CASE DIGEST
Ismael v. People
G.R. Nos. 234435-36, [February 6, 2023]
SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V
Speedy disposition of
cases; Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against
him
An information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information.
The Municipality of Lantawanin, Basilan, has faced persistent arrears on unremitted GSIS premiums since 1997, aggravated by accumulated penalties during Mayor Ismael's term starting in 2001. Despite collection letters sent to the mayor's office for arrears from January 1999 to February 2003, the obligations remained outstanding, leading to the suspension of members' loan privileges. Vice Mayor Dalugdugan and others filed a complaint against petitioners for malversation of public funds, resulting in charges before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and violations of Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4, Rule III of the IRR of RA No. 8291. The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners.
Petitioners attack the validity of the
Informations as they alleged conspiracy but failed to implead the municipal
accountant and budget officer, who are indispensable in consummating the
offenses charged. Petitioners submit that they cannot be expected to discharge
their respective duties in the remittance of the GSIS contributions without the
issuance of the certificate of availability of funds and remittance vouchers by
the municipal accountant and budget officer. Hence, for petitioners, such
incomplete allegation in the
Informations violated their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations
against them. They
also argue that their right to speedy disposition of cases was also violated
since the Informations were filed on June 5, 2005, but resolved only on August
2, 2017. They
maintain that their failure to remit was due to several factors beyond their
control, such as the terrorism activities in the area which disparaged their
municipality for years, the arrearages left by the previous administration
which inflated due to penalties, and the limited resources of the municipality
to meet its fiscal demands.
Whether or not the petitioners' right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them was
violated.
NO.
The non-inclusion of other conspirators in the indictment does not violate the
right to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
the accused. The Constitution mandates that the accused be informed of the
accusation's nature and cause, as outlined in Section 14(2), Article III. Rule
110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court specifies necessary allegations in a
criminal information, including the accused's name, offense designation, acts
or omissions constituting the offense, offended party's name, approximate date
of offense commission, and place of offense. Section 9 of the same Rule
requires clear and concise language to inform the accused of the offense
charged. In this case, the Informations against the petitioners sufficiently
stated their failure to ensure the municipality's GSIS contributions' full and
timely remittance. The indictment of purported conspirators and their roles is
not necessary for the Informations' sufficiency. Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
affirms that an information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one
person is charged, although the court cannot pass judgment on co-conspirators
not charged.
Whether or not the petitioners' right
to the speedy disposition of cases was violated.
NO.
The mere delay in proceedings does not necessarily violate the right to speedy
disposition of cases or speedy trial. The determination of whether a delay is
inordinate depends on the examination of the facts and circumstances of the
case. Courts assess whether the delay is reasonable considering the complexity
of the case and the timely invocation of the accused's rights. In this case,
although there was a lengthy delay in the proceedings, the petitioners were not
blameless, as they contributed to the delay by not complying with procedural
requirements. Their actions demonstrated a renunciation of their rights to speedy
disposition of the case and speedy trial. Additionally, the delay did not
result in significant prejudice to the petitioners, and there was no evidence
of arbitrariness, vexation, or oppression in the delay. Therefore, the delay
was not deemed unconstitutional as it was not objected to in a timely manner
and did not cause substantial harm to the petitioners.
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