Ortiz v. Forever Richsons Trading Corp., G.R. No. 238289, [January 20, 2021]

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Ortiz v. Forever Richsons Trading Corp.

 G.R. No. 238289, [January 20, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Legitimate Job Contracting

 

While the existence of registration in favor of a contractor is a strong badge of legitimacy, the elements of substantial capital, or investment and control over the workers may be examined to rebut the presumption of regularity to prove that a contractor is a labor-only contractor. 

 

Oscar S. Ortiz filed a complaint against Forever Richsons Trading Corporation, now Charverson Wood Industry Corporation, alleging illegal dismissal and monetary claims. He claimed to be a regular employee, having served them for two years after the expiration of his initial 5-month contract, and performed tasks essential to the company's plywood manufacturing and marketing. He was allegedly terminated for refusing to sign a new contract and blank papers. The respondents argued that they contracted Workpool Manpower, a registered independent job contractor, for supplying workers, and Oscar signed a contract with them. Workpool Manpower confirmed Oscar's employment with them, terminated upon contract expiration. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Oscar's complaint for not including Workpool Manpower as a necessary party, deeming him their regular employee. The NLRC and the CA affirmed this decision, recognizing Workpool Manpower as Oscar's employer.

 

Whether or not Workpool Manpower is a legitimate labor contractor. 

NO. Workpool Manpower is a labor-only contractor. Article 106 of the Labor Code defines labor-only contracting as an arrangement where a person supplies workers to an employer to perform activities directly related to the employer's principal business without substantial capital or investment. Legitimate contracting requires the contractor to have registration, carry out work independently, have substantial capital, and ensure compliance with labor laws. Despite Workpool Manpower's registration, it lacked substantial capital and control over workers. Oscar's employment directly with the respondents, performing tasks integral to their plywood manufacturing, indicated labor-only contracting. The agreement between respondents and Workpool Manpower showed the latter's sole obligation was to provide workers. Additionally, Oscar's use of respondents' machinery and receipt of wages from them indicated his direct employment with them. Therefore, Workpool Manpower was deemed a mere labor supplier.

 

Whether or not Oscar is an employee of and was illegally dismissed.

YES. Forever Richsons Trading Corporation, are the employers of Oscar who they illegally dismissed. Due to the prohibited form of contracting between Workpool Manpower and the respondents, it is unnecessary to include Workpool Manpower as a party to the case. In labor-only contracting, the principal and contractor's personalities merge, making Workpool Manpower a mere representative of the respondents. Despite the respondents claiming Oscar's termination was due to the expiration of his contract, Oscar had worked for them for over a year, performing tasks integral to their plywood manufacturing business. Therefore, Oscar is considered a regular employee, and his dismissal must be for a valid cause, not merely because of the contract's end. Consequently, the petition is granted, and Oscar S. Ortiz is declared illegally dismissed. The respondents are ordered to reinstate Oscar to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges and to provide backwages and other benefits from the time of his dismissal to the time of actual reinstatement.

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Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc., G.R. No. 190517, [July 27, 2022]

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Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc.

 G.R. No. 190517, [July 27, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Execution of Judgments; Satisfaction by levy; Escrow Funds; Garnishment

 

It is through the service of the writ of garnishment that the trial court acquires jurisdiction to bind the third person or garnishee to compliance with all its orders and processes. Courts cannot require third parties to comply with all its orders and processes absent the service of a writ of garnishment. 

 

The RTC initially rendered a judgment against Traders Royal Bank and Security Bank, ordering them to pay damages and attorney's fees to Radio Philippines Network (RPN), Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), and Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The CA, however, absolved Security Bank from liability and held Traders Royal solely responsible for the damages. Traders Royal appealed to the SC (G.R. No. 138510). 

Subsequently, the broadcasters sought a writ of execution from the RTC, targeting Traders Royal's assets and an escrow fund in Metrobank was established as part of a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) with Bank of Commerce, approved by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). The RTC granted the writ, including the escrow fund. Metrobank, where the escrow fund was deposited, objected, arguing it was not a party to the case and questioned the RTC's jurisdiction over it.

 

Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to issue the writ of execution against the escrow fund. 

