Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697 & G.R. Nos. 221698–700 (8 March 2016), En Banc, Perez, J. [STUDY NOTES]

Case Digest · Political Law · Citizenship

Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 221697 & G.R. Nos. 221698–700 · March 8, 2016EN BANC · Ponente: Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez

CASE DOCTRINE. Foundlings are, as a class, natural-born citizens. The silence of the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is not a restriction. The presumption that a foundling is born of nationals of the country where found — in Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention and Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness — binds the Philippines even though it is party to neither, because those principles are generally accepted principles of international law and enter our legal system through the incorporation clause, not through ratification. In a proceeding to cancel a certificate of candidacy, the burden of proof lies on the one alleging disqualification, and the misrepresentation must evince a deliberate intent to mislead.

Why this case matters. It is the clearest modern statement that a treaty the Philippines never ratified can still bind it. Students who memorise "treaties bind only parties" and stop there will get this wrong — the binding force here comes from custom, which the treaty merely records.

A woman found abandoned in a church in Iloilo in 1968 filed her certificate of candidacy for President in 2015. Four petitions asked the COMELEC to cancel it: she was a foundling, they said, and a foundling cannot prove Filipino parentage, so she cannot be natural-born. The COMELEC agreed. The Supreme Court reversed — and in doing so had to explain how two conventions the Philippines never signed could decide a Filipino's citizenship.

221697

G.R. No.
+ 221698–700

EN BANC

8 March 2016

Perez

Ponente

GRANTED

COMELEC reversed
DECLARED QUALIFIED

I. The parties

Party	Who they are
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares	Petitioner. A foundling; candidate for President in the 9 May 2016 elections.
COMELEC	Public respondent. Cancelled her certificate of candidacy through its First and Second Divisions and En Banc.
Estrella C. Elamparo	Private respondent in SPA No. 15-001 (DC).
Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio P. Contreras, Amado D. Valdez	Private respondents in SPA Nos. 15-002, 15-007 and 15-139 (DC), consolidated.

II. The facts

Date	What happened
3 Sept. 1968	She is found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo, by Edgardo Militar.
6 Sept. 1968	Three days later she is reported and registered as a foundling.
13 May 1974	The trial court grants the petition for adoption and orders her name changed.
18 Oct. 2001	She becomes a naturalized American citizen.
24–25 May 2005	She returns to the Philippines. The Court finds she actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005.
7 July 2006	She takes her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic under R.A. No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
20–21 Oct. 2010	She executes an Affidavit of Renunciation of American citizenship; the United States issues a Certificate of Loss of Nationality effective 21 October 2010.
Oct. 2015	She files her certificate of candidacy for President, with an affidavit affirming her renunciation sworn on 14 October 2015.
Dec. 2015	COMELEC Divisions cancel the COC (1 and 11 December); the En Banc affirms on 23 December.
8 March 2016	The Supreme Court grants the petition.

III. The gap in the text

The 1935 Constitution — the one in force when she was found — enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines. Foundlings are not among them. That silence was the whole of the case against her.

While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would... as the decision puts it; the sentence continues beyond the text reproduced here

The Court read the omission as a gap, not an exclusion, and pointed to the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, which show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.

IV. The two conventions

A · The 1930 Hague Convention, Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Art. 14

B · The 1961 Statelessness Convention, Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State. 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Art. 2

The problem. The Philippines is a party to neither. On the ordinary rule that a treaty binds only its parties, both documents should have been irrelevant to a Philippine case.

V. Not a party — still bound

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding.

The reason is that the obligation does not come from the treaties. It comes from custom, which those treaties merely record:

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law.

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.

Hold the two doors apart. Under Art. VII, Sec. 21, a treaty enters our law by transformation — Senate concurrence. Under Art. II, Sec. 2, a generally accepted principle of international law enters by incorporation — automatically, no legislative or executive act required. These conventions came in through the second door. Signing them was never the point.

The Court supported the customary character of the rule with the practice of jus sanguinis countries, and with the Philippines' own commitments under instruments it has adopted:

While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which [provides that] everyone has the right to a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.

VI. Foundlings as a class

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. A foundling qualifies because of what the law presumes about her parents, not because of anything she did:

The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.

VII. Evidence and the burden of proof

Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens.

That allocation decided the case on the facts. The Court then noted the circumstantial evidence pointing the other way:

1. Official statistics. The Solicitor General offered Philippine Statistics Authority figures for 1965–1975: "The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%."
2. The circumstances of abandonment — she was left as an infant in a Roman Catholic church in Iloilo City.
3. Physical characteristics — the decision records "typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face."

On that record the Court concluded that her "blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE."

Treat the third item with care. Reasoning from appearance is the weakest part of the opinion and has been criticised as such. It is also the part students most often repeat in an answer. The load-bearing propositions are the presumption and the burden of proof — lead with those.

VIII. What the COMELEC could not do

A · It cannot decide qualifications in a cancellation case

The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

[N]either can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the qualifications of a President belongs elsewhere, by the Constitution's own terms:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. quoted in the decision

B · Misrepresentation requires a deliberate intent to mislead

[T]he candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.

