EPZA vs DULAY [G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987]

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EPZA vs DULAY

G.R. No. L-59603,  April 29, 1987

EN BANC, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

 

Eminent Domain; Determination Just Compensation is a Judicial Function 

The determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

 

On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. The petitioner Objection to Commissioner’s Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.

 

Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD1533 is unconstitutional 

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the decreed compensation.

 

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Republic Of The Philippines V. Lim [G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005]

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LIM

G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005

EN BANC, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

 

Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Recovery of Expropriate property in case of non-payment of Just Compensation  

Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just”. 

 

On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines initiated an expropriation action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to acquire lots in Lahug, Cebu City, for a military reservation. The Republic took possession after depositing ₱9,500.00. The court later ordered the Republic to pay ₱4,062.10 as just compensation to the Denzons, the original lot owners. In 1962, another court ruled in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, successors of the Denzons, there having no payment of just compensation by Republic. Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged and foreclosed Lot 932 to Vicente Lim for failure to pay. In 1992, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title with the (RTC) seeking an absolute and exclusive possession of the property. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that Lim is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner. CA affirmed. OSG then filed petition for review with the Court. 

 

Whether the owner of the expropriated land is entitled for the repossession of his property when party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon. 

Yes. The Republic has not retained ownership of Lot 932 for its failure to pay respondent’s  predecessors-in-interest the just compensation pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940. The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic’s acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time. 

While the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. 

After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation which the court defined as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just.”

 

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Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership, Vs. Feati Bank And Trust Co. G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979

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ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO.

G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979

EN BANC, SANTOS, J.

 

Constitutional Law; Non-impairment of Contracts; Superiority of Police Power of the State 

 

While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it must be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Legitimate measures of Police Power prevails over the contract stipulations.

Plaintiff Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership is engaged in real estate business, specifically the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. Plaintiff sold Lots 5 and 6 of the subdivision through installment agreements in 1952, with restrictions on use and construction. Vendees later transferred the lots to Emma Chavez, and upon full payment, plaintiff executed deeds of sale. Building restrictions were annotated in TCTs issued to Emma Chavez, to be exclusive for residential purposes only. 

Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. 

 

Whether Resolution No. 27, series of 1960, declaring the area a commercial and industrial zone, is a valid exercise of police power. 

YES.  The resolution is a regulatory measure within the municipality's power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments. The municipality was justified in passing the resolution to promote the health, safety, peace, good order, and general welfare of the people in the are 

 

Whether the resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.

YES. Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power.

 

 

 

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Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988

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PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS. DRILON

G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988

EN BANC, LABRADOR, J.

 

Constitutional Law | Equal protection of the laws | Valid Classification

 

It is well-settled that “equality before the law” under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc (PASEI) is assailing the validity of a department order issued by DOLE (Department Order 1) which temporarily suspends the deployment of female domestic and household overseas workers. PASEI claims that it is a discrimination against males or females, it violates the right to travel, it is an invalid exercise of legislative power, and it violates the constitutional guaranty of workers’ participation in policy-making affecting their rights and benefits. 

 

Whether or not D.O. 1 violates the equal protection clause. 

NO. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract workers,” but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that “equality before the law” under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made—the preference for female workers—rests on substantial distinctions. As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the government’s efforts.

 

Whether or not D.O. 1 is violative of the right to travel.

NO. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of “public safety,” “as may be provided by law.” Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to “afford protection to labor,” pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor’s rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

 

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ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ [G.R. No. L-7995 , May 31, 1957]

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ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-7995 , May 31, 1957

EN BANC, PERLAS-BERNABE

 

Equal Protection Clause; Police Power of the State cannot be curtailed or restricted by a Treaty; Regulation of Retail Trade Business; 

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country”. But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

 

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. 

Petitioner Ichong, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional. Ichong attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. 

 

Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal protection of laws. 

NO. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.

 

Whether or not  law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

YES. A law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. Even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. A treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) v. SAN DIEGO [G.R. No. 89572, December 21,1989]

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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) v. SAN DIEGO

G.R. No. 89572, December 21,1989

EN BANC, CRUZ, J.

 

Academic Freedom; National Medical Admission Test (NMAT); Police Power; Equal Protection Clause

 

The three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

  

Roberto Rey San Diego is a Zoology graduate of the University of the East who wanted to pursue medical studies. However, he had taken the NMAT for a total of three (3) times already and failed in each try. When he tried to take the NMAT the fourth time, his application was denied based on MECS Order No. 12, s. 1972, which institutionalized the three-flunk rule, or that any college graduate who has failed the NMAT for three times is no longer eligible to take it. 

San Diego filed a petition before the RTC of Valenzuela to challenge the three-flunk rule, saying that the same was a violation of his academic freedom and his right to have quality education. In his amended petition, he said the rule was violative of due process and equal protection. San Diego was allowed to take the NMAT a fourth time subject to the outcome of his petition. 

 

Whether or not the three-flunk rule is a legitimate exercise of police power.

YES. The NMAT is a constitutionally sanctioned measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. 

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. 

 

Whether the three-flunk rule violates the constitutional guarantees of academic freedom, due process, and equal protection?

NO. A substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation.  There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals. 

The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." The SC held that the three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power.  Thus, having flunked it three times, San Diego is barred from taking the NMAT again.

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philex Mining Corp., G.R. No. 230016, [November 23, 2020]

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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. PHILEX MINING CORP.

G.R. No. 230016, [November 23, 2020]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Value Added Tax; VAT mandatory compliances; VAT Refund

 

While the tax law requires mandatory compliance with the keeping of subsidiary journals and the filing of monthly value-added tax (VAT) declarations, the Court will not deny the request for refund on the sole basis that the taxpayer failed to comply with these requirements when the law does not provide for its compliance by the taxpayer to be entitled for refund. The Court may not construe a statute that is free from doubt; neither can we impose conditions or limitations when none is provided for. 

 

Philex Mining Corporation, a VAT-registered taxpayer engaged in mining, sought a refund of ₱51,734,898.99 for unutilized input VAT attributed to its zero-rated sales during the second and third quarters of taxable year 2010. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) contested the refund claim, asserting that Philex Mining failed to comply with the accounting requirements of maintaining subsidiary sales and purchase journals and filing monthly VAT declarations.

 

Whether Philex Mining is entitled to a refund of unutilized input VAT despite its alleged non-compliance with subsidiary journal-keeping and monthly VAT declaration filing requirements. 

YES. The Court ruled in favor of Philex Mining, holding that the absence of subsidiary sales and purchase journals and monthly VAT declarations is not sufficient to deny the refund. The Court emphasized that the Tax Code does not explicitly require compliance with these specific accounting requirements as a condition for a refund. It clarified that strict construction is required for tax exemptions, but tax statutes should be construed strictly against the taxing authority and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. 

In this case, Philex Mining's refund claim was granted, stating that the taxpayer had sufficiently proven its entitlement to the refund. The absence of subsidiary sales journal, subsidiary purchase journal, and monthly VAT declarations is not sufficient to deprive Philex Mining of its right to a refund. The Court maintained that Philex Mining adequately demonstrated its entitlement to the refund by providing the necessary documents such as official receipts, quarterly VAT returns, and import entry declarations. In all, Philex Mining's failure to maintain subsidiary sales and purchase journals or to file the monthly VAT declarations should not result in the outright denial of its claim for refund or credit of unutilized input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales.

 

 

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