Matobato, Sr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 229265 & 229624 [February 15, 2022]

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MATOBATO, SR. V. PEOPLE

 G.R. Nos. 229265 & 229624, [February 15, 2022]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Law on Public Officers; Three-fold Liability rule; Sandiganbayan; Public Funds; Municipal Treasurer 

Under the "threefold liability rule," the wrongful acts or omissions of public officers may give rise to civil, criminal, and administrative liabilities. The dismissal of the criminal action does not extinguish the civil liability if (1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (2) the court declares that the liability is civil only; and (3) that the civil liability does not arise from the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The quantum of proof          to establish civil liability is preponderance of evidence only. Corollarily, public officers could still be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party notwithstanding their acquittal.

 

The Municipality of Pantukan authorized its Treasurer, Silvino Matobato, Sr., to transfer funds to Davao Cooperative Bank (DCB) based on a resolution. DCB suffered insolvency, and the municipality couldn't withdraw the funds. The Commission on Audit (COA) recommended criminal and administrative charges. Silvino, along with Sangguniang Bayan members Walter Bucao and Cirila Engbino, faced charges for violating RA No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan acquitted them due to insufficient evidence for criminal liability but found them civilly liable for the municipality's unrecovered funds.

 

Whether Silvino, Walter, and Cirila can be held civilly liable despite their acquittal on criminal charges.

YES. The court affirms the Sandiganbayan's decision, holding Silvino, Walter, and Cirila civilly and solidarily liable. Their acquittal on criminal charges doesn't extinguish civil liability, which the law requires only preponderance of evidence. It pertains to evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Here, the required quantum of proof was met to sustain the Sandiganbayan's findings on the civil liability of Silvino, Walter, and Cirila.

Silvino's negligence in depositing funds without due diligence and the others' reliance on verbal assurances without further scrutiny breached their duties. Silvino did not establish any precautionary or contingent measure to protect the financial interests of the Municipality of Pantukan from the whiplash of DCB's insolvency. It is likewise the Municipal Treasurer's duty to ensure that these funds are safe guarded, but Silvino failed to comply with these duties. On the part of Walter and Cirila, as Sangguniang Bayan members, they failed to require and examined the audited financial statements of DCB. Their negligence paves to their indispensable participations in the transfer of funds to DCB.

On this point, the Court reminds that public funds, like public office, are founded on public trust. How the public funds are managed and how they are safely kept reflect on the ability of the government to keep inviolate its fiduciary duty to the people. Therefore, Silvino, Walter, and Cirila are held civilly and solidarily liable to indemnify the Municipality of Pantukan.

 

 

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De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, [March 22, 2022]

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DE ALBAN V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 243968, [March 22, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Election Law; Nuisance Candidate; Senatorial Candidate Qualification 

The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the COMELEC's authority to refuse to give due course to or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of a nuisance candidate, under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). However, the court emphasizes that this authority must be exercised in accordance with procedural due process, and the COMELEC must provide a fair and reasonable opportunity for the candidate to clarify their position and present evidence in their defense.

  

Angelo Castro De Alban filed a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for senator in the May 13, 2019, elections as an independent candidate. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law Department, motu proprio, filed a petition to declare him a nuisance candidate, alleging lack of bona fide intent, financial capacity, and political machinery. COMELEC First Division declared De Alban a nuisance candidate, emphasizing his failure to establish financial capacity. The COMELEC En Banc upheld this decision, stating the need for evidence of a solid financial capacity for a nationwide campaign. 

 

Whether or not COMELEC's authority, under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), to motu proprio refuse due course to or cancel the CoC of a nuisance candidate is not unconstitutional. 

YES. The Court declares the case moot due to the conclusion of the 2019 elections. However, exceptions apply, and the case falls under the fourth exception since issues related to nuisance candidates are capable of repetition in future elections, yet evading review. In this case, the Court affirms COMELEC's authority to motu proprio refuse due course to or cancel the CoC of nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the OEC, emphasizing that the OEC governs all elections of public officers, including senators. The Court also rejects the argument that RA No. 6646 impliedly repealed Section 69 of the OEC, affirming the coexistence of both laws. COMELEC's motu proprio authority remains intact. Lastly, the Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 69, OEC rejecting De Alban's claim that it violates due process and the equal protection clause. The Court emphasizes the importance of preventing confusion and frustration in the electoral process. Therefore, the provisions of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code are not unconstitutional.

