Figueroa v. Sandiganbayan, Special Third Division, G.R. Nos. 235965-66, [February 15, 2022]

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Figueroa v. Sandiganbayan, Special Third Division

 G.R. Nos. 235965-66, [February 15, 2022]

FIRST, LOPEZ, M.V 

Inordinate Delay; Speedy Disposition of cases

 

An accused has no duty to bring himself to trial. The accused must be spared from the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that inordinate and vexatious delays crept the conduct of preliminary investigation which are violative of the constitutional guarantee to speedy disposition of cases. 

 

The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) lodged a corruption complaint against Rene Figueroa and other officers, initiating a preliminary investigation on July 19, 2011. By July 29 of the same year, the Office of the Ombudsman directed Rene and his co-accused to submit their counter-affidavits within ten days. Subsequently, on August 16, 2011 Rene requested an extension of ten additional days to file his counter-affidavit, which was granted. He submitted his counter-affidavit on September 5,2011. The Ombudsman recommended filing charges against Rene and others for violation of Sections 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 on September 22, 2014. Charges were filed before the Sandiganbayan on June 3, 2016, and the amended informations were admitted on July 4, 2017. Rene moved to quash the informations on July 20, 2017, citing undue delay in case handling, as more than six years had passed since the complaint was filed without a decision on the charges to be filed. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. 

 

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying Rene's motion to quash the informations. 

YES. The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash. 

Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution safeguards individuals' entitlement to a speedy disposition of cases in all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Cagang v. Sandiganbayan delineates the approach for assessing claims related to the right to speedy disposition of cases or speedy trial. The right to speedy trial applies only to criminal prosecutions before courts of law, while the right to speedy disposition of cases applies to any tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial. Notably, the period for fact-finding investigations before filing formal complaints is not counted in determining delays. As such, investigations preceding the filing of formal complaints are not counted in determining delay. Analysis of delay duration is not rigidly mechanical and must consider circumstances.

In the case at hand, the Ombudsman exceeded the time for preliminary investigation, warranting justification for the delay. However, the Ombudsman failed to provide sufficient explanation, merely arguing that any delay was reasonable. While Rene did not initially assert his right, he raised it in due time before the Sandiganbayan's ruling on the amended informations, sufficient to invoke constitutional protection against undue delay.

 

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Quiap y Evangelista v. People, G.R. No. 229183 (Resolution), [February 17, 2021]

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Quiap y Evangelista v. People

 G.R. No. 229183 (Resolution), [February 17, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Drug cases; Buy-bust Operation; Validity of Search warrant; Chain of Custody

 

The presence of the insulating witnesses is the first requirement to ensure the preservation of the identity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs. RA 9165 Requires three (3) witnesses to be present during the physical inventory and taking of photographs of pieces of evidence seized from a suspect, namely representatives from the DOJ, media, and public elective official - necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drugs. 

 

PO2 Garcia received information from a confidential asset about a person named "Kacho" planning to buy shabu in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The authorities organized an entrapment operation and intercepted a passenger jeepney carrying Kacho and the asset. During the interception, Kacho attempted to discard a wrapped object, but PO2 Garcia prevented him. Upon inspection, the object contained a sachet of white crystalline substance. Kacho, later identified as petitioner Leonides Quiap, was taken to the police station where the sachet was marked and sent for laboratory examination. The examination confirmed it contained methamphetamine hydrochloride. Leonides challenges the legality of his warrantless arrest and the admissibility of the seized item, citing procedural lapses in handling the evidence. 

 

Whether or not the chain of custody was properly observed. 

NO. The failure to adhere to required procedures has resulted in a significant gap in the chain of custody. The absence of mandated witnesses during the inventory and photographing of the seized item casts doubt on the integrity of the chain of custody. There was no representation from the media or the Department of Justice, and any elected public official. Additionally, the connection between the investigating officer and the forensic chemist was not definitively established, and precautions to prevent tampering were not adequately described. SPO2 Macabajon received the specimen but did not testify on its transfer to the forensic chemist. Due to these shortcomings, Leonides must be acquitted due to the prosecution's failure to establish a continuous chain of custody.

