Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan [G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006]

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Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan

 G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006

510 SCRA 496

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: An Unprobated Will Does Not Pass Any Right

 

FACTS: There was a complaint for unlawful detainer alleging that the plaintiffs were the owners of the property. The defendants were allegedly possessing the property by mere tolerance. In their defense, they alleged that they have a better right because they inherited it from their father, showing a Last Will and Testament which has not yet been probated. The lower courts (MTC and RTC) ruled that with the will they have a better right, but the CA reversed on the ground that the will has not yet been probated, hence, it has no passed any right.

 

In this case, both parties were claiming to have better right of possession due to ownership. One party claiming that there was conveyance; the other, having inherited it, hence, claiming a better right of possession following the law on succession.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Heirs can claim better right of possession following the law on succession, based upon a will which has not yet been probated.

  

Held: NO. The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to establish the right of possession without having been probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.

Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:

 

Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

 

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s death shall govern.  Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

 

In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) it was ruled that: “a will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: ‘No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.’”

 

Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceedings to establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.

 

Since the will has not yet been probated, it has no effect whatsoever and it cannot be the basis of any claim of any right of possession. The defendants have a better right of possession based on the deed of conveyances executed by the owner.

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Province of North Cotabato v. GRP [GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008]

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 Province of North Cotabato v. GRP

GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION

Topic: Creation of Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE); Concept of Associative State; Expansion of territory of ARMM

Facts: In pursuit of peace in Mindanao, the Philippine Government and MILF agreed to undergo peace talks. The fruit of the talks is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The parties were about to sign the agreement but petitioners filed for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued the TRO.

The MOA-AD essentially would create a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), which would result to an associative relationship (a state within a state).

ISSUE: Whether or not the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution and laws.

RULING:  UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The provisions of MOA-AD establishes an associative relationship with the Philippine Government and the BJE resulting to the latter as a separate independent state or a juridical, territorial, political subdivision not recognized by law. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship (a state within a state) envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President, dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

In sum, upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

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League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC

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League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION

Topic: RA 9009 on income requirement for cities; Cityhood Laws exemption

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

 

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.

 

ISSUE: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution on the creation of LGUs in accordance with the criteria in the local government code, and not in any other law.

 

RULING:

• ·   1^st ruling – unconstitutional (2008)
• ·       2^nd ruling – valid (2009)
• ·       3^rd ruling – unconstitutional (2010)
• ·       4^th ruling – valid (2011 FINAL RULING)

RATIO on FINAL RULING: Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11^th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of 100 million imposed by RA 9009. The exemption clause found in the individual cityhood bills are the express articulation of that intent of Congress to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009.

It cannot be denied (based on the exchange of Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel during the deliberation of RA 9009) that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting the municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement (from 20Million to 100 Million) imposed by the LGC as amended by RA 9009. Indeed these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledge that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to mention that this distinctive traits, makes it’s a self-sufficient cities.

 

Molo v. Molo [G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951]

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Molo v. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: principle of dependent relative revocation

 

FACTS: Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

 

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

 

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

 

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will

 

RULING: Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

 

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

  

The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will.

 

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Maloto v. CA [G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988]

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Maloto v. CA

G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Revocation of Will

FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs the parties (Aldina, Constantcio, Panfilo and Felino) in this case who are her niece and nephews. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the four (4) heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate which was instituted in the then CFI. However, while the case was still in progress, the heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana’s estate which provides for the division of the estate into four equal parts among themselves. When presented before the court, said agreement was approved.

 

However, three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana’s counsel, discovered a document entitled ―KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento) and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate that what they have received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners. Thus, Aldino and Constancio joined by other devisees and legatees filed a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will.

 

The appellate court found out that the will was burned by the househelper of Adriana and was at the possession of the lawyer in because Adriana was seeking the services of the lawyer in order to have a new will drawn up. The oppositors interpose that the will is already revoked by the act of burning, hence need not be probated anymore.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Adriana Maloto had been efficiently revoked.

 

RULING: NO, the will was not validly revoked.

 

In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.

 

There is no evidence to show compliance with these requirements in this case. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana and was not done in her presence.

 

Both witnesses stated that they were the only ones present at the place where papers were burned. The act done by the witnesses could not have constituted a valid revocation of Adriana’s Will.

 

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Unson v. Abella [G.R. No. 17857 June 12, 1922]

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Unson v. Abella

G.R. No. 17857 June 12, 1922

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Formalities of Wills; Paging Requirement; Attestation Clause; Testimony of Witness

FACTS: Pedro Unson, executor of Dona Josefa Zalamea’s last will, filed a petition the probate of the will of the latter. Attached on the said will is an inventory of all the properties of Dona Josefa.

