CITY OF MAKATI v. CITY OF TAGUIG [G.R. No. 235316, December 1, 2021]

 CASE DIGEST

CITY OF MAKATI v. CITY OF TAGUIG

[G.R. No. 235316, December 1, 2021]

Third Division, Rosario, J.

 

TERRITORIAL AND BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS; PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE; “CRITICAL DATE” DOCTRINE APPLIED BY ANALOGY; ADMISSIBILITY vs. WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE; FORUM SHOPPING AND RULINGS SUB SILENTIO; CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND LIS MOTA

 

In a boundary dispute between local government units, the claimant need only establish its territorial claim by preponderance of evidence — that evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that offered in opposition, which in the final analysis means probability of truth. In weighing largely historical proof, the court may apply by analogy the “critical date” doctrine of public international law: acts performed by the parties after the date the dispute crystallised are accorded little or no probative value, unless they are a normal continuation of prior acts and were not undertaken merely to improve a party's legal position. Finally, under the principle of constitutional avoidance, a court will not pass upon the constitutionality of an executive issuance where the case can be resolved on other grounds and the constitutional question is not the lis mota.

 

On November 22, 1993, the Municipality of Taguig filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig against the City of Makati and several national officials, denominated as “Judicial Confirmation of the Territory and Boundary Limits of Taguig and Declaration of the Unconstitutionality and Nullity of Certain Provisions of Presidential Proclamations 2475 and 518.” The dispute covered the Enlisted Men's Barangays (EMBOs) and the entirety of Fort Andres Bonifacio. 

The historical background is the Hacienda Maricaban. The United States Government acquired a portion of the hacienda in 1902 and the remaining portion in 1908, thereby acquiring the entirety of the estate and expanding Fort McKinley. In 1909 the US Government engaged Ramon Pertierra to survey Fort McKinley; he prepared Survey Plan Psu-2031, approved by the Director of Lands. 

Under Psu-2031, Fort McKinley was divided into four parcels: Parcel 1 in Pasay; Parcel 2 in Pasay and Parañaque; Parcel 3 in Taguig; and Parcel 4 in Taguig and Pasig. Psu-2031 did not mention Makati as the situs of any part of the property. It showed Fort McKinley bounded on the north and northwest by Pasay, with the Guadalupe Estate and the San Pedro de Macati Estate appearing within Pasay's territory. Those estates were included in Makati only in 1979, with the approval of the Makati Municipal Boundary Map. 

On July 12, 1957, President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 establishing Fort Bonifacio on what was formerly Fort McKinley. The proclamation states that the military reservation was located in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque and Pasay. Nowhere in Proclamation No. 423 was it stated that the reservation was located in Makati. The dispute was precipitated by Proclamation No. 2475 (1986) and Proclamation No. 518 (January 31, 1990). 

Makati opposed, contending that Psu-2031 was never identified at trial and was fake and spurious, and that it was in any event a mere private land survey not meant to reflect political boundaries. It presented an 1891 Spanish Cuaderno Suppletorio from the National Archives, the Spanish contract of sale over Hacienda Maricaban, and a certified copy of the 1902 Map of Fort William McKinley Military Reservation obtained from the United States National Archives, from which its expert witness plotted a sketch map of the portion claimed to be under Makati's jurisdiction. 

Procedurally, the case had a tangled history. After the RTC ruled for Taguig on July 8, 2011, Makati simultaneously moved for reconsideration ad cautelam and filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the decision had been rendered after the judge had retired. In G.R. No. 208393 (June 15, 2016), this Court found Makati guilty of wilful forum shopping, held its counsel in direct contempt and fined them — but did not order the dismissal of Makati's appeal. The Court of Appeals thereafter dismissed the appeal outright on the ground of forum shopping in its Resolutions dated March 8, 2017 and October 3, 2017, without evaluating the merits. Makati elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

 

 

ISSUE 1: Was the Court of Appeals correct in dismissing Makati's appeal outright on the ground of forum shopping?

ANSWER: NO. The Court was “not at all faulting the CA for dismissing the case,” since the rules on forum shopping and abundant jurisprudence would tend to support the action it had taken, there being an existing declaration from this Court that Makati had committed forum shopping. 

However, when the Court held Makati guilty of forum shopping in the earlier case, it had already taken into consideration all the arguments raised by both parties. Notwithstanding those complete deliberations, and despite finding Makati's attorneys guilty of direct contempt and imposing a fine, the Court refrained from dismissing Makati's appeal. In short, the Court passed upon the dismissal of Makati's appeal sub silentio. 

The concept finds basis in Rule 131, Section 3(o) of the Revised Rules of Court on disputable presumptions. The appeal therefore survived, and the boundary dispute had to be resolved on the merits.

 

 

ISSUE 2: May the “critical date” doctrine of public international law be applied by analogy in resolving a boundary dispute between two Philippine local government units?