NO. The RTC cannot require Metrobank to comply with all its orders and processes absent the service of a writ of garnishment. The execution process for a money judgment entails the executing officer first demanding immediate payment from the judgment debtors in cash, certified bank check, or acceptable mode of payment. If payment cannot be made using these methods, judgment debtors can select which personal properties to levy upon. If they fail to exercise this right or cannot be located, they waive it, allowing the executing officer to levy personal properties, then real properties if necessary.

Garnishment is another method, allowing the seizing of credits owed to the judgment debtors by a third party. In this case, the RTC deviated from the prescribed process by directing enforcement against all assets of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) and the escrow fund, without first demanding payment. The proper procedure involves demanding payment from TRB first, then levying properties if payment cannot be made, followed by service of a writ of garnishment to bind third parties. Service of a writ of garnishment is necessary for the court to bind third parties like Metrobank. Therefore, the RTC should deny the request for subpoena and follow the correct execution procedure to ascertain the status of the escrow account.

 

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Heirs of Tejada v. Hay, G.R. No. 250542, [October 10, 2022]

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Heirs of Tejada v. Hay

 G.R. No. 250542, [October 10, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Amendment to Pleadings; Motion to Admit Amended Answer;

 

Bona fide amendments to pleadings are allowed at any stage of the proceedings. Thus, as a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality, the paramount consideration being that it does not appear that the motion for leave was with intent to delay the proceedings. 

 

Myrna L. Hay filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against petitioners, alleging that their father, Pio, sold the disputed parcel of land to her in 1997, supported by a Deed of Absolute Sale (DoAS). Petitioners countered, claiming that the deeds of sale were falsified as their father's signature was forged. They sought dismissal of Myrna's Complaint. Later, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave for an Amended Answer, clarifying their position and asserting compulsory counterclaims, including nullification of the deeds of sale and declaration of their ownership over the property. The RTC denied the motion, citing the case's progression through preliminary and pre-trial conference. Petitioners appealed to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari, contesting the denial, which the CA dismissed.

 

Whether or not the denial of the Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer was proper. 

NO. The RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion for Leave on the ground that the case had already gone through preliminary/pre-trial conference. Sections 1 and 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court permit amendments to pleadings to ensure the speedy determination of the actual merits of a controversy, without regard to technicalities. The only limitation is if the court finds that the motion to amend was made with intent to delay. In this case, the RTC and CA denied the Motion for Leave mainly because the case had progressed through preliminary and pretrial conferences. However, there was no indication that the motion was filed with intent to delay. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored to aid in deciding cases on their merits and avoiding multiple lawsuits. The admission of the Amended Answer was warranted as it contained crucial allegations necessary for the proper resolution of the case. Therefore, the RTC had no valid reason to deny the motion for leave

 

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Office of the Court Administrator v. Ferraris, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-21-001 (Resolution), [December 6, 2022]

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Office of the Court Administrator v. Ferraris, Jr.

 A.M. No. MTJ-21-001 (Resolution), [December 6, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V 

Public's faith and confidence in judicial system; Judiciary Personnel; Clerk of Court

 

The public's faith and confidence in the judicial system depend, to a large extent, on the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and other matters pending before the courts. The nature of work of those connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.

 

Due to the compulsory retirement of Judge Rufino S. Ferraris, Jr., the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 7, Davao City. The audit revealed various delays and irregularities in the court's operations, including delays in rendering judgments, resolving pending motions, executing writs of execution, and handling criminal cases. Judge Ferraris, Jr. was found to have committed irregularities by failing to decide on civil cases within the prescribed period, neglecting motions in civil and criminal cases, and not taking appropriate actions in several cases. Furthermore, the MTCC, Branch 7, failed to address hundreds of criminal cases, particularly those under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Additionally, the court's oversight in checking the actual status of pending cases contributed to further delays. As a result, both Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Ms. Odruña, the Clerk of Court and former sheriff, were recommended to be held administratively liable for their respective roles in the identified irregularities.

 

Whether or not Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Odruña are administratively liable. 

YES. Both Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Odruña should be held administratively liable.