 

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Tan y Sia v. People, G.R. No. 232611 (Resolution), [April 26, 2021]

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Tan y Sia v. People

 G.R. No. 232611 (Resolution), [April 26, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Drug cases; Buy-bust Operation; Validity of Search warrant; Chain of Custody

 

In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the "objective test" requires that the prosecution paint a clear picture of how the initial contact between the buyer and the pusher was made. It is not enough to show that there was an exchange of money and illegal drugs. The details that led to such exchange must be clearly and adequately accounted for. Failing in which will certainly cast a doubt on the veracity of the whole buy-bust operation.

 

Jasper Tan was arrested in a buy-bust operation after police officers conducted surveillance on him and obtained a search warrant for his house. During the operation, police officers observed Jasper conducting a drug transaction at his house, and later searched his room in the presence of Barangay Captain Emerenciana Velasco. Jasper challenges the validity of the search warrant, arguing that it lacked specific descriptions of the premises to be searched. He also claims his right to personally witness the search was violated as he was already arrested and his movement restricted when the search was conducted. Additionally, he claims that the prosecution failed to comply with the chain of custody rule. 

 

Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the buy-bust operation through the "objective test."

NO. The prosecution failed to establish the buy-bust operation through the "objective test." This test requires specific details of the transaction to be clearly presented, including the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the seller, the offer, payment, and delivery of the illegal drug. However, the prosecution did not adequately establish these elements. There is no clear indication of the initial contact, offer, or agreement on the purchase price. Additionally, there is a lack of direct observation of the drug sale by the police officer involved. Moreover, crucial witnesses, such as the poseur-buyer, were not presented to provide firsthand accounts of the transaction. As a result, Jasper's guilt regarding the illegal sale of drugs becomes doubtful based on these inconsistencies and gaps in the prosecution's case.

 

Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody.

NO. The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody. There are critical gaps in the chain of custody process, including uncertainties regarding how the item subject to the buy-bust operation was transferred to the police officers and what happened to the item while in the poseur-buyer's possession. Furthermore, there is no clear testimony regarding the marking of the seized items or their identification in court. These lapses raise doubts about the identity and integrity of the evidence recovered from Jasper. As a result, the evidence loses its evidentiary value due to the violation of mandatory legal requirements.

 

Whether or not the search conducted after Jasper's arrest was proper.

NO.  The search conducted was improper. The search warrant authorized the search of Jasper's room inside a house where he resides, but the transaction occurred at the gate of the same house. During the search, Jasper wasn't brought to his room to observe the search, as required by law. According to Section 8 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the search of a house or room should be conducted in the presence of the lawful occupant or witnesses. The absence of such presence renders the search unreasonable, and any evidence obtained becomes inadmissible. Since the confiscated shabu is the main evidence, its exclusion leads to the conclusion that there's insufficient evidence to convict Jasper, warranting his acquittal on both charges.

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People v. Napoles, G.R. No. 247611 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

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People v. Napoles

 G.R. No. 247611 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Posting bail pending appeal; conviction of capital offense (Plunder); provisional release on humanitarian grounds

 

OCA Circular No. 91-2020 does not mandate blanket release of Persons Deprived of Liberty (PDLs) due to the pandemic but rather emphasizes the implementation of existing policies on bail and speedy trial. Bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion post-conviction and must be carefully weighed given the determination of guilt. In cases of capital offenses, bail should typically be denied.

 

This is an Urgent Motion for Recognizance/Bail or House Arrest for Humanitarian Reason Due to COVID-19 filed by Janet Lim Napoles. The Sandiganbayan convicted Richard A. Cambe and Janet Lim Napoles of Plunder relative to the utilization of Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr.'s Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). In her Motion, Napoles alleges that she is at risk of contracting COVID-19 inside the prison due to her Diabetes, an underlying COVID-19 health condition. She is entitled to be provisionally released on humanitarian grounds. She raises that the Nelson Mandela Rules, provide the basis for the release of persons deprived of liberty (PDLs) in times of public health emergencies. 

