Sanchez v. Perez, A.C. No. 12835 (Resolution), [February 3, 2021]

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Sanchez v. Perez

 A.C. No. 12835 (Resolution), [February 3, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Legal ethics; Lawyer's negligence; Lawyer-Client relationship

 

A lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. 

 

Sanchez, represented by his counsel Atty. Dindo Antonio Q. Perez, filed a complaint against Peter Lim before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Subsequently, Sanchez returned to the United States where he resides. However, the RTC dismissed the complaint due to Atty. Perez's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference scheduled on the same day. Despite seeking reconsideration and rescheduling the pre-trial twice, Atty. Perez still did not attend, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint. Danilo, seeking updates on the case's status, received no response from Atty. Perez. Upon inquiring with the RTC, Danilo discovered that the case had been dismissed, prompting him to file a disbarment complaint against Atty. Perez. 

 

Whether or not Atty. Perez violated the CPR for neglecting his client's case. 

YES. Convincing evidence exist that Atty. Perez failed to exercise the required diligence in handling his client's case. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to diligently handle legal matters entrusted to them, and their negligence in doing so renders them liable. This duty encompasses not only reviewing cases, giving legal advice, and filing necessary documents but also properly representing clients in court, attending hearings, and urging case progress. Atty. Perez's failure to attend the pre-trial led to the case's dismissal, despite later attempts to reconsider. Additionally, Rule 18.04 requires lawyers to keep clients informed about case status, which Atty. Perez neglected, leaving his client unaware of the case's dismissal until Danilo's inquiry with the RTC. Atty. Perez's argument of informing Danilo of his withdrawal as counsel doesn't excuse his negligence, as withdrawal requires proper procedure. Consequently, the Court concurred with the IBP's recommendation to suspend Atty. Perez from practicing law for six months.

 

 

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Brasales v. Borja, A.M. No. P-21-024, [June 16, 2021]

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Brasales v. Borja

A.M. No. P-21-024, [June 16, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

SC Power of Discipline and Supervision over all court personnel;

 

Rule 140 of the Rules is applied in disciplining court personnel who are not judges or justices since it is the prevailing legal framework. The exception is when its application will be prejudicial, or will work injustice to the court employee, i.e., the gravity of the offense will be increased, or a higher penalty for violation will be imposed. In such instance, the civil service rules, which is the framework of rules prevailing at the time of the commission of the offense, will apply. 

 

Maxima Z. Borja, Clerk of Court IV, faced charges of Abuse of Authority and Malfeasance issued by Judge Marlo C. Brasales for allegedly approving the leave of absence applications of Court Stenographer II Rachel N. Dadivas without proper authority, contrary to verbal instructions and court regulations. Borja's defense cited the overwhelming workload of her position, leading to occasional forgetfulness regarding the prescribed protocols.

 

Whether or not Maxima is guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. 

YES. Maxima was found guilty of violating reasonable office rules and regulations, specifically A.C. No. 08-2017, which mandates that the clerk of court may only approve leave of absence applications for lower court personnel with prior written authorization from the presiding judge. Despite lacking authorization from Judge Brasales, Maxima approved Rachel's leave applications, offering her workload as an excuse. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) correctly determined Maxima's breach of office rules and regulations. However, regarding the penalty, the retroactive application of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court was deemed prejudicial to Maxima. While Rule 140 prescribes suspension for violations of Supreme Court (SC) rules, directives, and circulars, the 2011 Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) categorizes Maxima's offense as a light offense punishable by reprimand for the first offense. In such instance, the civil service rules, which is the framework of rules prevailing at the time of the commission of the offense, will apply. Consequently, the reprimand was the appropriate penalty for Maxima's transgression of A.C. No. 08-2017.

 

 

 

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Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No. 218530 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

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Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr.

