorize PDB to apply the spouses’ personal loan payments directly to the corporations’ obligations.

Moreover, applying Article 1254 of the Civil Code, the Court observed that even if the debts could somehow be considered together, the spouses’ personal loan was the more onerous obligation because they were principal debtors therein, whereas their liability on the corporate loans was merely secondary as sureties. Therefore, the payment should still have been applied first to the spouses’ personal debt.

The Court further held that the bank’s conduct amounted to bad faith. As a banking institution, PDB was expected to observe the highest standards of diligence and integrity. Its continued refusal to apply the spouses’ payment to the proper loan and its insistence on a legally untenable position forced the spouses to litigate for over two decades. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the release of the collateral and awarded the spouses ₱2,000,000.00 moral damages, ₱2,000,000.00 exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees.

 

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LOURDES CHENG v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 207373, [March 23, 2022]

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LOURDES CHENG v. PEOPLE 

G.R. No. 207373, [March 23, 2022]

FIRST DIVISION, GAERLAN, J.

 

Estafa (Art. 315(1)(b), RPC); Misappropriation/Conversion; Entrusted funds; Acquittal with civil liability

 

A mere failure to return entrusted funds does not automatically constitute estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC; the prosecution must prove misappropriation or conversion beyond reasonable doubt. If such element is not proven, acquittal follows, but civil liability may still be imposed if supported by preponderant evidence.

 

Lourdes Cheng, an employee of NAPOLCOM, was charged with estafa under Article 315(1)(b) for allegedly defrauding several private complainants by receiving money in trust/under obligation to return or account for it, but failing to do so. The RTC convicted her; the CA affirmed. Cheng elevated the case to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.

 

Whether Cheng is criminally liable for estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC—specifically, whether misappropriation or conversion was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

NO. Cheng was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove misappropriation or conversion beyond reasonable doubt (reasonable doubt existed on that element).

Estafa under Art. 315(1)(b) requires proof of misappropriation or conversion. Non-return of money/property entrusted is not, by itself, equivalent to misappropriation or conversion; criminal conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt of that element.

 

Whether Cheng may still be held civilly liable despite acquittal.

YES. Despite acquittal, the Court found preponderant evidence to hold her civilly liable, ordering her to pay ₱691,912.81 plus legal interest.

Acquittal does not automatically erase civil liability. Where criminal liability fails for reasonable doubt (particularly on an element like misappropriation/conversion), the Court may still adjudge civil liability if the record shows preponderant evidence, to avoid unjust enrichment.

 CA and RTC rulings reversed; Cheng ACQUITTED of estafa; ordered to PAY ₱691,912.81 with interest: 12% p.a. from filing of the Information until June 30, 2013; 6% p.a. from July 1, 2013 until finality; then 6% p.a. from finality until full payment.

 

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GRAMATICA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 260233 & 266039, (2025)

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GRAMATICA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 260233 & 266039, (2025)

EN BANC, INTING, J.

 

R.A. 7610, Sec. 5(b) (Sexual abuse / Lascivious conduct); “Indulges/engages”; Semblance of consent vs. force/unconsciousness; Proper charge

 

Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 applies only when the minor (now: aged 16 to below 18, after R.A. 11648) “indulges” or “engages” in sexual intercourse/lascivious conduct due to an adult’s coercion or influence—i.e., there is a semblance of consent, albeit vitiated. If the act is done through force/intimidation, or when the victim is asleep/unconscious/deprived of reason, the proper charge is Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), not Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610.

  

The accused, Jeffrey Laurista Gramatica, was prosecuted in multiple criminal cases involving sexual acts against minors. In one of the cases (the one material to the doctrine discussed), the Information charged him with lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610—the theory being that the child was subjected to “sexual abuse” as contemplated by the statute.

During trial, the child-victim (CCC) testified in a clear and categorical manner that she was asleep when the accused touched her vagina and breasts, including placing his hand inside her panties. The testimony showed no participation by the child at the time of the act and no opportunity for the accused to exert persuasion or “influence” to make the child yield—because the act happened while she was asleep.

Despite this, the RTC convicted the accused for Section 5(b), R.A. 7610, and the CA largely upheld (with modifications). On review, the Supreme Court examined whether the proven facts actually fit Sec. 5(b) (sexual abuse with “indulging/engaging” through coercion/influence) or instead fit Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336, RPC (lascivious acts without the Sec. 5(b) statutory setting).

 

Whether the accused was correctly convicted under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610, considering that the child-victim was asleep during the lascivious touching.

NO. Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 was not the proper basis for conviction on these facts.

The Court clarified the reach of Sec. 5(b), R.A. 7610 (as amended by R.A. 11648). It applies to minors (as relevant here, those 16 and above but below 18) subjected to “other forms of sexual abuse” where the child “indulges” or “engages” in the lascivious conduct due to an adult’s coercion or influence—meaning a semblance of consent, although not a valid one. Conversely, Sec. 5(b) does not apply when the lascivious act is committed through force/intimidation, or when the victim is unconscious/asleep/deprived of reason; in such cases, the correct offense is Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336, RPC. 

