CASE DIGEST
Belgica vs. Executive
Secretary
G.R. Nos. 208566,
208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013
EN BANC, LAZARO-JAVIER,
J.
Administrative Law; Liability
of Public Officials; Administrative Due Process; State University President not
liable for Lost Payroll Money
PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other personnel benefits. It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced. In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district.
As early as 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a dummy NGO.
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional. (YES)
I.
SUBSTANTIVE
ASPECTS
The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been violated. The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive department. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated. The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
Violative
of the principle of checks and balances. This kind of
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure
of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. In
fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the
2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then
operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. This is because the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation
for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of checking itself or its members. The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
The
Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy. The
Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local
autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers,
to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.
II.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
There
is an actual and justiciable controversy. The case is ripe
for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their
utilization are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners. The case is not moot as the
proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter.
The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify or annul
the legal existence of the PDAF.
Political
Question Doctrine is Inapplicable. The intrinsic constitutionality of
the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. The 1987 Constitution
expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the
power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on
the part of the government.
Petitioners
have legal standing to sue. Petitioners have legal standing by virtue
of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines. As
taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public
funds. As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.