ANSWER: YES. Because the case turned on mostly historical evidence, the Court applied by analogy the concept of critical date from public international law — a doctrine often used in resolving territorial disputes, meaning that point in time when the dispute has crystallised. 

Its significance is evidentiary: acts performed by the parties after the critical date to bolster their respective claims are accorded little to no probative value, unless they are a normal continuation of prior acts and not undertaken merely to improve their legal position. The reason is simple — such acts lack evidentiary weight because they are executed in bad faith merely to reinforce a party's theory or cure a weakness in its claim. 

The Court fixed the critical date at January 31, 1990, the date Proclamation No. 518 was issued. While the territorial row had been brewing earlier, the dispute crystallised then; both parties were put on notice of their contending claims, culminating in Taguig's complaint of November 22, 1993.

 

 

ISSUE 3: Is Survey Plan Psu-2031 admissible in evidence despite Makati's objection that it is fake and spurious?

ANSWER: YES. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant and competent. Relevancy is assessed in terms of the evidence's relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence; evidence is competent if not excluded by the Constitution, the laws, or the Rules of Court. 

The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with the weight of evidence. Relevance and competence determine admissibility, while weight presupposes that the evidence has already been admitted and pertains to its persuasive value. Makati's attacks went to weight and credibility, not to admissibility. 

The Court also observed that in assessing the evidence it could consider only what was formally offered, but that it could in addition take judicial notice of the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial branches, and take these into account regardless of whether the parties raised them.

 

 

ISSUE 4: Did Taguig prove by preponderance of evidence that Parcels 3 and 4, Psu-2031, comprising Fort Bonifacio, fall within its territorial jurisdiction?

ANSWER: YES. Preponderance of evidence concerns a determination of the truth or falsity of the alleged facts based on the evidence presented; in the final analysis it means probability of truth. It is that evidence which is more convincing to the Court as worthier of belief than that offered in opposition. 

In arriving at its conclusion the Court considered historical evidence, maps, cadastral surveys, and the contemporaneous acts of lawful authorities, and found Taguig's evidence more credible. 

The pillars of Taguig's case were these. Psu-2031, the 1909 survey approved by the Director of Lands, placed Parcel 3 in Taguig and Parcel 4 in Taguig and Pasig, and never mentioned Makati. It showed the Guadalupe and San Pedro de Macati Estates as lying within Pasay's territory; those estates were folded into Makati only in 1979. Proclamation No. 423 (1957), which established Fort Bonifacio, described the reservation as located in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque and Pasay — not Makati. Psu-2031 was referred to in various government issuances and served as the basis for the cadastral mapping of Pasig, Pasay, Taguig and even Makati itself.

 

 

ISSUE 5: Did the Supreme Court rule on the constitutionality of Proclamations Nos. 2475 and 518, as the trial court had done?

ANSWER: NO. The Court invoked the principle of constitutional avoidance, which is underpinned by the democratic character of constitutional interpretation: while this Court is the final arbiter of actual cases and controversies, it does not possess the exclusive competence to read and interpret the organic law, sharing that power and duty with the other branches and with the people. 

The requisites of judicial review include that the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Courts avoid resolving constitutionality if the case can be ruled upon on other grounds; the question is passed upon only if indispensable to the resolution of the case. 

“In the present case, We can resolve, as We have resolved, the boundary dispute without resorting to constitutional adjudication of the assailed proclamations.” The Court added a second, practical ground: the Office of the Solicitor General never entered its appearance for the Republic in the petition, and the State as a litigant is likewise entitled to due process. Without even a comment from the OSG as statutory counsel of the Republic, the Court could not rule on the constitutionality or validity of the assailed proclamations. 

This is why the Court REINSTATED the RTC Decision with MODIFICATION — the declaration of unconstitutionality made below did not survive.

 

 

ISSUE 6: Should Proclamations Nos. 2475 and 518 henceforth be read as placing the disputed areas within Makati?

ANSWER: NO. The Court acknowledged that the assailed proclamations precipitated the boundary dispute. Having declined to rule on their validity, it nevertheless supplied the rule of construction that would govern going forward. 

The Court ruled that henceforth the assailed proclamations should be read in a manner consistent with its decision — that the disputed areas are within the territorial jurisdiction of Taguig, and not Makati.

 

DISPOSITION. The Petition was DENIED and the RTC Decision dated July 8, 2011 was REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, as follows: (1) the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, consisting of Parcels 3 and 4, Psu-2031, is confirmed to be part of the territory of the City of Taguig; (2) the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 2, 1994 issued by the RTC of Pasig, explicitly referring to Parcels 3 and 4, Psu-2031, is made PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined Makati from exercising jurisdiction over, making improvements on, or otherwise treating as part of its territory those parcels; and (3) the City of Makati was ordered to pay the costs of suit.


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