CASE DIGEST
GRAMATICA v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 260233
& 266039, (2025)
EN BANC, INTING,
J.
R.A. 7610, Sec. 5(b)
(Sexual abuse / Lascivious conduct); “Indulges/engages”; Semblance of consent
vs. force/unconsciousness; Proper charge
Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 applies only
when the minor (now: aged 16 to below 18, after R.A. 11648) “indulges” or
“engages” in sexual intercourse/lascivious conduct due to an adult’s coercion
or influence—i.e., there is a semblance of consent, albeit vitiated. If the act
is done through force/intimidation, or when the victim is
asleep/unconscious/deprived of reason, the proper charge is Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), not Sec. 5(b)
of R.A. 7610.
The accused, Jeffrey Laurista
Gramatica, was prosecuted in multiple criminal cases involving sexual acts
against minors. In one of the cases (the one material to the doctrine
discussed), the Information charged him with lascivious conduct under Section 5(b)
of R.A. 7610—the theory being that the child was subjected to “sexual abuse” as
contemplated by the statute.
During trial, the child-victim (CCC) testified in a clear and categorical manner that she was asleep when the accused touched her vagina and breasts, including placing his hand inside her panties. The testimony showed no participation by the child at the time of the act and no opportunity for the accused to exert persuasion or “influence” to make the child yield—because the act happened while she was asleep.
Despite this, the RTC convicted the
accused for Section 5(b), R.A. 7610, and the CA largely upheld
(with modifications). On review, the Supreme Court examined whether the proven
facts actually fit Sec. 5(b) (sexual abuse with
“indulging/engaging” through coercion/influence) or instead fit Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336, RPC (lascivious acts without the
Sec. 5(b) statutory setting).
Whether the accused was correctly convicted under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610, considering that the child-victim was asleep during the lascivious touching.
NO. Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 was not the proper basis for conviction on these facts.
The Court clarified the reach of Sec. 5(b), R.A. 7610 (as amended by R.A. 11648). It applies to minors (as relevant here, those 16 and above but below 18) subjected to “other forms of sexual abuse” where the child “indulges” or “engages” in the lascivious conduct due to an adult’s coercion or influence—meaning a semblance of consent, although not a valid one. Conversely, Sec. 5(b) does not apply when the lascivious act is committed through force/intimidation, or when the victim is unconscious/asleep/deprived of reason; in such cases, the correct offense is Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336, RPC.
Here, the victim was asleep when the accused touched her private parts. Because she was asleep, she could not have “indulged” in the act—there was no consent, not even a semblance of it. The record also did not show that the accused compelled, persuaded, or manipulated the child into yielding (the kind of coercion/influence contemplated by Sec. 5[b]); instead, the act was consummated while she was unconscious/asleep. Thus, the statutory elements that make the conduct fall under Sec. 5(b), R.A. 7610 were “patently wanting.” Given these facts, the Court held that the accused should be held liable for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336, RPC, not for “lascivious conduct” under Sec. 5(b).
Because the child-victim was asleep and therefore did not “indulge” or “engage” (even defectively) in the act due to coercion or influence, Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 does not apply. The proper offense is Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336, RPC.