Here, the victim was asleep when the accused touched her private parts. Because she was asleep, she could not have “indulged” in the act—there was no consent, not even a semblance of it. The record also did not show that the accused compelled, persuaded, or manipulated the child into yielding (the kind of coercion/influence contemplated by Sec. 5[b]); instead, the act was consummated while she was unconscious/asleep. Thus, the statutory elements that make the conduct fall under Sec. 5(b), R.A. 7610 were “patently wanting.” Given these facts, the Court held that the accused should be held liable for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336, RPC, not for “lascivious conduct” under Sec. 5(b).

Because the child-victim was asleep and therefore did not “indulge” or “engage” (even defectively) in the act due to coercion or influence, Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 does not apply. The proper offense is Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336, RPC. 

 

 

 

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Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. vs. Edward King, G.R. No. 145901, December 15, 2005

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Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. vs. Edward King

G.R. No. 145901, December 15, 2005

THIRD DIVISION, CORONA J. 

 

Corporate Office; Distinction between corporate officer and employee, and the proper jurisdiction

 

Corporate officers in the context of Revised Corporation Code are those officers of a corporation who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws.

 

Edward King was initially hired by Easycall Communications as Assistant to the General Manager and later promoted to Vice President for Nationwide Expansion. His appointment and compensation were determined by the General Manager, not the Board of Directors. Due to alleged poor sales performance and excessive time spent in the field, the company asked for his resignation. When King refused, he was issued a notice of termination, citing loss of confidence. King filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled that his termination was valid due to loss of trust and confidence, which the NLRC affirmed. However, the NLRC also dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, holding that King was a corporate officer, and thus, his dismissal was an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of the SEC (under PD 902-A). 

King elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the NLRC’s findings. The CA ruled that King was not a corporate officer as defined by the Corporation Code and that the NLRC had jurisdiction over his complaint. The appellate court further held that King was illegally dismissed, as there was no sufficient factual basis for loss of confidence and the requirements of due process were not complied with. The case was then brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari. 

 

Whether or not Edward King was a corporate officer or an employee for jurisdictional purposes. 

NO.  The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that Edward King was not a corporate officer within the purview of the Corporation Code or the company’s by-laws. Citing Section 25 of the Corporation Code, the Court emphasized that corporate officers are those who are either expressly mentioned in the Code—namely, the president, secretary, and treasurer—or those created by the corporation’s by-laws. Since Easycall failed to prove that the position of Vice President for Nationwide Expansion was created by its by-laws, and because King was appointed by the General Manager rather than elected by the Board of Directors, he could not be considered a corporate officer. As such, his removal did not fall under the jurisdiction of the SEC (as provided under PD 902-A) but under the NLRC, pursuant to the Labor Code.

 

Whether or not Edward King is illegally dismissed. 

YES. On the matter of the dismissal, the Court found that the alleged loss of trust and confidence was not supported by clearly established facts. The grounds cited by Easycall—King’s sales performance and time spent in the field—were found insufficient to justify dismissal. In fact, the company had previously praised his performance for the same period it later criticized, even promoting him twice during that time. This inconsistency weakened the credibility of Easycall’s claim of loss of confidence. Moreover, the company failed to observe due process, as King was given only one notice—of his termination—and was not given the opportunity to respond to specific charges in a formal setting. The mere existence of internal dialogues did not satisfy the requirement for notice and hearing.

Since petitioner failed to satisfy the burden of proof that was required of it, we cannot sanction its claim that respondent was a ‘corporate officer’ whose removal was cognizable by the SEC under PD 902-A and not by the NLRC under the Labor Code.

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Villanueva v. Domingo, G.R. No. 144274, September 20, 2004

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Villanueva v. Domingo

G.R. No. 144274, September 20, 2004

THIRD DIVISION, CORONA J. 

 

Registered owner rule; Liability of Registered Owner of Motor Vehicles 

We have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the public and third persons while it is being operated.

 

Priscilla R. Domingo was the registered owner of a silver Mitsubishi Lancer (Plate No. NDW 781), which was involved in a vehicular collision along South Superhighway while being driven by her son Leandro Luis R. Domingo. The other vehicle involved was a green Mitsubishi Lancer (Plate No. PHK 201), driven by Renato Ocfemia, who was drunk and unlicensed at the time. This vehicle was registered in the name of petitioner Nostradamus Villanueva, who claimed he had already swapped it with another vehicle and that the actual owner at the time was Albert Jaucian of Auto Palace Car Exchange. Villanueva contended that he was no longer liable since he no longer had possession or control of the vehicle, and Ocfemia was not his employee. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found Villanueva liable, prompting the petition before the Supreme Court.

 

Whether the registered owner of a motor vehicle can be held liable for damages resulting from an accident even if the vehicle was already transferred to another person and operated without the registered owner's knowledge or consent.

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and held that the registered owner is directly and primarily liable for damages caused by the operation of the vehicle, regardless of actual ownership or driver authorization. The Supreme Court have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the public and third persons while it is being operated. 

To allow a registered owner to escape liability by claiming that the driver was not authorized by the new (actual) owner results in the public detriment the law seeks to avoid. The main purpose of vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible for any accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle... The protection that the law aims to extend... would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.

 

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