 G.R. No. 218530 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Jurisdiction of Ombudsman; RA 3019; Directors of GOCC; Bad faith

 

The Ombudsman's determination of probable cause generally merits deference, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion. It is not enough to simply allege the presence of bad faith. The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith. To establish evident bad faith or manifest partiality in cases of alleged violation of anti-graft laws, there must be clear evidence of deliberate wrongdoing or corrupt motive, rather than mere speculation or hypothesis.

 

In January 2007, Estacio was elected as a member of the board of directors of Independent Realty Corporation Group of Companies (IRC), recommended by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Despite his term ending in June 2010, Estacio continued to serve on the IRC board until December 2010 and concurrently held the position of Vice-President. Before his term expired, Estacio and other IRC directors passed Resolution No. 2010-05-18 granting separation benefits to IRC officers, resulting in Estacio receiving various emoluments. Quiogue, IRC's General Manager, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that Estacio's receipt of these benefits caused undue injury to the government, violating Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. Quiogue cited Memorandum Circulars (MC) 40 and 66, limiting benefits for PCGG-nominated directors of sequestered corporations. Estacio argued that he was not a public officer, MCs 40 and 66 did not apply, and the benefits were granted in good faith under the business judgment rule. 

 

Whether or not the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint against Estacio for lack of probable cause, in violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 

NO. There being no proof that the incidental benefits received by Estacio was done with, or rooted in any corrupt intent, the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint must be upheld. The Ombudsman had jurisdiction over Estacio's case, as IRC, a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC), is subject to the government's fiscal supervision. While the Ombudsman generally has discretion to determine probable cause, exceptions exist for grave abuse of discretion. However, the petition failed to demonstrate such abuse.

The board resolution which granted separation pay benefits is a corporate act and Estacio is only one among the board of directors of IRC. Also, a simple reading of the board resolution reveals that the corporation has previously granted separation benefits to all employees of IRC exclusive of its officers. Estacio's participation in the approval of the resolution did not exhibit evident bad faith or manifest partiality, and the benefits were granted in the ordinary course of IRC's corporate activities, not to unduly favor Estacio.

Therefore, the Ombudsman's dismissal was upheld.

 

 

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Macasil v. Fraud Audit and Investigation Office-Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 226898 (Resolution), [May 11, 2021]

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Macasil v. Fraud Audit and Investigation Office-Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 226898 (Resolution), [May 11, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V 

Ombudsman; RA 3019; Probable Cause; Preliminary Investigation;Grave Abuse of Discretion

 

Probable cause for filing a criminal information requires facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Additionally, for charges under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and falsification of public documents, specific elements must be proven, including the accused's position, manifestation of partiality or bad faith, and the resulting injury or benefit.

 

The COA Regional Office No. VIII investigated infrastructure projects of the Tacloban City Sub-District Engineering Office and found 32 projects to be non-compliant with approved plans, resulting in overpayment due to inflated accomplishment reports. Subsequently, a Complaint was filed against Materials Engineer Joel Nemensio M. Macasil and other officials for violating Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and Article 171 of the RPC. Macasil, denying the charges, argued that as a Materials Engineer, his role was in quality control, not certifying Statements of Work Accomplished (SWA), which was the responsibility of the Project Engineer. Macasil claimed he had no involvement in recommending payment or signing disbursement vouchers. Despite not being included in the investigation's fact-finding phase, the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) found probable cause to indict Macasil for multiple counts of violation of RA No. 3019 and falsification of public documents under the RPC. 

 

Whether or not the Ombudsman (Visayas) committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as amended, and paragraph 4, Article 171 of the RPC. 

YES. The Court found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman regarding the charges against Materials Engineer Joel Nemensio M. Macasil. While generally, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's findings unless certain conditions are met, such as protecting the accused's constitutional rights or when the charges lack merit, in this case, the elements required for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and falsification of public documents were not established. Macasil's role as a Materials Engineer did not entail certifying completion or compliance with project plans; instead, his responsibilities focused on ensuring the quality of materials used. The evidence did not support the Ombudsman's contention that Macasil made false statements in his certifications, nor did it show that he abused his official position to commit falsification. Furthermore, in cases involving public officials, it must be demonstrated that the accused took advantage of their official position to commit the alleged offenses. Failure to establish these elements may invalidate the charges and preclude the finding of probable cause. Consequently, there was no prima facie case to support probable cause for the charges against Macasil under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and falsification laws.

