Union Bank of the Phil. vs. Santibanez [G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005]

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Union Bank of the Phil. vs. Santibanez

G.R. No. 149926,  February 23, 2005

452 SCRA 228

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Probate of Wills

FACTS: Efraim Santibanez obtained a loan First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC; Unionbank is its successor) in two instances. This is for the payment of [2] tractors that he purchased. He executed loan agreements and promissory notes (PNs). Edmund, his son, was co-maker in the PNs. Efraim eventually died without having these obligation being fully paid. He left a holographic will which was then probated before the court. Subsequently, Edmund and his sister Florence (heirs of Efraim) executed a Joint Agreement whereby they distributed to themselves certain properties, including the tractors that were financed by the subject loans. The Agreement also provides that the heirs agree to assume the indebtedness pertaining to the properties allotted to them.

 

Unionbank then sent demand letters to Edmund and Florence for the payment of the balance of the obligations but these remained unpaid.

 

In defense, Florence argued that:

• Unionbank should have filed its claim before the probate court in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court; and
• The Joint Agreement executed by her and her brother were null and void since there can be no distribution of the estate of the deceased until the will was probated first, and that at the time of the execution of the agreement, the proceedings for the probate of her father’s will is still pending.

ISSUE: May a creditor of a deceased for a money claim collect directly from the heir on the ground that obligations of the deceased transmit to said heirs from the moment of death of the decedent?

 

 RULING: NO. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.

 

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

 

At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.

 

Moreover, the joint agreement is invalid. The partition is nullity absent the mandatory probate of the will. It provides that the heirs as parties thereto “have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp.” The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.

 

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Lipana v. CFI of Cavite [G.R. No. 47174, June 28, 1940]

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Lipana v. CFI of Cavite

G.R. No. 47174, June 28, 1940

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Probate of a destroyed or lost Will

 

FACTS: One Eliodora Lipana filed in the respondent court an application for the probate of a will supposedly executed by the deceased, Manuela Lipana, a carbon copy of which was attached to the application. Natividad Lipana filed an opposition, she claimed that evidence was unnecessary upon the facts alleged in the application, the copy of the will attached thereto showing, in itself, that the will had not been executed in accordance with law. The respondent court, after inspecting the copy of the will but without a hearing, dismissed the application on the ground that such copy could not be admitted to probate, it not having been signed by the testatrix and the attesting witnesses at the end thereof and on the left margin of each page. It is against this order of dismissal that the petition for certiorari has been filed with this court.

 

 

ISSUE: WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction?

 

HELD: Yes. There can be no doubt that the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in rendering a judgment upon the merits of the case without a previous hearing. The pronouncement made by the respondent court that the will had not been executed in accordance with law, is founded undoubtedly on the erroneous assumption that the probate of the carbon copy of the will was being applied for.

 

It is apparent from the application that what is sought to be admitted to probate is the original of the will. It is alleged therein that the original was in the possession of a third person or that it was either lost or destroyed by some person other than the testatrix. Such copy was attached to the application merely to corroborate the allegation as to the existence of its original and not to establish a full compliance with the requirements of the law as to the execution of the will.

 

Under section 623 of Act No. 190, if a will is shown to have been torn by some other person without the express direction of the testator, it may be admitted to probate, if its contents, due execution and its unauthorized destruction are established by satisfactory evidence. The applicant, therefore, was entitled to hearing to prove the due execution of the original will and its loss or destruction, and the respondent court had no statutory authority to dismiss the application without such hearing.

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Gago v. Mamuyac [G.R. No. 23317 Jan 29, 1927]

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Gago v. Mamuyac

G.R. No. 23317 Jan 29, 1927

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Revocation of a Will

 

Facts: Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will.

 

Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

 

 ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will.

  

HELD: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.

Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan [G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006]

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Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan

 G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006

510 SCRA 496

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: An Unprobated Will Does Not Pass Any Right

 

FACTS: There was a complaint for unlawful detainer alleging that the plaintiffs were the owners of the property. The defendants were allegedly possessing the property by mere tolerance. In their defense, they alleged that they have a better right because they inherited it from their father, showing a Last Will and Testament which has not yet been probated. The lower courts (MTC and RTC) ruled that with the will they have a better right, but the CA reversed on the ground that the will has not yet been probated, hence, it has no passed any right.

 

In this case, both parties were claiming to have better right of possession due to ownership. One party claiming that there was conveyance; the other, having inherited it, hence, claiming a better right of possession following the law on succession.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Heirs can claim better right of possession following the law on succession, based upon a will which has not yet been probated.

  

Held: NO. The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to establish the right of possession without having been probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.

Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:

 

Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

 

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s death shall govern.  Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

 

In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) it was ruled that: “a will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: ‘No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.’”

 

Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceedings to establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.

 

Since the will has not yet been probated, it has no effect whatsoever and it cannot be the basis of any claim of any right of possession. The defendants have a better right of possession based on the deed of conveyances executed by the owner.

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Province of North Cotabato v. GRP [GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008]

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 Province of North Cotabato v. GRP

GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION

Topic: Creation of Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE); Concept of Associative State; Expansion of territory of ARMM

Facts: In pursuit of peace in Mindanao, the Philippine Government and MILF agreed to undergo peace talks. The fruit of the talks is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The parties were about to sign the agreement but petitioners filed for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued the TRO.

The MOA-AD essentially would create a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), which would result to an associative relationship (a state within a state).

ISSUE: Whether or not the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution and laws.

RULING:  UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The provisions of MOA-AD establishes an associative relationship with the Philippine Government and the BJE resulting to the latter as a separate independent state or a juridical, territorial, political subdivision not recognized by law. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship (a state within a state) envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President, dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

In sum, upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

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League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC

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League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION

Topic: RA 9009 on income requirement for cities; Cityhood Laws exemption

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

 

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.

 

ISSUE: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution on the creation of LGUs in accordance with the criteria in the local government code, and not in any other law.

 

RULING:

• ·   1^st ruling – unconstitutional (2008)
• ·       2^nd ruling – valid (2009)
• ·       3^rd ruling – unconstitutional (2010)
• ·       4^th ruling – valid (2011 FINAL RULING)

RATIO on FINAL RULING: Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11^th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of 100 million imposed by RA 9009. The exemption clause found in the individual cityhood bills are the express articulation of that intent of Congress to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009.

It cannot be denied (based on the exchange of Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel during the deliberation of RA 9009) that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting the municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement (from 20Million to 100 Million) imposed by the LGC as amended by RA 9009. Indeed these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledge that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to mention that this distinctive traits, makes it’s a self-sufficient cities.

 

Molo v. Molo [G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951]

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Molo v. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: principle of dependent relative revocation

 

FACTS: Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

 

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

 

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

 

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will

 

RULING: Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

 

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

  

The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will.

 

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