Jimenez v. Jimenez, Jr. [G.R. No. 228011, February 10, 2021]

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Jimenez v. Jimenez, Jr.

G.R. No. 228011, February 10, 2021

SECOND DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Mortgagee in good faith; Purchaser in good faith; Notice of Lis Pendens

The protection granted to mortgagees in good faith extends even if they have knowledge of adverse claims or ongoing litigation related to the property. And the foreclosure sale retroacts to the mortgage's registration date, making the sale superior to the subsequent adverse claim.

 

Corona F. Jimenez owned a property covered by TCT No. RT-122097. Her children discovered a Deed of Donation allegedly forged in favor of Damian F. Jimenez, Jr. This deed led to the issuance of a new title, TCT No. N-217728, in Damian's name. Damian then mortgaged the property to Arturo S. Calubad and Antonio Keh for a P7,000,000.00 loan. The mortgage was registered. The Jimenez siblings, however, filed a case to annul the forged Deed of Donation and the new title along with the mortgage.

Despite their efforts, the foreclosure auction proceeded, and Calubad and Keh emerged as the highest bidders, leading to the issuance of new titles in their names. The RTC and CA both ruled that the Deed of Donation was forged but upheld Calubad and Keh's rights as innocent mortgagees for value and good faith. Danilo, one of the Jimenez siblings, appealed, arguing that Calubad and Keh were not purchasers in good faith because they were aware of the adverse claim before the public auction.

 

Whether the highest bidders could be considered mortgagees in good faith despite having notice of an adverse claim.

 

YES. The mortgagee in good faith is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. SC clarified that even if a mortgagee has notice of an adverse claim, their rights can still be protected if they satisfy the requirements of being mortgagees in good faith. 

In this case, Calubad and Keh met the requisites of being mortgagees in good faith. They relied on the title's face value, conducted an ocular inspection that confirms Damian’s possession and occupation, found nothing on TCT No. N-217728 that would have notified them of Damian's invalid title or reason to inquire further into Damian's title's status. 

The adverse claim could not affect the rights of the mortgagee. The Court emphasized that the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the mortgage's registration, making it prior in time to any subsequent liens or claims. The fact that the adverse claim was recorded after the mortgage did not affect the rights of Calubad and Keh as innocent mortgagees. Thus, their rights as innocent mortgagees were upheld.

 

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Quiambao v. China Banking Corp. [G.R. No. 238462, May 12, 2021]

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Quiambao v. China Banking Corp.

G.R. No. 238462, May 12, 2021

SECOND DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.

 

Obligations and Contracts; Foreclosure; Blanket Mortgage Clause; Contract of Adhesion 

Under the concept of contracts of adhesion, contracts are interpreted strictly against the drafting party, especially when there's ambiguity. The presence of a "blanket mortgage clause" does not automatically guarantee that all subsequent obligations will be covered; the wording must be explicit.

 

Elena R. Quiambao obtained a loan from China Banking Corporation, secured by a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over her property. The REM contained a "blanket mortgage clause" stating that it would secure current and future debts. Later, the bank initiated a foreclosure for unpaid loans under eight promissory notes (PNs). Elena challenged the foreclosure, claiming that the REM only covered the initial loan, and not the subsequent loans. She also claimed she signed blank documents without understanding, and the foreclosure was invalid.

  

Whether the blanket mortgage clause in the REM secured the subsequent loans, allowing for their valid foreclosure.

  

NO. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Quiambao. It highlighted that contracts of adhesion, where one party has more power, should be interpreted against the drafting party. While blanket mortgage clauses, also known as dragnet clauses, can encompass both existing and future debts, the clause's specific language must be examined meticulously to determine its scope. The Court found that the language of the clause did not unequivocally cover the subsequent loans linked to the eight PN.

At the trial, it was established that Elena and Daniel signed the amendments to the REM in blank. It was China Banking Corporation which drafted and prepared the standard forms on which Elena and Daniel merely affixed their signatures. Corollarily, any ambiguity in the provisions of these documents must be interpreted against China Banking Corporation, the party who prepared the contracts. Moreover, Elena's limited education and the complex nature of the transactions were considered.

