BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN V. WENLE G.R. No. 242957 [February 28, 2023]

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BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN V. WENLE

G.R. No. 242957, [February 28, 2023]

EN BANC, GESMUNDO, C.J.

 

Summary Deportation Order; Due Process in Deportation Proceedings; Powers of Bureau of Immigration over Undersirable Alien 

Being legally detained by virtue of the valid Summary Deportation Order issued by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration is not an arbitrary arrest and is not illegal. The alleged lack of notice and hearing before the issuance of the Summary Deportation Order does not render the Summary Deportation Order and his confinement void for violation of due process. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings, such as deportation proceedings, is the opportunity to be heard.

 

This case involves an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Resolution dated October 22, 2018, which declared null and void the Summary Deportation Order (SDO) issued by the Bureau of Immigration's Board of Commissioners. The SDO was issued against Yuan Wenle, a Chinese national, and companion Chinese nationals. The RTC, in a habeas corpus proceeding, ruled that the SDO did not accord due process to aliens. 

The background includes a request from the Chinese Embassy for assistance in arresting and deporting the individuals based on cancelled Chinese passports. The Bureau issued a Charge Sheet, a Watchlist Order, and subsequently, the SDO. Respondent Yuan Wenle filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that the SDO was issued without notice and hearing, making his arrest arbitrary and illegal. The RTC granted the petition, declaring the SDO null and void for being issued without due process. The Bureau, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking to reverse the RTC's decision. 

 

Whether a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a proper remedy to assail a decision or final order of the RTC in habeas corpus cases.

NO. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which explicitly allows petitions for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, limited to questions of law. The Court emphasized that the RTC lacked jurisdiction in entertaining pleas against a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) in a habeas corpus proceeding, as the power to deport aliens is vested in the President through the Bureau of Immigration. This is obvious in deportation proceedings, where the president or the Bureau of Immigration, in order to complete or execute our immigration policies, is given the power to issue arrest warrants for purposes of carrying out a final order of deportation. It is impossible to deport an undesirable alien without first gaining custody of the alien's person.

All told, the Petition for Habeas Corpus was moot and academic, respondent Wenle having been detained by virtue of a legal process. The trial court, therefore, should have denied the Petition. Therefore, SC nullifies the decision of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16 in R-MNL-18-10197-SP for seriously erring in assuming jurisdiction over the habeas corpus case and in invalidating the July 26, 2018 Summary Deportation Order.

 

Whether the Summary Departure Order (SDO) issued by the Bureau against respondent is void for violating due process.

NO. Section 37(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 (CA No. 613), which grants the Commissioner of Immigration the authority to issue warrants of arrest for the purpose of deportation. The Court recognized that an SDO essentially functions as a warrant issued by an administrative body.

In this case, respondent Yuan Wenle was being legally detained by virtue of the valid Summary Deportation Order issued by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration. The alleged lack of notice and hearing before the issuance of the Summary Deportation Order does not render the Summary Deportation Order and his confinement void for violation of due process.

It is undisputed that on July 17, 2018, respondent Wenle was charged before the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, the body with jurisdiction over deportation cases. Nine days later, or on July 26, 2018, a Summary Deportation Order was subsequently issued against respondent Wenle, and only then was he arrested pursuant to the deportation order. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings, such as deportation proceedings, is the opportunity to be heard, which was undisputedly given to respondent Wenle. Wenle was not deprived of his right to due process. He was amply afforded an opportunity to be heard during the proceedings in his petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, SDO issued by the Bureau did not violates the petitioner’s right to due process.

 

 

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TAÑADA, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. No. 217012, [March 1, 2016]

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TAÑADA, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

 G.R. No. 217012, [March 1, 2016]

EN BANC, CARPIO, J.

