People v. Diega y Zapico, G.R. No. 255389 (Resolution), [September 14, 2021]

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People v. Diega y Zapico

 G.R. No. 255389 (Resolution), [September 14, 2021]

FIRST, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Rape; Conspiracy to Commit rape; Liability of Co-conspirator 

An accused is responsible not only for the Rape he personally committed but also for the other counts of Rape that his co-conspirators perpetrated although they were unidentified or are at large. Consistent with the rule that where there is a conspiracy, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

 

Carlo Diega y Zapico, along with three unidentified individuals, was charged with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, Paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The charges stemmed from an incident on April 14, 2013, where the accused, allegedly conspiring together, forcibly had carnal knowledge with AAA, a 12-year-old minor, by means of intoxication. The prosecution presented evidence showing that AAA was invited for a drinking session, forcibly taken to a riverbank and a vacant lot, and raped successively by Carlo and his companions. Medical findings supported AAA's account. 

Carlo pleaded not guilty, denying the accusations and presenting an alibi defense. He claimed he went home early during the drinking spree and later returned to inform AAA that someone was looking for her. Carlo was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay damages to AAA. 

 

Whether Carlo's conviction for rape is valid considering his denial and alibi defenses, and the alleged inconsistencies in AAA's testimony. 

YES. The Court affirmed Carlo's conviction for rape. It emphasized that the assessment of AAA's credibility was best left to the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe her demeanor. The Court found no substantial inconsistencies in AAA's testimony regarding the identity of her rapists. It held that Carlo's denial and alibi were uncorroborated and insufficient to overcome AAA's positive identification. An uncorroborated denial and alibi defenses are self-serving and undeserving of weight in law unless supported by clear and convincing proof. The accused's failure to provide evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene weakens these defenses.

Likewise, the Court properly appreciated the existence of the conspiracy. Jurisprudence consistently teaches us that conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, showing that at the time of the commission of the offense, all the perpetrators have the same purpose and were united in its execution. The records show that Carlo and his three (3) companions successively raped AAA and that while one of them had carnal knowledge of the victim, the others held her arms and kept her from struggling. Viewed in its totality, the individual participation of each perpetrator pointed to a joint purpose and criminal design. Carlo and his three companions, are thus responsible for all four counts of rape. The penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and the award of damages were affirmed, with Carlo held solidarily liable for each count.

 

 

 

 

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Kucskar v. Sekito, Jr., G.R. No. 237449, [December 2, 2020]

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Kucskar v. Sekito, Jr.

 G.R. No. 237449, [December 2, 2020]

THIRD, LOPEZ, M.

 

Succession; Wills; Probate of Foreigner's Will; Doctrine of Processual Presumption 

A foreign will to be considered for probate in the Philippines, it must comply with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where it was executed or with Philippine laws. the doctrine of "processual presumption," stating that the party invoking a foreign law has the burden of proving it, and the foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved. In the absence of proof of the foreign law's content, the presumption is that the foreign law is the same as Philippine law.

 

Aida A. Bambao, a naturalized American citizen, executed a Last Will and Testament (will) in California on October 28, 1999. In the will, she nominated her cousin, Cosme B. Sekito, Jr., as a special independent executor over her assets located in the Philippines. Aida passed away on February 5, 2000, in Long Beach, California. Cosme filed a Petition for the Allowance of Will before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. Linda A. Kucskar, Aida's sister and one of the heirs, opposed the petition, claiming expenses for Aida's adopted minor child, Elsa Bambao.

 

Whether or not Aida's will, executed in California, meets the formalities required for its probate in the Philippines. 

NO. The Court, in remanding the case, held that Aida's will failed to comply with the legal formalities required for its probate in the Philippines. Philippine laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad, but such wills must conform to the formalities prescribed by the law of the place of execution or Philippine laws. Aida's will, executed in California, should have been examined based on California law. However, the petitioner failed to present a copy of the pertinent California law as required by the rules. 

The Court emphasized that the doctrine of "processual presumption" applies, and foreign laws must be pleaded and proven in accordance with the Rules of Court. The will did not meet the requirements for acknowledgment and attestation under Philippine law. Even if the substantial compliance rule was applied to the attestation clause, it could not remedy the lack of acknowledgment. The living trust presented by the proponent did not fill the void, and Linda's failure to object during the probate proceedings did not relieve the proponent from establishing compliance with legal formalities. The case was remanded to the RTC for compliance with the rules on proving foreign laws.

 

 

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Chingkoe v. Chingkoe, G.R. No. 244076, [March 16, 2022]

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Chingkoe v. Chingkoe

 G.R. No. 244076, [March 16, 2022]

THIRD, LOPEZ, M.

 

Land Titles and Deeds; Presumption of Regularity of Notarized Deed of Sale; Clear and Convincing Evidence to prove contrary

 

Notarized documents enjoy a presumption of regularity, authenticity, and due execution, which can only be overturned by clear and convincing evidence. In the absence of such evidence, the court should uphold the presumption and consider the document valid. 