Judge Ferraris, Jr. is found guilty of various administrative offenses, including two counts of gross neglect of duty, one count of simple neglect of duty, and one count of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. Gross neglect of duty refers to serious negligence endangering public welfare, while simple neglect of duty signifies failure to give proper attention to assigned tasks. The judge's delays in resolving cases, motions, and pending incidents constitute gross neglect, while failure to act in over 400 criminal cases and violations of court rules represent serious breaches of duty. Mitigating factors such as Judge Ferraris, Jr.'s advanced age and the economic impact of the pandemic are considered, leading to the decision not to impose suspension from service, as he has already retired.

Ms. Odruña is found to have committed both gross negligence and simple neglect of duty in various aspects of her role as Clerk of Court and former sheriff. Her gross negligence is evidenced by her failure to timely release 274 orders in criminal cases and her inability to ensure that court personnel under her supervision fulfill their duties regarding case records management. Additionally, as a sheriff, she demonstrated gross neglect by not promptly reporting to the court regarding unsatisfied writs of execution, as required by law. Sixty-three (63) writs assigned to her remained unimplemented or unserved for an extended period, with returns submitted years later without adequate explanation for the delay. These actions collectively demonstrate Ms. Odruña's failure to fulfill her duties effectively, resulting in her administrative liability. The Court also finds Ms. Vivian N. Odruña GUILTY of two (2) counts of the serious charge of gross neglect of duty; and one (1) count of the less serious charge of simple neglect of duty.

 

 

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Sugar Regulatory Administration v. Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc., G.R. No. 253821, [March 6, 2023]

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Sugar Regulatory Administration v. Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc.

 G.R. No. 253821, [March 6, 2023]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Petition for Certiorari; Pure Questions of Law; Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.

 

The following entail pure questions of law—jurisdiction of an administrative agency; whether a litigant is a real party-in-interest; and whether a statute or administrative regulation repealed another. 

The Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) issued Sugar Orders that allocated Class "D" world market sugar to accredited Class "F" ethanol producers. Central Azucarera, questioning the legality of these orders, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). After the parties agreed that there were no factual issues, Central Azucarera moved for summary judgment. The RTC ruled in favor of Central Azucarera, declaring the Sugar Orders null and void, stating that ethanol manufacturers fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy (DOE), not the SRA. The SRA appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but Central Azucarera argued for dismissal, claiming that the appeal raised purely legal issues and should have been directly filed with the Supreme Court. The CA agreed and dismissed the appeal, noting that the controversy involved purely legal questions and thus should have been addressed through a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

 

Whether or not the controversy in the case at bar is purely legal and the SRA should have directly filed an appeal with the SC. 

YES. The SRA raised pure questions of law in its appeal. Thus, it availed of the wrong mode of appeal. The Rules of Court outline three modes of appeal from Regional Trial Court (RTC) decisions: ordinary appeal, petition for review, and appeal by certiorari. Each mode corresponds to specific circumstances and allows for different types of questions to be raised. A question of law pertains to doubts about applicable laws or jurisprudence, without requiring an assessment of evidence's probative value, while a question of fact involves disputes over the truth of alleged facts.

In this case, the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) raised pure questions of law in its appeal regarding the validity and interpretation of its orders. The issues raised, including the real party-in-interest status and mootness of the case, are questions of law and do not necessitate an examination of factual evidence. Therefore, the Court of Appeals (CA) correctly dismissed the appeal, as the proper mode of review should have been a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.

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Ismael v. People, G.R. Nos. 234435-36, [February 6, 2023]

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Ismael v. People

 G.R. Nos. 234435-36, [February 6, 2023]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Speedy disposition of cases; Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him 

An information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information. 

 

The Municipality of Lantawanin, Basilan, has faced persistent arrears on unremitted GSIS premiums since 1997, aggravated by accumulated penalties during Mayor Ismael's term starting in 2001. Despite collection letters sent to the mayor's office for arrears from January 1999 to February 2003, the obligations remained outstanding, leading to the suspension of members' loan privileges. Vice Mayor Dalugdugan and others filed a complaint against petitioners for malversation of public funds, resulting in charges before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and violations of Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4, Rule III of the IRR of RA No. 8291. The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners. 