 

Whether or not COMELEC has gravely abused its discretion in declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate.

YES. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)'s motu proprio authority under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) is subject to procedural due process requirements. In this case, the COMELEC abused its discretion by declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate based on an incorrect interpretation of the law and a lack of substantial evidence. The COMELEC's motu proprio authority under Section 69 of the OEC must not result in the denial of the candidates' opportunity to be heard, which must be construed as a chance to explain one's side. The Court underscores that due process requires a fair opportunity for candidates to present evidence and disputes the COMELEC's premature dismissal of De Alban's capacity to wage a nationwide campaign.

In this case, the Court criticizes the COMELEC's reliance on general allegations without specifying the acts or circumstances indicating De Alban's lack of bona fide intention to run. It rejects the notion that financial capacity alone justifies declaring a candidate a nuisance, emphasizing the absence of legal requirements for financial qualifications in Senatorial Elections. Financial capacity to sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign, cannot be used, by itself, to declare a candidate as nuisance.  In the same vein, the Court finds that non-membership in a political party or being unknown nationwide, or the low probability of success do not by themselves equate to the absence of bona fide intention to run for public office.

The Court reminds the COMELEC that the candidate's bona fide intention to run for public office is neither subject to any property qualifications nor dependent upon membership in a political party, popularity, or degree of success in the elections. Therefore, while upholding the constitutionality of COMELEC's authority under Section 69, the Court sets aside the COMELEC's resolution declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate.

 

 

 

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REPUBLIC V. SERENO [G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018]

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REPUBLIC V. SERENO

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

EN BANC, TIJAM J.

 

Quo Warranto Proceeding against Impeachable Official

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative, or criminal action, if otherwise.

 

The OSG 's quo warranto petition challenged respondent's right and title to the position of Chief Justice. He averred that in failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court, respondent could not be said to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that respondent's appointment as Chief Justice be declared void. 

She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be annulled absent any allegation of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition for quo warranto is time-barred; and that respondent was and is a person of proven integrity.

  

Whether the impeachable officials such as justices of Supreme Court can be ousted in office through a Quo Warranto Proceeding. 

YES. SC held that the Constitution in fact allows quo warranto actions against impeachable officers. No provision states that quo warranto cannot extend to non-elected impeachable officers. he authority to hear quo warranto petitions against appointive impeachable officers emanates from Section 5(1) of Article VIII which grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without qualification as to the class of public officers over whom the same may be exercised. The nature of quo warranto as a remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office. It is a remedy against the "unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. Quo warranto should be available to question the validity of appointments especially of impeachable officers since they occupy the upper echelons of government and are capable of wielding vast power and influence on matters of law and policy. 

Thus, SC nullified Maria Lourdes Sereno's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, finding that she never lawfully held the office due to a lack of integrity for failing to file certain required financial documents (SAL-N). As a result, she was ousted from the Supreme Court as Chief Justice. 

A quo warranto petition cannot remove someone from office. If a quo warranto petition succeeds, the target's very appointment is declared null and void ab initio, meaning, legally, Sereno was never Chief Justice at all, as her appointment has been declared illegitimate.

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CARPIO-MORALES VS. CA [GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015]

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CARPIO-MORALES VS. CA

GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

EN BANC, PERLAS-BERNABE

 

Re-election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.

The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect. There is no basis for saying that the election of an official to a new term fully absolves the official of any administrative liability arising from an offense committed during a prior term, since public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.

 

Ombudsman ordered the preventive suspension of Binay, Jr, Mayor of Makati, pending investigation as to his involvement in the alleged corruption in the Makati Parking Building Project. Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable since Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati and Phases III to V transpired during his first term. His re-election as mayor for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. Binay invokes condonation doctrine that all administrative irregularities committed during his previous term were already condoned by the fact of his re-election.

 

Does condonation through re-election operate to absolve an elective official from administrative liability arising from a previous term? 