Faustino Chingkoe (Faustino) and his wife, Gloria Chingkoe (Gloria), owned a parcel of land in Quezon City. In 1990, Faustino allowed his brother, Felix Chingkoe (Felix), to occupy the property. At the request of their mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino signed an undated Deed of Sale conveying the property to Felix, who claimed to have been in possession since 1989. In 1994, a notarized Deed of Sale was executed, but Faustino refused to surrender the Owner's Duplicate of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), hindering its transfer to Felix. Felix filed a complaint for specific performance, leading to an RTC decision in his favor, upheld on appeal, ordering Faustino to surrender the TCT. The CA later reversed the decision, finding the contract void for lack of consideration.

 

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's decision and declaring the Deed of Sale void for lack of consideration. 

YES. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reinstating the RTC's decision, which affirmed Felix's entitlement to the property based on the validly executed Deed of Sale. The notarized Deed of Sale carried a presumption of regularity, which could only be overturned by clear and convincing evidence. The CA relied on Tan Po Chu's testimony, but it was insufficient to contest the regularity of the document. Tan Po Chu admitted her incompetence to attest to the sale's validity. The trial court correctly found her testimony insufficient. The court emphasized the trial court's unique position to evaluate witness credibility. The CA erred in declaring the contract void due to Felix's failure to prove payment, as actual payment is not an essential requisite of a valid contract. The Deed of Sale's terms attested to full payment. Faustino's claims were considered flimsy, and Felix's unrealized profits claim lacked evidentiary support. The court upheld the RTC's decision, emphasizing the principle of not relieving parties from voluntarily assumed obligations despite unfavorable contracts. The claim for actual damages was denied due to lack of competent proof. The CA decision was reversed, and the RTC decision was reinstated.

 

 

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Mutya-Sumilhig v. Sumilhig, G.R. No. 230711, [August 22, 2022]

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Mutya-Sumilhig v. Sumilhig

 G.R. No. 230711, [August 22, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.

 

Nullity of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity; Tong-its and Mahjong addict 

The totality of evidence rule should be applied in evaluating Article 36 petitions. Even without a personal examination of the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, the court may consider expert testimony and the narratives of the petitioner and witnesses to establish the psychological condition of the respondent and the failure of the marriage.

 

Carolyn met Joselito T. Sumilhig in February 1984 when they both worked at Daungan Restaurant. They developed a romantic relationship, leading to marriage on October 20, 1987. Despite Carolyn's hopes for reform, Joselito's vices, including gambling, drinking, and physical abuse, persisted after marriage. Their first child, Jay, was born on April 6, 1988, but Joselito displayed little concern. Their second child, Jennalyn, born on May 24, 1989, was premature due to stress from constant quarrels. Joselito's behavior worsened, and Carolyn eventually left in September 1990 due to his vices and abuse. Joselito did not provide for their children, and they never reconciled. Carolyn filed a petition for the nullity of marriage on October 18, 2010, based on Joselito's alleged psychological incapacity.

 

Whether or not Joselito's psychological incapacity, as claimed by Carolyn, justifies the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 

YES. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially denied Carolyn's petition, citing insufficient evidence to prove the gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence of Joselito's psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, stating that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decisions, finding that the evidence presented, including expert opinions from Dr. Soriano and Dr. Benitez, established Joselito's psychological incapacity. Dr. Soriano diagnosed him with Antisocial-Dependent Personality Disorder, comorbid with alcohol dependence and pathological gambling, with the disorder existing before marriage. Dr. Benitez confirmed his chronic alcoholism and gambling, concluding that reconciliation was unlikely. The Court ruled that the totality of evidence clearly and convincingly proved Joselito's psychological incapacity, justifying the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

 

 

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Angeles v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 228795, [December 1, 2020]

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Angeles v. Commission on Audit

 G.R. No. 228795, [December 1, 2020]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Administrative Law; Robbery of Payroll Money; Accountability of Municipal Treasurer 

The accountability for government funds involves the diligence of a good father of a family. The absence of a security escort alone does not indicate negligence, and a balanced approach is necessary to prevent injustice to government employees not guilty of negligence. The decision rejects the idea that a higher degree of diligence is required merely due to the substantial amount involved and emphasizes the need for a reasonable assessment of the circumstances surrounding the loss of government funds. 

On March 12, 2010, Lily De Jesus (cashier) and Estrellita Ramos (revenue collection officer) of the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal, along with driver Felix Alcantara, withdrew P1,300,000.00 payroll money from Land Bank. While returning to the office, an armed man shot Felix, resulting in injuries, and later another man forcibly took the payroll money from Lily, causing her death. The suspects were later arrested and indicted for Robbery with Homicide. Estelita, the officer-in-charge municipal treasurer, sought relief from accountability for the lost money, citing the absence of specific regulations on safeguarding payroll money while in transit. The COA denied her petition for review, emphasizing the necessity of a higher degree of precaution due to the substantial amount involved.