 

HRET Jurisdiction; Nuisance Candidate

 

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disclaiming jurisdiction over the protest filed by herein petitioner Wigberto "Toby" R. Tañada, Jr. (Wigberto). the HRET lacks the authority to rule on whether or not Alvin John is indeed a nuisance candidate. The latte is not considered a "Member" of Congress, as a non-member of Congress, the HRET could not therefore assume jurisdiction over the issues concerning his eligibility, e.g. the issue on whether he is a nuisance candidate.

 

Wigberto "Toby" R. Tañada, Jr. (Wigberto) filed an election protest ad cautelam before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) contesting the 2013 election results for the Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Quezon. Wigberto's protest stemmed from the 2013 elections where three candidates, including himself, contested the position. For the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, the name of candidate Alvin John remained in the ballots. After the canvass of the votes, the following results indicated that Tan was the winning candidate, to wit: Tan (84,782), Tañada, Wigberto (80,698) and Tañada, Alvin John (7,038). The Quezon PBOC then proclaimed Tan as the winning candidate.  

He filed petitions with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking the cancellation of Alvin John's Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), on the basis of his material misrepresentations under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but not on being a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC dismissed the petitions, but later, on Wigberto's motion for reconsideration, cancelled Alvin John's CoC based on Section 78. While Wigberto's petition for certiorari was still pending in the Supreme Court, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the action of the COMELEC Second Division annulling Tan's proclamation. However, Tan had by then taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation moot. 

Wigberto, after the election, filed an election protest before the HRET, alleging fraud in the fielding of Alvin John as a nuisance candidate, resulting in the miscounting of votes. The HRET dismissed the protest, asserting it lacked jurisdiction to declare Alvin John a nuisance candidate. 

 

Whether or not HRET had jurisdiction to declare Alvin John a nuisance candidate. 

NO. The Supreme Court found that the HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring that it lacked jurisdiction to determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. Wigberto committed procedural errors by filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Banc's ruling, which is expressly prohibited by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The ruling had become final and executory, barring him from raising the issue in another forum. If Wigberto had timely filed a petition before the Supreme Court to question Alvin John's nuisance candidacy, the Court could have assumed jurisdiction. The COMELEC En Banc's resolution on Alvin John's alleged nuisance candidacy had already become final and executory by the time Wigberto filed his petition before the Supreme Court.

The SC reasoned that it appears that Wigberto's petition challenging Alvin John's nuisance candidacy filed before the HRET, and now before this Court, is a mere afterthought. It was only after Tan was proclaimed a winner that Wigberto renewed his zeal in pursuing Alvin John's alleged nuisance candidacy. It is not enough for Wigberto to have Alvin John's COC cancelled, because the effect of such cancellation only leads to stray votes. Alvin John must also be declared a nuisance candidate, because only then will Alvin John's votes be credited to Wigberto.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed Wigberto's petition, affirming the HRET's Resolutions and emphasizing the importance of timely and proper legal procedures in election cases.

 

 

 

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 Concurring Opinion, Jose Portugal Perez, [J]

Mohamed v. Republic, G.R. No. 220674, [December 2, 2021]

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Mohamed v. Republic

 G.R. No. 220674, [December 2, 2021]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Citizenship; Naturalization Law; Refugee Convention

 

The right of an alien to become a citizen by naturalization is statutory, rather than a natural one, and it does not become vested until he establishes facts showing strict compliance with the law. The strict compliance with legal requirements in naturalization proceedings, ensures that the privilege of Philippine citizenship is granted only to those fully qualified under the law. 

 

Sefyan Abdelhakim Mohamed, a Sudanese national, married to Filipino citizen Lailanie N. Piano, applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization. Recognized as a convention refugee in 2005, Mohamed filed a Petition for Naturalization in 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. The RTC granted his application in 2009, and on September 24, 2012, the RTC allowed him to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed, contending that Mohamed failed to comply with the one-year period for filing the Declaration of Intention in compliance with the Revised Naturalization Law, which law provides, “one year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice, a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines.”. OSG points out that Mohamed's failure to comply with the required period in filing and that his premature oath rendered the naturalization void.