PARTLY GRANTED. The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect starting April 12, 2016 (Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals attained finality). The condonation doctrine should be abandoned. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support it. It would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times. 

In fact the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. 

However, the Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application. It should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected.

 

Condonation Doctrine Concept

Condonation Doctrine, which applies only to administrative cases, (1) the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; (2) an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and (3) courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. 

Applicability: the condonation doctrine can still apply to pending administrative cases provided that the re-election is also before the abandonment.

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Carlos v. Department of Finance [G.R. No. 225774. April 18, 2023]

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Carlos v. Department of Finance

G.R. No. 225774. April 18, 2023

EN BANC, LEONEN J.

 

Liability of SALN violations; Due Process in error and omissions on SALNs

Compliance with the mandatory review under Republic Act No. 6713 is a prerequisite for holding public officials or employees liable for omissions or errors in their SALNs. This requires the government to notify individuals of any defects in their SALNs and provide them an opportunity to correct these defects. Without following this procedure, liability for SALN violations does not arise.

 

Carlos was initially hired as a Tax Specialist II on a contractual basis by the Department of Finance-One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center. He later received a permanent appointment as Tax Specialist I. Carlos was investigated for discrepancies between his Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) and his actual assets, including properties and loans. He was accused of failing to disclose various assets, obtaining dubious loans, and amassing wealth disproportionate to his income. The Office of the Ombudsman found him guilty of grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty.

 

Whether or not Carlos was guilty of dishonesty for his alleged omissions and errors in his SALNs. 

No. The Court held that Carlos cannot be held liable for omissions or errors in his SALNs because the government failed to comply with the mandatory review and compliance procedure outlined in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6713. This procedure requires the government to inform the reporting individual of any defects in their SALNs and provide them an opportunity to correct these defects. Without following this procedure, liability for SALN violations does not arise. The Court emphasized that the review and compliance mechanism serves as a buffer against haphazard actions and affords public officials the opportunity to explain discrepancies. The Court also noted that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute violations of SALNs is not absolute and should be in line with the procedures set forth in Republic Act No. 6713. Therefore, the Court ruled that Carlos was not guilty of dishonesty and should not be penalized for the alleged SALN discrepancies.

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Pimentel v. Legal Education Board [G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, September 10, 2019]

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Pimentel v. Legal Education Board

 G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, [September 10, 2019]

EN BANC, REYES J.

 

Academic Freedom of Educational Institution 

The Court struck down the specific provisions of PhiLSAT and faculty qualification requirements that it deemed unconstitutional. The strict pass-fail requirement of PhiLSAT and the faculty qualification requirements went beyond reasonable regulation and intruded on academic freedom. LEB’s regulatory power should be reasonable and should not unduly restrict the autonomy of educational institutions and the choices of students.

This case involves consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7662, known as the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993. The act established the Legal Education Board (LEB) and introduced the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) as a requirement for law school applicants. Petitioners primarily argued that these provisions violated academic freedom.

 

Whether the introduction of PhiLSAT and related provisions under R.A. No. 7662 infringe upon the academic freedom of law schools and applicants.

  

Yes. The Supreme Court held that R.A. No. 7662 did not encroach upon the Court's rule-making authority and that the state had the jurisdiction to regulate legal education in the interest of public welfare. However, certain provisions of PhiLSAT that excluded, restricted, and qualified admissions to law schools were deemed unconstitutional as they violated institutional academic freedom.

The Court found that the PhiLSAT, in its current form, impeded academic freedom by restricting law schools' discretion in admissions and, therefore, ruled certain PhiLSAT provisions unconstitutional. The Court also nullified certain LEB issuances that exceeded the powers granted under its charter. The Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education but with limitations to protect academic freedom of educational institutions. 

 

Violation of Academic Freedom: 

·        Interference with Admission Policies: The Court reasoned that PhiLSAT, as initially designed, imposed a pass-or-fail requirement for law school admission. This meant that law schools were restricted in admitting students solely based on their PhiLSAT scores. 

·        Restriction on Student Choice: academic freedom extends to students as well. The PhiLSAT, by imposing a rigid entrance exam requirement, limited the students' ability to choose their preferred law schools. 