 

Whether or not Estelita should be held accountable for the lost payroll money due to the absence of a security escort during the bank transaction. 

NO. The Court reversed the Commission on Audit's (COA) decision, granting Estelita relief from accountability. The Court held that Estelita and Lily had exercised reasonable care and caution under the circumstances. They followed the standard procedure, using the municipal service vehicle and obtaining a travel pass. The robbery was unexpected, occurring in broad daylight on a public street. The Court emphasized that the absence of a security escort alone does not indicate negligence, and it criticized the COA's stringent condition for requiring one. The COA's conclusion, in hindsight, that a security escort should have been requested was insufficient to establish negligence. The Court stressed the need for a balanced approach to prevent injustice to government employees not guilty of negligence.

 

 

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Trinidad, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 227440 (Resolution), [December 2, 2020]

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Trinidad, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman

 G.R. No. 227440 (Resolution), [December 2, 2020]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Administrative Law; Administrative case against DPWH Engineer; Gross Neglect of Duty

 

The unjustified reliance on a subordinate constitutes inexcusable negligence. Public officials are not granted a blanket authority to depend on their subordinates, and even minor tasks, no matter how minuscule, must be diligently accomplished. 

Ricardo served as Engineer II in the Department of Public Works and Highways - Quezon City Second Engineering District (DPWH-QCSED). He was responsible for overseeing laborers of the DPWH-QCSED's Oyster Program, designed to provide jobs to Filipinos as gardeners or cleaners. Subsequently, an administrative case was filed against Ricardo for dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The case arose from the approval of daily time records (DTRs) for certain laborers who were found to be simultaneously employed in other government agencies, resulting in double or triple compensations. Ricardo relied solely on his subordinate's logbook in signing the workers' DTRs.

  

Whether or not Ricardo's reliance on his subordinate's logbook in signing the workers' DTRs constitutes gross negligence. 

NO. The Court rejects Ricardo's argument that his reliance on the logbook is justified due to the minor nature of his duties with the Oyster Program. While good faith may exculpate a public official from criminal liability, it does not necessarily relieve him from administrative liability. The Court distinguishes between criminal and administrative gross negligence, emphasizing that the purpose of administrative proceedings is to protect the public service. Ricardo's negligence, although not gross, is deemed simple negligence. Simple negligence is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a required task due to carelessness or indifference, as opposed to gross negligence characterized by a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness to perform a duty. The penalty imposed is a two-month suspension without pay, considering that supervising the Oyster Program's workers is not Ricardo's primary task, and this being his first infraction. Ricardo is warned of more severe consequences for any repetition of the offense.

 

 

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AES Watch v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246332 (Resolution), [December 9, 2020]

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AES Watch v. Commission on Elections

 G.R. No. 246332 (Resolution), [December 9, 2020]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V 

Appeal to COA's decision; Separation pay of Dismissed Employees; Rules on the Refund of Benefits received under Disallowed amounts 

While COMELEC has the authority to regulate election procedures, including the use of capturing devices, such regulations should be narrowly tailored to address specific concerns without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of poll watchers and voters. SC underscores the importance of balancing the discretionary powers of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) with the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights during the electoral process. 

In 1997, Republic Act (RA) No. 8436 empowered the COMELEC to adopt an automated election system (AES). RA No. 9369 in 2007 amended provisions allowing the use of paper-based or direct recording electronic election systems. The COMELEC implemented a paper-based AES with optical mark reader machines in the 2010, 2013, 2016, and 2019 National Elections. The COMELEC implemented this directive and issued guidelines that the VVPAT must be printed in the form of paper receipts and that the voters can verify their votes through these receipts. This petition challenged the constitutionality of COMELEC's actions in the 2019 National Elections, specifically on the prohibition of capturing devices including digital cameras or cellular phones, for any purpose inside the polling place during the casting of votes. The petitioners, AES-WATCH, et al., contested this prohibition, arguing that it was inconsistent with Section 179 of the Omnibus Election Code. They contended that the sweeping nature of the prohibition, encompassing proceedings during the counting of votes, as well as the transmission and printing of election returns.

 

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in prohibiting of capturing devices purpose inside the polling place. 

YES. The court, while acknowledging the discretionary powers of COMELEC, delved into the constitutional implications of the prohibition on capturing devices. It underscored that the use of such devices during the counting of votes was allowed under Section 179 of the Omnibus Election Code. The court emphasized the importance of allowing poll watchers to record any irregularities and voters to object to discrepancies promptly. However, it also recognized COMELEC's authority to regulate the use of such devices to ensure the orderly conduct of elections. The court ruled that the prohibition, as stated in Resolution No. 10460, was unconstitutional in its broad scope, as it encompassed legitimate activities. While the court affirmed COMELEC's discretion, it clarified that restrictions on capturing devices should be narrowly tailored to address specific concerns without unduly infringing on constitutionally protected rights. The decision aimed at striking a balance between the need for secure and transparent elections and the preservation of constitutional rights during the electoral process.

 

 

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