 

Whether or not Mohamed complies with the requirements for naturalization as required by the Revised Naturalization Law. 

NO. The Court held that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest, emphasizing strict construction in favor of the government. Under the Revised Naturalization Law, the declaration of intention must be filed one year prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization. The one-year period for the Declaration of Intention must be computed from the submission of the supplemental declaration in cases of substantial changes. In this case, Mohamed file such declaration of intention before the expiration of the one-year period; filing the petition a month after the supplemental declaration. Mohamed's failure to adhere to this timeframe constituted a jurisdictional defect.

Mohamed also failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law for purposes of naturalization. Discrepancies in the names declared by Mohamed and the lack of proper documentation for the character witnesses did not help his case. Mohamed also did not submit documentary evidence or medical certificate to prove that he is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable disease. Thus, the Court rejected arguments of substantial compliance, emphasizing the mandatory nature of legal requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.

The Court dismiss the petition for naturalization without prejudice, allowing Mohamed to refile. However, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, and the OSG was given a fresh one-year period for investigation, aligning with international commitments of the Philippines to facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees, under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

 

Whether or not the naturalization requirements are NOT to be applied strictissimi juris in view of the Philippines obligation as party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

NO. Regarding Mohamed's status as a convention refugee, the Court clarified that while the 1951 Refugee Convention aimed to expedite naturalization, it did not waive all legal requirements. Mohamed's premature oath administered before the OSG's appeal period expired, was declared void. Although the Philippines is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, this does not amount to a blanket waiver or relaxation of all the legal requirements for naturalization as mandated by the Revised Naturalization Law of the Philippines. 

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Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan v. Commission on Elections En Banc, G.R. No. 225152, [October 5, 2021]

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Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 225152, [October 5, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Election Law; Constitutionality of COMELEC resolution extending deadline submission of SOCE 

The Supreme Court En banc says the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the deadline of submission of the Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) beyond the 30-day period mandated by RA 7166 or the Synchronized Elections Law. The COMELEC has exceeded its delegated rule making authority which amounts to usurpation of legislative power.

 

A Petition for certiorari was filed by Partido Demokratiko Pilipino–Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) against the COMELEC. PDP-Laban challenged the COMELEC’S Resolution No. 10147, which extended the filing of Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) until June 30, 2016, despite being originally set at June 8,2016 which is thirty (30) days after the May 9, 2016 national elections. PDP-Laban argued that the COMELEC exceeded its limits and violated section 14 of RA 7166 due to the said order.

 

Whether or not the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10147 which extended the SOCE submission after the 2016 elections is unconstitutional. 

YES. The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot extend the deadline for submission by candidates of their Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE). Under section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 or the Synchronized Elections Law, candidates are required to file their full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election within 30 days after the conduct of election. The language in RA 7166, Section 14 is not ambiguous; the law is clear that SOCEs must be filed within 30 days after the latest polls. Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the SOCE deadline and exempted candidates and political parties from administrative liabilities in violation of the clear language of the law and legislative intent. The COMELEC likewise cannot conveniently invoke the exigency of public service to justify its actions. The COMELEC’s task is to administer the law, not supplant them. For these reasons, the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10147 is declared void for being repugnant to the law. Applying the doctrine of operative fact, however, the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the COMELEC’s Resolution shall be applied prospectively. Thus, the Statements of Contributions and Expenditures for the May 9, 2016 national and local elections that were submitted within the extended period (on or before June 30, 2016) are deemed timely filed. 

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House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal v. Panga-Vega, G.R. No. 228236 (Resolution), [January 27, 2021]

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House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal v. Panga-Vega

 G.R. No. 228236 (Resolution), [January 27, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

HRET Legal Capacity to Sue; Petition for Review against CSC decision to CA; CSC guidelines; OSG Legal Standing

 

The rules on maternity leave can be suppletorily applied to the Magna Carta of Women's special leave benefit. It emphasizes a liberal interpretation in favor of women's empowerment. Additionally, it affirms the expertise of administrative agencies like the CSC in matters within their jurisdiction which are accorded with great respect if not finality.