 

Opposition was made was made thereto to by Antonio, Ignacia and Santiago Vito on the following grounds:

• ·    The will is not paged correlatively in letters rather it is in Arabic numerals
• ·    There is no attestation clause in the inventory attached to the will
• ·     Will was not signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other.

Only the two witnesses namely Gonzalo Avaya and Eugenio Zalamea testified as to the authenticity of the will.  The third witness, Pedro de Jesus, was not presented because he was hostile with Unson and has been meeting with the oppositors since the filing of the petition for the probate of the will of Josefa.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is validly executed?

 

HELD: YES.

 

1. As to the paging of the will, the SC cited the the case of Aldaba v. Roque. It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates the correlation of the pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of any of them. The object of the law in requiring that the paging law be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the more or less or degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signatures. And even the emission of paging does not necessarily render the testament invalid (Abangan vs. Abangan 40 Phil., 476)

 

2. Attestation clause. The inventory is referred to in the will as an “integral part” of it so the inventory need not have an additional attestation clause at the end. Attestation clause is unnecessary at the end of inventory.

 

3. As to the Witness. The actuation of the proponents in NOT bringing to court Pedro de Jesus does not render the will invalid. The will may even be admitted without the testimony of said witness, if, upon the other proofs adduced in the case, the court is satisfied that the will has been duly executed.

 

But supposing that de Jesus, when cited, had testified adversely to the application, this would not by itself have change the result reached by the court for section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a will can be admitted notwithstanding one or one or more witnesses do not remember having attested it, provided the court is satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will, upon the evidence adduced, has been executed and signed in the has been executed and signed in the manner prescribed by the law.

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Vda. De Roxas v. Roxas [G.R. L-2396, December 11, 1950]

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Vda. De Roxas v. Roxas

G.R. L-2396, December 11, 1950

 

SUBJECT: LAW ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Topic: Expert testimony vs testimony of attesting witness; due execution of a will

FACTS: Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. On August 10 1946, Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his estate. An opposition was filed by Pablo’s siblings on the ground that the alleged will was not executed and attested as required by law, and that, in any event, it was intended as a mere formal request which was, however, subsequently revoked as shown by the fact that it was crumpled with intent to destroy. The oppositors (Maria and Pedro Roxas) also alleged that the will is vitiated by the following formal defects: "(a) The alleged last will and testament was not attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; (b) The testator and the instrumental witnesses did not sign the only page of the will on the left margin, nor was the page numbered in letters on the upper part of the sheet; (c) The attestation clause does not state that the alleged witnesses thereto witnessed and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other."

 

The respondent judge rendered a decision denying the probate of the will. The lower court concluded that the body of the will was typewritten and signed by the testator on a date or occasion different from and anterior to the date or occasion when the attestation clause was typewritten and signed by the attesting witnesses, with the result that the will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other. That had the testator and the attesting witnesses signed on the same occasion, the probability was that one or two fountain pens only should have been used instead of three as testified to unanimously by the expert witnesses both for the proponent and the oppositors.

 

The petitioner has appealed. Her counsel insist that the testimony, unanimous in all essential points, of the three attesting witnesses should be given controlling weight. Counsel for oppositors, upon the other hand, argue that the testimony of Maria Roxas, in conjunction with the opinions of experts, should prevail.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not, experts testimony on handwritings shall be favored in the presence of small infirmities of witness testimony on the account of due execution of the will.

  

RULING: No. Testimonies of attesting witness shall prevail. This case is one in which the will is couched in a language known and spoken by the testator and the signatures of the three attesting witnesses are admittedly genuine. Such being the situation, the question that arises, far from requiring the intervention of experts, is one merely of credibility of witnesses.

 

In our opinion, the testimony of the three attesting witnesses — confirmatory of the due execution of the will — deserves full credit, not only because of their qualifications (hereinbefore pointed out) but because their reputation for probity has not been impeached. The fact that they may have some relationship with the petitioner is not sufficient to warrant the belief that they did not tell the truth. The law, in the first place, does not bar relatives either of the testator of the heirs or legatees from acting as witnesses.

 

Ordinarily, the findings of fact of a trial court, because of the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses, are entitled to great weight. But, in this case, the lower court relied on the conclusions of experts.

 

The Court do not venture to impute bias to the experts introduced during the trial, but we hasten to state that the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot be mathematically precise but which, on the contrary, are "subject to inherent infirmities." Speculations on these matters should give way to the positive declarations of the attesting witnesses. The law impliedly recognizes the almost conclusive weight of the testimony of attesting witnesses when it provides that if the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court.

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