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Arcena v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 227227, [February 9, 2021]

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Arcena v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 227227, [February 9, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V 

Immutability of Final Judgment; Petition for Review; Remedy against COA Decisions; Disallowances

 

As the duly authorized agency to adjudicate matters relating to the examination, audit, and settlement of all accounts of the government and its expenditures, the COA has acquired special knowledge and expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized jurisdiction. Hence, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of the COA, which are duly supported by the evidence on record, must be accorded not only great respect but finality.

 

Between 1995 and 1996, the Philippine Marine Corps (PMAR) undertook infrastructure projects to relocate and replicate the Philippine Marine Headquarters from Fort Bonifacio, Makati City to the Marine Base in Ternate, Cavite (MBT projects), funded with P70 million. An audit revealed that expenditures for construction exceeded the actual plans by 2.33%, amounting to P1.6 million, with Arcena, as the proprietor of Berlyn Construction, held liable as the payee-contractor. Arcena's appeal to the COA Proper was dismissed for being filed out of time, as the exact date of receipt of the Notice of Disallowance (ND) was not specified. Arcena contends that the MBT projects were settled accounts and could not be revisited without violating Section 52 of PD No. 1445.

 

Whether or not the COA gravely abused its discretion in -- first, dismissing Arcena's petition for review due to timeliness; and, -- second, not ruling on the merits of Arcena's petition for review. 

NO. The COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in both instance. Arcena failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the ND. This failure alone should have warranted the dismissal of the appeal. Under the rules, it is required that the petition must state the specific dates to show that it was filed within the prescribed period. The period from the receipt of the ND up to the time Arcena filed his appeal forms part of the six-month or 180-day period to appeal to the COA Proper. Consequently, Arcena's Petition for Review, whether filed on February 28, 2011 as alleged in the petition or on March 3, 2011 as held by the COA Proper, was filed out of time.

Even on the merits, however, the petition must still be dismissed. Section 52 of PD No. 1445 does not apply to transactions in the MBT Projects since the accounts are not yet settled. Jurisprudence has held that the issuance of an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) is just an initiatory step in the investigative audit to determine the propriety of disbursements made. It is the disallowance that becomes final and executory absent any motion for reconsideration or appeal. In case the ND is appealed, it is the decision on appeal that becomes final and executory that would settle the account. Contrary to Arcena's contention, the MBT Projects are not settled accounts at the time of the conduct of the audit made by the special audit team. 

Here, the audit team was fettered by the deficiency of disbursement vouchers and documentation. The COA arrived at the estimated cost and the reasonableness of the unit prices/costs by using data from the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines, relevant Price Index published by the NSO, DPWH Cost Analysis Manuals and Association on Carriers and Equipment, Inc. (ACEL) Rates 1992. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of the COA, which are duly supported by the evidence on record, must be accorded not only great respect but finality.

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Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 247787, [March 2, 2021]

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Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 247787, [March 2, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V 

Immutability of Final Judgment; Petition for Review; Remedy against COA Decisions;Legal Standing; real party in interest

 

The term "aggrieved party" presupposes that the movant or appellant is a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the assailed decision, order, or ruling. The question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

 

The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) granted salary increases to its senior officers totaling P17 million, which the supervising auditor initially disallowed for lack of prior approval from the Office of the President. However, the DBP cited a memorandum from former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approving the compensation plan from 1999 onwards, leading the Commission on Audit (COA) to lift the disallowance. Subsequently, Pagaragan, the Vice President/Officer-In-Charge of DBP's Program Evaluation Department submitted confidential letters to the COA arguing that President Arroyo's approval, made within 45 days before the May 10, 2010 elections, was void under Section 261(g)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code. Treating these letters as a motion for reconsideration, the COA reopened the case and reversed its decision, prompting DBP to seek reconsideration, which was partly granted. While sustaining the disallowance, the COA exempted the approving officers and the recipients from liability based on the presumption of good faith. 

