Arcena v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 227227, [February 9, 2021]

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Arcena v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 227227, [February 9, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V 

Immutability of Final Judgment; Petition for Review; Remedy against COA Decisions; Disallowances

 

As the duly authorized agency to adjudicate matters relating to the examination, audit, and settlement of all accounts of the government and its expenditures, the COA has acquired special knowledge and expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized jurisdiction. Hence, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of the COA, which are duly supported by the evidence on record, must be accorded not only great respect but finality.

 

Between 1995 and 1996, the Philippine Marine Corps (PMAR) undertook infrastructure projects to relocate and replicate the Philippine Marine Headquarters from Fort Bonifacio, Makati City to the Marine Base in Ternate, Cavite (MBT projects), funded with P70 million. An audit revealed that expenditures for construction exceeded the actual plans by 2.33%, amounting to P1.6 million, with Arcena, as the proprietor of Berlyn Construction, held liable as the payee-contractor. Arcena's appeal to the COA Proper was dismissed for being filed out of time, as the exact date of receipt of the Notice of Disallowance (ND) was not specified. Arcena contends that the MBT projects were settled accounts and could not be revisited without violating Section 52 of PD No. 1445.

 

Whether or not the COA gravely abused its discretion in -- first, dismissing Arcena's petition for review due to timeliness; and, -- second, not ruling on the merits of Arcena's petition for review. 

NO. The COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in both instance. Arcena failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the ND. This failure alone should have warranted the dismissal of the appeal. Under the rules, it is required that the petition must state the specific dates to show that it was filed within the prescribed period. The period from the receipt of the ND up to the time Arcena filed his appeal forms part of the six-month or 180-day period to appeal to the COA Proper. Consequently, Arcena's Petition for Review, whether filed on February 28, 2011 as alleged in the petition or on March 3, 2011 as held by the COA Proper, was filed out of time.

Even on the merits, however, the petition must still be dismissed. Section 52 of PD No. 1445 does not apply to transactions in the MBT Projects since the accounts are not yet settled. Jurisprudence has held that the issuance of an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) is just an initiatory step in the investigative audit to determine the propriety of disbursements made. It is the disallowance that becomes final and executory absent any motion for reconsideration or appeal. In case the ND is appealed, it is the decision on appeal that becomes final and executory that would settle the account. Contrary to Arcena's contention, the MBT Projects are not settled accounts at the time of the conduct of the audit made by the special audit team. 

Here, the audit team was fettered by the deficiency of disbursement vouchers and documentation. The COA arrived at the estimated cost and the reasonableness of the unit prices/costs by using data from the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines, relevant Price Index published by the NSO, DPWH Cost Analysis Manuals and Association on Carriers and Equipment, Inc. (ACEL) Rates 1992. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of the COA, which are duly supported by the evidence on record, must be accorded not only great respect but finality.

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Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 247787, [March 2, 2021]

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Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 247787, [March 2, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V 

Immutability of Final Judgment; Petition for Review; Remedy against COA Decisions;Legal Standing; real party in interest

 

The term "aggrieved party" presupposes that the movant or appellant is a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the assailed decision, order, or ruling. The question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

 

The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) granted salary increases to its senior officers totaling P17 million, which the supervising auditor initially disallowed for lack of prior approval from the Office of the President. However, the DBP cited a memorandum from former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approving the compensation plan from 1999 onwards, leading the Commission on Audit (COA) to lift the disallowance. Subsequently, Pagaragan, the Vice President/Officer-In-Charge of DBP's Program Evaluation Department submitted confidential letters to the COA arguing that President Arroyo's approval, made within 45 days before the May 10, 2010 elections, was void under Section 261(g)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code. Treating these letters as a motion for reconsideration, the COA reopened the case and reversed its decision, prompting DBP to seek reconsideration, which was partly granted. While sustaining the disallowance, the COA exempted the approving officers and the recipients from liability based on the presumption of good faith. 

 

Whether or not Pagaragan is a real party in interest.