Why this matters practically. A candidate who states a position in good faith — even one later held to be wrong — has not made the kind of misrepresentation that cancels a certificate. Error is not deceit.

IX. The residence question

The petitions also attacked her claim to have been a Philippine resident for the period the Constitution requires. The Court found that she actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005, and that "when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good." It further held that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner — an entry in an earlier certificate of candidacy is not an estoppel that overrides the proven facts of domicile.

X. The disposition

[T]he questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions [of 1 December 2015, 11 December 2015 and the two Resolutions of 23 December 2015] are hereby ANNULED [sic] and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016. SO ORDERED.

Two notes on the text. First, the published decision prints "ANNULED" with one L; reproduced here as it appears. Second, the decision itself states no vote tally. The signature block records dissents from Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Del Castillo, Reyes (concurring in Perlas-Bernabe's dissent) and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ. — six — with the remaining nine Justices concurring. If you need a tally for a pleading, derive it from the signature page rather than from a secondary source.

XI. What the Court did not decide

Read this before you write your answer. The Court did not make a final, conclusive adjudication that she is a natural-born citizen for all purposes — it held that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion, and said in terms that the COMELEC could not decide qualifications in a cancellation case; the Constitution lodges that contest elsewhere. It did not find her actual parentage as a fact; it worked from a presumption and from the burden of proof. It did not hold that every unratified treaty binds the Philippines — only that the two specific principles involved had become generally accepted principles of international law. And it did not disturb the rule that a treaty, as a treaty, needs Senate concurrence.

XII. Likely exam angles

Q1The Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention or the 1961 Statelessness Convention. How can their provisions bind it?

ABecause the binding force is not the treaty. The principles those conventions record are generally accepted principles of international law, and by the incorporation clause such principles "form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations."

Q2Distinguish incorporation from transformation.

ATransformation: a treaty becomes domestic law through a constitutional mechanism — Senate concurrence under Art. VII, Sec. 21. Incorporation: a generally accepted principle of international law becomes part of our law automatically, by force of Art. II, Sec. 2, with no further act required. This case travels through incorporation.

Q3The 1935 Constitution's enumeration of citizens does not mention foundlings. Does that exclude them?

ANo. The enumeration is silent, and there is no restrictive language; the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show the framers intended foundlings to be covered. "As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens."

Q4Who bears the burden of proving that a foundling candidate is not a Filipino?

AThe one alleging disqualification. "[T]he burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen" — and they "should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens."

Q5May the COMELEC cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that the candidate is unqualified?

ANot in the same cancellation case. The COMELEC "cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate"; the facts of qualification "must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction." For a President, that is the Supreme Court en banc as sole judge of contests relating to qualifications.

Q6A candidate states a legal position in her COC that is later held wrong. Is that a material misrepresentation?

ANo. The misrepresentation must refer to a material fact and "evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact," made "with an intention to deceive the electorate." Honest error is not deceit.

XIII. Bar takeaways

1. Foundlings are, as a class, natural-born citizens.
2. A convention the Philippines never ratified can still bind it — when its principle is customary.
3. Incorporation, not transformation. Art. II, Sec. 2 operates without any further act.
4. Silence in an enumeration is not exclusion where the deliberations show inclusion was intended.
5. The presumption runs in the foundling's favour: parents presumed nationals of the State where found.
6. The burden of proof lies on the one alleging disqualification — and it means proving both parents were aliens.
7. COMELEC cannot adjudicate qualifications inside a cancellation case.
8. Material misrepresentation requires deliberate intent to deceive, not merely a wrong position.

XIV. Authorities

Authority	Point taken
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2	The incorporation clause — generally accepted principles of international law form part of the law of the land.
1935 Constitution, Art. IV	The enumeration of citizens; silent as to foundlings, but not restrictive.
1930 Hague Convention, Art. 14	A child of unknown parents takes the nationality of the country of birth; a foundling is presumed born in the territory where found.
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Art. 2	A foundling is presumed born within the territory, of parents possessing that State's nationality.
UDHR, Art. 15(1); UNCRC; ICCPR	Everyone has the right to a nationality; the Philippines is obliged to grant nationality from birth and ensure no child is stateless.
R.A. No. 9225	Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 — the statute under which she took her 2006 Oath of Allegiance.

WE NEVER SIGNED IT. WE ARE STILL BOUND.

Custom binds whether or not a treaty records it. The treaty is the evidence, not the source.

Careful in the comments. Three things get said about this case that the decision does not support. First, that the Court "made her a citizen" — it held that she already was one, by presumption, from birth. Second, that the Court "applied a treaty we never signed" — it applied a customary principle that two treaties happen to record; the distinction is the whole of section V. Third, that the Court "finally settled her qualifications" — it held the COMELEC had no business deciding them in a cancellation case, which is not the same as deciding them itself.

Source. Prepared from the text of the decision as published by The LawPhil Project — lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2016/mar2016/gr_221697_2016.html — and the Supreme Court E-Library. All quoted passages were verified against that text, including the typographical slip noted in section X. Separate concurring and dissenting opinions are not digested here.

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