 

Whether or not the Constitution and the Rules of Court allow an accused to post bail pending the appeal of his, or her conviction of a capital offense.

NO. While the right to bail is linked to the fundamental presumption of innocence, it is not absolute after conviction for such offenses. Bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion post-conviction and must be carefully weighed given the determination of guilt. In cases of capital offenses, bail should typically be denied. In the case at hand, Napoles was convicted of Plunder by the lower court, a capital offense, making her ineligible for bail pending appeal of her conviction. Therefore, her motion for bail must be rejected.

 

Whether or not Napoles could be provisionally released on humanitarian grounds due to the risk of contracting COVID-19.

NO. There are no compelling reasons to justify granting provisional release on humanitarian grounds for Napoles. Previous cases like De La Rama and Enrile, where the Court considered special circumstances for bail, are exceptional and isolated. Napoles' claim of being at risk of contracting COVID-19 due to diabetes does not present a sufficient basis for release. OCA Circular No. 91-2020 does not mandate blanket release of Persons Deprived of Liberty (PDLs) due to the pandemic but rather emphasizes the implementation of existing policies on bail and speedy trial. Releasing an accused convicted of a capital offense goes against constitutional and legal provisions.

 

Whether or not the Nelson Mandela Rules and the international community's call for the temporary release of PDLs due to the threats of COVID-19, provide sufficient basis to grant bail post-conviction.

NO.  The Nelson Mandela Rules, which set international standards for prisoner treatment, do not justify granting bail post-conviction due to COVID-19. These rules outline standards for prisoner healthcare but do not support release on bail pending appeal of a capital offense conviction. Furthermore, the release of prisoners in other countries due to COVID-19 is limited, especially for high-risk inmates. Neither international rules nor global trends support releasing convicted individuals pending appeal for capital offenses. Additionally, Napoles is not entitled to release on recognizance, as it is only available to those who qualify for bail but cannot afford it due to poverty, as per RA No. 10389.

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Sanchez v. Perez, A.C. No. 12835 (Resolution), [February 3, 2021]

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Sanchez v. Perez

 A.C. No. 12835 (Resolution), [February 3, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Legal ethics; Lawyer's negligence; Lawyer-Client relationship

 

A lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. 

 

Sanchez, represented by his counsel Atty. Dindo Antonio Q. Perez, filed a complaint against Peter Lim before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Subsequently, Sanchez returned to the United States where he resides. However, the RTC dismissed the complaint due to Atty. Perez's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference scheduled on the same day. Despite seeking reconsideration and rescheduling the pre-trial twice, Atty. Perez still did not attend, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint. Danilo, seeking updates on the case's status, received no response from Atty. Perez. Upon inquiring with the RTC, Danilo discovered that the case had been dismissed, prompting him to file a disbarment complaint against Atty. Perez. 

 

Whether or not Atty. Perez violated the CPR for neglecting his client's case. 

YES. Convincing evidence exist that Atty. Perez failed to exercise the required diligence in handling his client's case. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to diligently handle legal matters entrusted to them, and their negligence in doing so renders them liable. This duty encompasses not only reviewing cases, giving legal advice, and filing necessary documents but also properly representing clients in court, attending hearings, and urging case progress. Atty. Perez's failure to attend the pre-trial led to the case's dismissal, despite later attempts to reconsider. Additionally, Rule 18.04 requires lawyers to keep clients informed about case status, which Atty. Perez neglected, leaving his client unaware of the case's dismissal until Danilo's inquiry with the RTC. Atty. Perez's argument of informing Danilo of his withdrawal as counsel doesn't excuse his negligence, as withdrawal requires proper procedure. Consequently, the Court concurred with the IBP's recommendation to suspend Atty. Perez from practicing law for six months.