NO. Pagaragan is not a real party in interest or an aggrieved party who is entitled to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. The question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Pagaragan questions the validity of former President Arroyo's approval of the DBP's compensation plan but failed to establish that he has the requisite personal and substantial interest. Pagaragan did not sustain any direct injury or is in danger of suffering any damages from the assailed salary increases. To be sure, the allowance or disallowance of the salary increases will not affect Pagaragan. Verily, Pagaragan was not a party to the original proceedings and merely came into the picture when the COA lifted the notice of disallowance.

 

Whether or not the COA Decision is already final and executory.

YES. The COA's Decision dated February 1, 2012 is already final and executory absent a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal. The COA Rules of Procedure is explicit that the Commission's Decision or Resolution shall become final and executory after 30 days from notice unless a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Supreme Court is filed.

Here, the COA lifted the notice of disallowance on February 1, 2012. The DBP received a copy of the COA's Decision on February 6 and it has 30 days or until March 7 to move for a reconsideration or file a petition to the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Pagaragan's letters which the COA treated as a motion for reconsideration was filed only on March 27 or beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Hence, the COA has no more jurisdiction to entertain Pagaragan's letters. Taken together, the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing a final and executory judgment and reopening a settled account beyond the legal period. Nothing is more settled that a definitive final judgment is no longer subject to change or revision.

 

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Thomas v. Trono, G.R. No. 241032 (Resolution), [March 15, 2021]

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Thomas v. Trono

G.R. No. 241032 (Resolution), [March 15, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Annulment of Judgment; Due Process; Finality of Judgment

 

A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. There is no need for any judicial declaration or performance of an act before the finality takes effect. Finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected, or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed.

  

The case revolves around the dismissal of Charnnel Shane Thomas's petition for annulment of judgment, which challenges the validity of her father's marriage to her mother, Rachel Trono. After Earl Alphonso Thomas's marriage to Rachel was declared void due to bigamy, Alphonso later married Jocelyn C. Ledres, Charnnel's mother. Following Alphonso's death, Jocelyn requested documents from the RTC to settle his affairs, leading to the discovery that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was not furnished with a copy of the 1997 Decision declaring Alphonso's marriage to Rachel as void. The RTC, upon the OSG's motion for reconsideration, reversed its decision, declaring Alphonso's marriage to Rachel as valid. 

Charnnel filed a petition for annulment of judgment, alleging denial of due process, which the Court of Appeals dismissed, citing the RTC's retained jurisdiction due to the failure to furnish the OSG with the decision. Charnnel argues lack of due process as she was not allowed to participate in the reconsideration proceedings, while the OSG contends that due process was observed as Jocelyn filed a manifestation and special appearance. 

 

Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment was proper. 

NO. The dismissal was improper. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction, or through extrinsic fraud. However, jurisprudence recognizes a third ground – denial of due process of law.

Here, Charnnel, as an heir of Alphonso, is vested with the legal standing to assail the marriage of Alphonso and Rachel by seeking the annulment of the RTC's Order dated June 28, 2011.Charnnel was neither made a party to the proceedings nor was she duly notified of the case. Also, she was a minor at the time the RTC granted the OSG's motion.

Anent, the jurisdiction of the RTC to rule on the OSG's motion for reconsideration, the CA overlooked the fact that the OSG's motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed. Considering that the OSG received a copy of the 1997 Decision on March 8, 2011, it had until March 23 to file its motion for reconsideration. However, the motion was filed only on March 28, beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, the 1997 Decision became final.

 

 

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City Government of Tacloban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 221554 (Resolution), [February 3, 2021]

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City Government of Tacloban v. Court of Appeals

 G.R. No. 221554 (Resolution), [February 3, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Civil Procedure; Doctrine of Res Judicata; Compromise Agreement; Wit of Execution 

One and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. Case law explained that if there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If, as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.

 

The case involves Spouses Sacramento's land in Tacloban City, subject to an eminent domain complaint by the City Government. A Compromise Agreement between the parties was initially ratified but later withdrawn by the City Council. Spouses Sacramento sought enforcement, leading to conflicting court decisions. The RTC eventually granted their motion, issuing a Writ of Execution, which is upheld by the CA. When the RTC ordered the enforcement without an alias writ, the City Government appealed again, but the CA dismissed the petition citing res judicata. 