·        Faculty Qualification Requirements: The law required that law professors have at least five years of practice or substantial experience in the field before they could teach. The Court found that this provision could limit the pool of qualified professors and limit the academic freedom of law schools to choose their faculty members.

 

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Macalintal vs. COMELEC [GR No. 263590, June 27, 2023]

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Macalintal vs. COMELEC

GR No. 263590, June 27, 2023

EN BANC, KHO, A.

 

Constitutionality of the postponement of the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections in October 2023 

The free and meaningful exercise of the right to vote requires the holding of genuine periodic elections which must be held at intervals which are not unduly long, which ensures that the authority of government continues to be based on the will of electors.

  

This is a consolidated petitions of Atty. Macalintal and of Atty. Alberto N. Hidalgo, assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act 11935 or “An Act Postponing the December 5, 2022 Barangay and SK Elections” and reschedule it to last Monday of October 2023.

  

Whether or not the issue has become moot and academic.

NO. The Supreme Court held that the case has not been rendered moot to preclude the exercise by this court of its judicial review power because RA 11935’s transgression on the people’s right of suffrage is continuing and did not cease upon the lapse of the December 5, 2022 election schedule. Thus, despite the intervening expiration of the previous election date, the case undoubtedly presents an actual case or controversy that justifies the continued exercise by this court of its judicial review power.

 

Whether or not the postponement of Barangay and SK Election is unconstitutional.

YES. The Supreme Court en banc exercised its inherent power to check and balance the legislative powers of Congress, the executive branch, and the Commission on Elections (Comelec). The Supreme Court has nullified the law that authorized the postponement of the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections in October 2023. Postponement unduly deprives the people of their fundamental power to decide on whether to retain or to change the incumbents who have overstayed in office for the longest time.

The Supreme Court declared that the free and meaningful exercise of the right to vote, as protected and guaranteed by the Constitution, requires the holding of genuine periodic elections which must be held at intervals which are not unduly long, and which ensure that the authority of government continues to be based on the free expression of the will of electors. The right of suffrage is one of the most fundamental and vital rights of the people. COMELEC cannot just negate that basic right.

 

Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to postpone elections on a nationwide basis.

NO. This power lies with the Congress pursuant to (i) its plenary power to legislate, and (ii) its power to fix the term of office of barangay officials under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution. As such, the Congress did not unconstitutionally encroach on the power of Comelec to administer elections when it enacted RA 11935. Neither did the provision for “hold-over” capacity amount to an unconstitutional “legislative appointment.”

 

SALIENT POINTS OF THIS LANDMARK DECISION:

 1.    Fundamental Right to Vote: The Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to vote, as protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. Genuine periodic elections held at reasonable intervals are essential for the free and meaningful exercise of this right. Prolonged postponements unduly deprive the people of their power to decide on the retention or replacement of incumbents.

2. Congressional Power and Role of COMELEC: The Supreme Court clarified that Comelec does not possess the authority to postpone elections on a nationwide basis. Such power resides with Congress, pursuant to its legislative and administrative authority under the Constitution. Congress did not unconstitutionally encroach on COMELEC'S powers when it enacted RA 11935.

3. Ongoing Transgression of Rights: The Court held that the case remained relevant and justiciable despite the expiration of the previous election date. RA 11935's infringement on the people's right of suffrage continued, justifying judicial review.

4.    Unnecessary Means Employed by Congress: The Supreme Court criticized the means employed by Congress as unreasonably unnecessary to achieve the government's goals. Transferring budget allocations from COMELEC to the executive branch violated the constitutional prohibition against such appropriations transfers.

5.    Future Elections: The Court mandated that the succeeding Barangay and SK elections should be held on the first Monday of December 2025 and every three years thereafter, as stipulated in RA 11462. However, Congress retains the authority to further amend RA 9164 (as amended), the law governing synchronized elections.

6.    Guidelines and Principles: The Supreme Court established guidelines and principles for government actions seeking to postpone elections. These guidelines were intended to guide the bench, bar, and the public and emphasized the importance of adhering to the principles of suffrage