 

 

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Brasales v. Borja, A.M. No. P-21-024, [June 16, 2021]

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Brasales v. Borja

A.M. No. P-21-024, [June 16, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

SC Power of Discipline and Supervision over all court personnel;

 

Rule 140 of the Rules is applied in disciplining court personnel who are not judges or justices since it is the prevailing legal framework. The exception is when its application will be prejudicial, or will work injustice to the court employee, i.e., the gravity of the offense will be increased, or a higher penalty for violation will be imposed. In such instance, the civil service rules, which is the framework of rules prevailing at the time of the commission of the offense, will apply. 

 

Maxima Z. Borja, Clerk of Court IV, faced charges of Abuse of Authority and Malfeasance issued by Judge Marlo C. Brasales for allegedly approving the leave of absence applications of Court Stenographer II Rachel N. Dadivas without proper authority, contrary to verbal instructions and court regulations. Borja's defense cited the overwhelming workload of her position, leading to occasional forgetfulness regarding the prescribed protocols.

 

Whether or not Maxima is guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. 

YES. Maxima was found guilty of violating reasonable office rules and regulations, specifically A.C. No. 08-2017, which mandates that the clerk of court may only approve leave of absence applications for lower court personnel with prior written authorization from the presiding judge. Despite lacking authorization from Judge Brasales, Maxima approved Rachel's leave applications, offering her workload as an excuse. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) correctly determined Maxima's breach of office rules and regulations. However, regarding the penalty, the retroactive application of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court was deemed prejudicial to Maxima. While Rule 140 prescribes suspension for violations of Supreme Court (SC) rules, directives, and circulars, the 2011 Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) categorizes Maxima's offense as a light offense punishable by reprimand for the first offense. In such instance, the civil service rules, which is the framework of rules prevailing at the time of the commission of the offense, will apply. Consequently, the reprimand was the appropriate penalty for Maxima's transgression of A.C. No. 08-2017.

 

 

 

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Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No. 218530 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

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Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr.

 G.R. No. 218530 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Jurisdiction of Ombudsman; RA 3019; Directors of GOCC; Bad faith

 

The Ombudsman's determination of probable cause generally merits deference, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion. It is not enough to simply allege the presence of bad faith. The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith. To establish evident bad faith or manifest partiality in cases of alleged violation of anti-graft laws, there must be clear evidence of deliberate wrongdoing or corrupt motive, rather than mere speculation or hypothesis.

 

In January 2007, Estacio was elected as a member of the board of directors of Independent Realty Corporation Group of Companies (IRC), recommended by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Despite his term ending in June 2010, Estacio continued to serve on the IRC board until December 2010 and concurrently held the position of Vice-President. Before his term expired, Estacio and other IRC directors passed Resolution No. 2010-05-18 granting separation benefits to IRC officers, resulting in Estacio receiving various emoluments. Quiogue, IRC's General Manager, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that Estacio's receipt of these benefits caused undue injury to the government, violating Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. Quiogue cited Memorandum Circulars (MC) 40 and 66, limiting benefits for PCGG-nominated directors of sequestered corporations. Estacio argued that he was not a public officer, MCs 40 and 66 did not apply, and the benefits were granted in good faith under the business judgment rule. 

 

Whether or not the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint against Estacio for lack of probable cause, in violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 

NO. There being no proof that the incidental benefits received by Estacio was done with, or rooted in any corrupt intent, the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint must be upheld. The Ombudsman had jurisdiction over Estacio's case, as IRC, a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC), is subject to the government's fiscal supervision. While the Ombudsman generally has discretion to determine probable cause, exceptions exist for grave abuse of discretion. However, the petition failed to demonstrate such abuse.

The board resolution which granted separation pay benefits is a corporate act and Estacio is only one among the board of directors of IRC. Also, a simple reading of the board resolution reveals that the corporation has previously granted separation benefits to all employees of IRC exclusive of its officers. Estacio's participation in the approval of the resolution did not exhibit evident bad faith or manifest partiality, and the benefits were granted in the ordinary course of IRC's corporate activities, not to unduly favor Estacio.

Therefore, the Ombudsman's dismissal was upheld.

 

 

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