 

Whether or not it was proper for the CA to dismiss the petition applying the principle of res judicata. 

YES. The CA correctly applied the principle of res judicata in dismissing the petition for certiorari. It bears emphasis that a compromise agreement is in the nature of both a contract and a judgment on the merits. Spouses Sacramento and the City Government of Tacloban freely and voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement. The terms and conditions of the agreement are likewise clear. Moreover, the RTC approved the agreement and the Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified it. As such, the City Government of Tacloban cannot, later, relieve itself of liability simply because the city council changed its position. Thus, the CA correctly applied the principle of res judicata in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

Case law explained that if there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If, as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.

Here, as opposed to the CA's conclusion, all the requisites of res judicata under the concept of "bar by prior judgment" and not "conclusiveness of judgment" are present. The two cases involve similar causes of action. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical, is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.

The fact that two cases involve different RTC resolutions does not prevent the application of res judicata. Suffice it to say that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.

 

 

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Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. v. TIG Insurance Co., G.R. No. 256177, [June 27, 2022]

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Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. v. TIG Insurance Co.

 G.R. No. 256177, [June 27, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Civil Procedure; Verification and Non-forum shopping; ADR Rules 

The enforcement of a foreign arbitral award will not be refused on the grounds of public policy unless the award violates fundamental principles of justice and morality or is blatantly injurious to public interests. Additionally, failure to attach a secretary's certificate or special power of attorney authorizing the person who signed the verification and certification against forum shopping does not invalidate a petition filed under the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution.

 

Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation (Pioneer), a domestic corporation, entered into an agreement with Clearwater Insurance Company (Clearwater), a foreign entity, regarding reinsurance contracts. Clearwater filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City to confirm, recognize, and enforce an arbitral award issued in its favor. The arbitral award stemmed from Pioneer's failure to pay Clearwater certain outstanding amounts, leading Clearwater to initiate arbitration proceedings in New York. The arbitral panel awarded Clearwater a substantial sum, which Pioneer failed to pay despite receiving the final award.

 

Whether or not the Philippine courts should confirm, recognize, and enforce the arbitral award in favor of Clearwater despite Pioneer's objections regarding procedural irregularities, prescription of claims, and violation of public policy.

 

YES. The Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and confirmed, recognized, and enforced the arbitral award in favor of Clearwater. It found that Clearwater's petition complied with the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) regarding verification and certification against forum shopping, and failure to attach a secretary's certificate did not invalidate the petition. The Court also dismissed Pioneer's arguments regarding prescription of claims, noting that Pioneer failed to prove the illegality or immorality of the arbitral award. Enforcement of the award was deemed not contrary to public policy, as it did not violate fundamental principles of justice and morality or injure public interests. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts and upheld the enforcement of the arbitral award in favor of Clearwater.

 

 

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Republic v. Salinas, G.R. No. 238308 (Resolutions), [October 12, 2022]

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Republic v. Salinas

 G.R. No. 238308 (Resolutions), [October 12, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Notice of Appeal; Filing of Pleading 

The filing date of a pleading submitted to the court through registered mail is proved by the post office-stamped date appearing on the envelope of the pleading or that stated in the registry receipt.

  

A Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by respondent Teresita I. Salinas was granted by the RTC. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) but was denied in an Order which it received on August 4, 2015. It, thus, had until August 19, 2015 to file an appeal. However, the RTC received a Notice of Appeal via registered mail, contained in an envelope rubber stamped with the date "October 5, 2015," which it found to be imprinted by the postmaster. Thus, the RTC denied the Republic's Notice of Appeal for being filed late. 

The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the Notice of Appeal for being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The CA considered the OSG Inner Registered Sack Bill akin to a registry receipt. However, the CA observed that the Republic failed to present an affidavit of the person who purportedly mailed the Notice of Appeal as required under Section 12, Rule 13 of the Rules. 

 

Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it denied the Republic's Notice of Appeal for being filed late. 

NO. No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the RTC in considering the date stamped on the envelope of the Republic's Notice of Appeal, which was October 5, 2015, as the date of the pleading's filing.