Petitioners attack the validity of the Informations as they alleged conspiracy but failed to implead the municipal accountant and budget officer, who are indispensable in consummating the offenses charged. Petitioners submit that they cannot be expected to discharge their respective duties in the remittance of the GSIS contributions without the issuance of the certificate of availability of funds and remittance vouchers by the municipal accountant and budget officer. Hence, for petitioners, such incomplete allegation in the

Informations violated their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them. They also argue that their right to speedy disposition of cases was also violated since the Informations were filed on June 5, 2005, but resolved only on August 2, 2017. They maintain that their failure to remit was due to several factors beyond their control, such as the terrorism activities in the area which disparaged their municipality for years, the arrearages left by the previous administration which inflated due to penalties, and the limited resources of the municipality to meet its fiscal demands. 

 

Whether or not the petitioners' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them was violated. 

NO. The non-inclusion of other conspirators in the indictment does not violate the right to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused. The Constitution mandates that the accused be informed of the accusation's nature and cause, as outlined in Section 14(2), Article III. Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court specifies necessary allegations in a criminal information, including the accused's name, offense designation, acts or omissions constituting the offense, offended party's name, approximate date of offense commission, and place of offense. Section 9 of the same Rule requires clear and concise language to inform the accused of the offense charged. In this case, the Informations against the petitioners sufficiently stated their failure to ensure the municipality's GSIS contributions' full and timely remittance. The indictment of purported conspirators and their roles is not necessary for the Informations' sufficiency. Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan affirms that an information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged, although the court cannot pass judgment on co-conspirators not charged.

Whether or not the petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated. 

NO. The mere delay in proceedings does not necessarily violate the right to speedy disposition of cases or speedy trial. The determination of whether a delay is inordinate depends on the examination of the facts and circumstances of the case. Courts assess whether the delay is reasonable considering the complexity of the case and the timely invocation of the accused's rights. In this case, although there was a lengthy delay in the proceedings, the petitioners were not blameless, as they contributed to the delay by not complying with procedural requirements. Their actions demonstrated a renunciation of their rights to speedy disposition of the case and speedy trial. Additionally, the delay did not result in significant prejudice to the petitioners, and there was no evidence of arbitrariness, vexation, or oppression in the delay. Therefore, the delay was not deemed unconstitutional as it was not objected to in a timely manner and did not cause substantial harm to the petitioners.

 

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Puregold Price Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 244374 (Resolution), [February 15, 2022]

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Puregold Price Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 244374 (Resolution), [February 15, 2022]

FIRST, LOPEZ, M.V 

Certiorari; 60-day period in Petition for Certiorari (rule 65); Notice

 

When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon such counsel. Notice to the client or to any other lawyer other than the counsel of record, is not notice in law. 

 

Puregold Price Club, Inc. (PPCI) hired Renato M. Cruz, Jr. as a probationary store head, later appointing him as a store officer/manager at Puregold Extra. Renato filed an illegal dismissal case against Puregold Extra and its officers. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Renato's favor due to the respondents' absence, prompting PPCI to seek annulment of the decision, alleging improper joinder and lack of summons. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) remanded the case to the LA, but Renato's subsequent appeal was denied. He then petitioned for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that his filing was timely filed on March 13, 2017. Meanwhile, the LA found that PPCI dismissed Renato for just cause, a decision upheld by the NLRC. While Renato's CA petition was granted, PPCI contends it was filed beyond the 60-day period. PPCI argues that Renato's counsel received the NLRC Resolution on December 29, 2016, requiring a petition by February 27, 2017 to avail a petition for certiorari. 

 

Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to Renato's petition despite being filed out of time. 

YES. The CA erred in giving due course to Renato's petition for certiorari for being filed out of time. The court emphasized the strict filing deadline of sixty (60) days for petitions for certiorari from the notice of judgment or denial of a motion for reconsideration. Renato argued that the period commenced on January 12, 2017, when he purportedly received the NLRC resolution. However, the court ruled that the period began on December 29, 2016, the date Renato's counsel received the resolution, per Rule III of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon such counsel. Hence, it was on December 29, 2016 when the notice was received by Renato’s counsel that the 60-day reglementary period starts to accrue.

Consequently, the March 13,2027 petition should have been dismissed for being time-barred. Court of Appeals should have dismissed it outright.

 

 

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