 

Whether or not Pagaragan is a real party in interest.

NO. Pagaragan is not a real party in interest or an aggrieved party who is entitled to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. The question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Pagaragan questions the validity of former President Arroyo's approval of the DBP's compensation plan but failed to establish that he has the requisite personal and substantial interest. Pagaragan did not sustain any direct injury or is in danger of suffering any damages from the assailed salary increases. To be sure, the allowance or disallowance of the salary increases will not affect Pagaragan. Verily, Pagaragan was not a party to the original proceedings and merely came into the picture when the COA lifted the notice of disallowance.

 

Whether or not the COA Decision is already final and executory.

YES. The COA's Decision dated February 1, 2012 is already final and executory absent a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal. The COA Rules of Procedure is explicit that the Commission's Decision or Resolution shall become final and executory after 30 days from notice unless a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Supreme Court is filed.

Here, the COA lifted the notice of disallowance on February 1, 2012. The DBP received a copy of the COA's Decision on February 6 and it has 30 days or until March 7 to move for a reconsideration or file a petition to the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Pagaragan's letters which the COA treated as a motion for reconsideration was filed only on March 27 or beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Hence, the COA has no more jurisdiction to entertain Pagaragan's letters. Taken together, the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing a final and executory judgment and reopening a settled account beyond the legal period. Nothing is more settled that a definitive final judgment is no longer subject to change or revision.

 

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Thomas v. Trono, G.R. No. 241032 (Resolution), [March 15, 2021]

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Thomas v. Trono

G.R. No. 241032 (Resolution), [March 15, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Annulment of Judgment; Due Process; Finality of Judgment

 

A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. There is no need for any judicial declaration or performance of an act before the finality takes effect. Finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected, or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed.

  

The case revolves around the dismissal of Charnnel Shane Thomas's petition for annulment of judgment, which challenges the validity of her father's marriage to her mother, Rachel Trono. After Earl Alphonso Thomas's marriage to Rachel was declared void due to bigamy, Alphonso later married Jocelyn C. Ledres, Charnnel's mother. Following Alphonso's death, Jocelyn requested documents from the RTC to settle his affairs, leading to the discovery that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was not furnished with a copy of the 1997 Decision declaring Alphonso's marriage to Rachel as void. The RTC, upon the OSG's motion for reconsideration, reversed its decision, declaring Alphonso's marriage to Rachel as valid. 

Charnnel filed a petition for annulment of judgment, alleging denial of due process, which the Court of Appeals dismissed, citing the RTC's retained jurisdiction due to the failure to furnish the OSG with the decision. Charnnel argues lack of due process as she was not allowed to participate in the reconsideration proceedings, while the OSG contends that due process was observed as Jocelyn filed a manifestation and special appearance. 

 

Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment was proper. 

NO. The dismissal was improper. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction, or through extrinsic fraud. However, jurisprudence recognizes a third ground – denial of due process of law.

Here, Charnnel, as an heir of Alphonso, is vested with the legal standing to assail the marriage of Alphonso and Rachel by seeking the annulment of the RTC's Order dated June 28, 2011.Charnnel was neither made a party to the proceedings nor was she duly notified of the case. Also, she was a minor at the time the RTC granted the OSG's motion.

Anent, the jurisdiction of the RTC to rule on the OSG's motion for reconsideration, the CA overlooked the fact that the OSG's motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed. Considering that the OSG received a copy of the 1997 Decision on March 8, 2011, it had until March 23 to file its motion for reconsideration. However, the motion was filed only on March 28, beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, the 1997 Decision became final.

 

 

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