The pleading's filing date can be proved either by:

2.1. the post stamp on the envelope, which is considered part of the records; or

2.2. the registry receipt 

Contrary to the CA's ruling, the photocopy of the OSG Inner Registered Sack Bill cannot be equated to a registry receipt nor given probative value. Unlike a registry receipt, the OSG's Inner Registered Sack Bill was not issued or signed by the postmaster or any authorized receiving personnel of the concerned post office; hence, unverified to be authentic.

In addition, the Republic could have conveniently presented the registry receipt corresponding to its Notice of Appeal, which would have constituted the best evidence of its claim that it filed its Notice of Appeal on August 18, 2015, even if a different date appears on the envelope. Unfortunately, the Republic failed to present such original receipt nor has it offered any explanation for its failure to do so, which only leads to a conclusion that such evidence would operate to its prejudice and support the case of the adversary.

 

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People v. Mazo y Ybañez, G.R. No. 242273 (Resolution), [November 23, 2020]

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People v. Mazo y Ybañez

 G.R. No. 242273 (Resolution), [November 23, 2020]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Illegal Sale and Possesion of dangerous drugs; Buy-bust Operation;  Chain of Custody 

The court emphasized the importance of strict adherence to the chain of custody rule outlined in RA 9165 to maintain the integrity of seized drugs as evidence. Provisions of Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165 embody the constitutional aim to prevent the imprisonment of an innocent man. The Court cannot tolerate the lax approach of law enforcers in handling the very corpus delicti of the crime.

 

On January 12, 2017, the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Group planned a buy-bust operation against Nico, based on information alleging drug selling activities in Barangay La Paz, Makati City. During the operation, PO1 Andrew O. Amante acted as the poseur-buyer, with PO1 Nathaniel Maculi and PO1 Stephanie Limjap as back-ups. Nico was identified by an informant and subsequently engaged in a transaction with the poseur-buyer, handing over sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride. Nico, Joey, and Joy were arrested, and the confiscated items were submitted for examination, resulting in positive drug identification. 

However, critical procedural lapses emerged concerning the chain of custody of the seized drugs. First, there was ambiguity regarding where and when the confiscated items were marked. Although PO1 Andrew O. Amante testified to marking the sachets, details on the actual marking process were lacking, creating uncertainty about the integrity of the evidence. Second, the inventory and photograph of the seized items were conducted not immediately after the seizure but at the barangay hall, without justification for the delay. Moreover, the absence of representatives from the National Prosecution Service or the media during the inventory further undermined the integrity of the process. These lapses raised questions about the preservation of the identity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs, violating the chain of custody rule under RA 9165. 

 

Whether or not the prosecution established an unbroken chain of custody over the seized drugs, as required by law, thus ensuring the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. 

NO. The court acquitted Nico and Joey due to a broken chain of custody. It found that the prosecution failed to satisfy the essential requirement of proving the movement and custody of the seized drugs from the time of confiscation to their presentation in court. In illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, the contraband itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offenses and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.20 Thus, it is essential to ensure that the substance recovered from the accused is the same substance offered in court.21 Indeed, the prosecution must satisfactorily establish the movement and custody of the seized drug through the following links: (1) the confiscation and marking of the specimen seized from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized item by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the investigating officer's turnover of the specimen to the forensic chemist for examination; and, (4) the submission of the item by the forensic chemist to the court.22 Here, the records reveal a broken chain of custody.

In this case, the prosecution failed to provide adequate explanations for deviations from these procedural requirements. The apprehending team failed to provide justifiable reasons for non-compliance with Section 21 Chain of Custody Rule, and they likewise failed to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved despite procedural lapses. Specifically, there were deficiencies in the marking, inventory, and witness presence during the seizure, casting doubt on the integrity of the evidence. The police officers only made a general statement that the place of arrest was hostile without elaborating any threat on their security. The operatives also failed to provide any justification showing that the integrity of the evidence had all along been preserved. Worse, it appears that the barangay official was absent when the drugs were seized. Lastly, no representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media as an insulating were present to witness to the inventory and photograph of the seized items.

The court emphasized the importance of strict adherence to procedural requirements to prevent the imprisonment of innocent individuals. Therefore, Nico and Joey were acquitted, and the resolution reversed and set aside, with immediate release ordered unless lawfully held for another cause.

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