 

Atty. Daisy B. Panga-Vega, then Secretary of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), requested a 15-day special leave under the Magna Carta of Women to undergo hysterectomy. HRET approved the leave not exceeding two months. After one month, Panga-Vega informed HRET of her readiness to resume duties, presenting medical certificates. HRET directed her to consume the full leave due to an ongoing investigation on her alleged alteration and tampering a minutes of a meeting. Panga-Vega appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which ruled in her favor, granting her both commuted money value and salary for actual services. HRET filed a Petition for Review assailing the foregoing Decision and Resolution of the CSC. The HRET argues that the CSC should not have applied suppletorily the rules on maternity leave to the special leave benefit under RA No. 9710. It also contends that Panga-Vega did not sufficiently comply with the "CSC Guidelines on the Availment of the Special Leave Benefits for Women Under RA No. 9710.

  

Whether the HRET, as the petitioner, has the legal capacity to initiate the case.

 NO. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) lacked the authority to initiate the case due to the absence of explicit authorization from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the absence of a conflicting position. Under the law, OSG was constituted as the office tasked to represent the Government and its officers in the Court in which the Government, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity is a party. The OSG, however, may be excused from representing the Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities when there is an express authorization by the OSG, naming therein the legal officers who are being deputized in cases involving their respective offices, subject to its supervision and control, or when the OSG takes a position different from that of the agency it is duty bound to represent.

A perusal of the records shows that there was no express authorization by the OSG naming the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the HRET as its deputized legal officers in filing this petition. There was also no proof, let alone an allegation, that the OSG took a position different from the HRET in this case. Thus, HRET had the no legal capacity to initiate the case and the Court has dismissed the petition.

 

Whether Panga-Vega complied with CSC Guidelines for her return to work.

YES. The Court accorded finality to the CSC's findings that Panga-Vega sufficiently complied with the CSC Guidelines, acknowledging the CSC's expertise. The Court suppletory applied the rules on maternity leave to the special leave benefit under the Magna Carta of Women, considering its purpose to protect women's health and welfare. A liberal interpretation was favored, asserting that the fundamental objective of RA No. 9710 is to protect the health and welfare of women. In examining the compliance of Atty. Daisy B. Panga-Vega with Civil Service Commission (CSC) Guidelines for her return to work, the Court deferred to the findings of the CSC, acknowledging its specialized knowledge and expertise in administrative matters. The Court emphasized the adequacy of Panga-Vega's compliance with the CSC Guidelines, particularly regarding the requisite medical certificate, and accorded finality to the CSC's determination. Therefore, her return to work was deemed appropriate.

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Sobrejuanite-Flores v. Pilando, Jr., G.R. No. 251816, [November 23, 2021]

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SOBREJUANITE-FLORES V. PILANDO, JR.

G.R. No. 251816, [November 23, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Licensure Examination; Exemption to qualified Psychologist; Equal Protection Clause; Constitutionality of RA 10029

 

The Court held that RA No. 10029 satisfied the completeness test and sufficient standard test which renders valid the delegation of legislative powers. The completion of at least 100 hours of updating workshops and training programs under Section 16(c) of the IRR of RA No. 10029 is not oppressive and not unreasonable.

 

On May 7, 2015, Florentina Sobrejuanite-Flores applied for registration as a psychologist without examination but the Board of Psychology (BOP) rejected her application on the ground that she had insufficient work experience and had not updated her professional education. Aggrieved, Florentina appealed to the PRC, which also denied her appeal for her failure to substantiate her claim that she worked as a psychologist for a minimum accumulated period of 10 years and for her failure to update her professional education. She elevated her case to the CA, but her appeal was also denied. A petition for review certiorari filed by Florentina assailing the decision finding that she was not qualified to avail the exemption, or to register with as psychologist without examination pursuant to the assailed Section 16(c) provisions of the IRR of RA No. 10029.

 

Whether or the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 10029, or the Philippine Psychology Act of 2009 is unconstitutional.

 

NO. SC Upholds Validity of Sec. 16(c) of the Rules Implementing the Philippine Psychology Act. The assailed provision granted a period for practitioners to register as psychologists without examination and crafted sufficient standards on who may avail the exemption measured in terms of educational attainment and work experience. Specifically, the law provides that applicants who have Bachelor’s Degree in Psychology may be registered without examination if they accumulated a “minimum of ten (10) years of work experience in the practice of psychology as a psychology” and “updated their professional education in various psychology-related functions.”

The Supreme Court finds no constitutional violation to pronounce void Section 16(c) of the IRR of RA No. 10029. The said law satisfied the completeness test and sufficient standard test which renders valid the delegation of legislative powers. The Court noted that the completion of at least 100 hours of updating workshops and training programs under Section 16(c) of the IRR of RA No. 10029 can hardly be considered oppressive, as argued by Florentina. Furthermore, the Court held that the same requirement emanates from the valid exercise of police power to prescribe regulations that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare of the people, and thus a valid exercise of the State’s police power.

Aside from not finding any constitutional violation, the Court agreed with the CA, the PRC, and the Board of Psychology (BOP), that petitioner Florentina is not qualified to avail of the exemption. It noted that Florentina’s claim that she worked since 1980 as a school psychologist, counselling psychologist, industrial psychologist, and migrant psychologist was unsubstantiated. Records revealed that Florentina started working as a psychologist only in March 2004 or for a period of six years and two months from the effectivity of the law on June 2, 2010. Hence, she was not qualified to avail of the exemption as stated in the assailed Section 16(c), of the IRR of RA 10029.

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Ampatuan v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 252007, [December 7, 2021]

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AMPATUAN V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 252007, [December 7, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Powers of COA;Commission on Audit Notice of Disallowances; petition for Review;  Liability of Public Officers

Mere position of a superior public officer is insufficient to establish civil liability for disallowed expenditures. Holding a public officer personally liable for civil liability for disallowances requires a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, which was absent in this case.

 

The case pertains to a Petition for Certiorari filed by Zaldy Uy Ampatuan challenging the Commission on Audit's (COA) Resolution dated August 15, 2019. The COA conducted a special audit of the Office of the Regional Governor in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao for the period of January 2008 to September 2009. Following the audit, Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. ORG-12-002-MDS/LF (08 & 09) was issued, disallowing disbursements totaling ₱79,162,435.00. The petitioner, who was the Regional Governor, was held personally liable for his alleged failure to monitor the transactions. Petitioner was faulted for his alleged failure to monitor the acts of his subordinates who perpetrated the unlawful disbursements. Plainly, civil liability was imposed upon petitioner for his alleged failure to ensure that all resources of the government are managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition.

 

Whether or not there is legal basis for holding a public officer personally liable for disallowed expenditures.

NO. The primary legal basis for the ruling lies in the requirement that civil liability for disallowed expenditures necessitates a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of the public officer. Under the legal provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, it explicitly state that expenditures of government funds in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found directly liable. Solidary liability for illegal expenditures falls on the official or employee authorizing or making the payment, or taking part therein, and every person receiving such payment.

In this case, the Court finds no legal and evidentiary bases to support a finding of liability in the Notice of Disallowances (ND) against petitioner. Verily, the sole proposition that an official is the head of the audited agency does not suffice to hold him personally liable for disallowances on account of his subordinate's actions. Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of an agency. The court emphasized that the mere position of the public officer is insufficient to establish personal liability for Notice of Disallowances. An officer's liability depends on the wrong committed and not solely on their position. It is important therefore, to establish direct participation and knowledge of the public officer in the disallowed transaction to impute liability – which absent in this case.

Hence the court granted the petition, setting aside the COA's Resolution.

 

 

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