Therefore, the bank cannot validly foreclose a mortgage based on non-payment of unsecured PNs. As such, the foreclosure proceedings are void.

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Quiogue, Jr. v. Quiogue [G.R. No. 203992, August 22, 2022]

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Quiogue, Jr. v. Quiogue

G.R. No. 203992, [August 22, 2022]

SECOND DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.

 

Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; Psychological Incapacity; Chronic Infidelity 

Psychological incapacity is determined by clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the marital union, and it need not be medically diagnosed. Chronic infidelity is a manifestation of psychological incapacity.

 

Antonio S. Quiogue, Jr. filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Maria Bel B. Quiogue (Maribel). They were married on October 16, 1980, and have four children. They separated in 1998 after Maribel drove Antonio out of their conjugal home due to his infidelity. Antonio claimed that both he and Maribel were psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations. Maribel denied driving Antonio out and accused him of chronic womanizing, nocturnal gambling, and abusive behavior. After referral to the public prosecutor and failed attempts at reconciliation, the case proceeded to trial.

 

Whether the marriage between Antonio and Maribel should be declared null and void based on the ground of psychological incapacity.

 

YES. The court ruled in favor of Antonio, declaring the marriage null and void due to his psychological incapacity. The court clarified that psychological incapacity, as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, requires the presence of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It emphasized that psychological incapacity need not be medically diagnosed, and the assessment can be based on the totality of evidence.

Antonio's chronic infidelity was considered a manifestation of his psychological incapacity. His behavior, deeply rooted in his upbringing and personality structure, indicated his inability to maintain monogamous relationships and his distorted understanding of marital obligations. Antonio's inability to maintain a faithful and committed relationship with Maribel was rooted in a dysfunctional personality structure that preexisted their marriage. Antonio's lack of genuine remorse and unwillingness to change further supported his psychological incapacity. 

Maribel's retaliatory acts and evicting Antonio from the conjugal home, were deemed a reaction to Antonio's philandering and not a basis for psychological incapacity. Admittedly, Maribel's vengeful stance contributed to the collapse of the marriage as it aggravated Antonio's psychological incapacity. Despite Maribel's belligerent attitude and verbal offensives towards Antonio, the Court rules that these do not amount to psychological incapacity. 

Thus, the court concluded that Antonio's psychological incapacity rendered the marriage null and void.

 

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Dedicatoria v. Dedicatoria [G.R. No. 250618, July 20, 2022]

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Dedicatoria v. Dedicatoria

 G.R. No. 250618, [July 20, 2022]

SECOND DIVISION , LOPEZ, M.V.

 

Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; Psychological Incapacity 

Psychological incapacity as a ground to consider a marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code, is not a medical, but a legal concept. It is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder in a strict medical sense, although one's clinical mental or personality disorder can be its root cause. Psychological incapacity should be assessed based on clear and convincing evidence rather than rigid medical criteria. 

 

Jennifer and Ferdinand got married in 1995. Jennifer later filed for nullity of their marriage, claiming that Ferdinand's psychological incapacity caused their marriage to fail. During trial, Jennifer testified that she noticed how irresponsible, immature, insensitive, self-centred, and dependent on his parents Ferdinand was. Despite their marriage, Ferdinand continued to reside with his parents, who provided for his needs, rendering him jobless and reliant on them. She also presented testimonies from witnesses and a clinical psychologist's evaluation, which diagnosed Ferdinand with Dependent Personality Disorder. This disorder made him immature, irresponsible, and unable to fulfill his marital duties rooted in his upbringing, primarily characterized by overdependence on his parents and a lack of personal responsibility.

  

Whether there is enough evidence to prove Ferdinand's psychological incapacity as grounds to void the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

  

YES. The court ruled in favor of Jennifer, declaring the marriage null and void. Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity is a legal concept and does not necessarily require a clinical diagnosis. Its existence does not demand strict medical criteria but relies on clear and convincing evidence. The court rejected the notion that both spouses need to be examined by a psychologist for the diagnosis to be reliable. Instead, psychological incapacity should be assessed based on the totality of clear and convincing evidence rather than rigid medical criteria. Such that expert opinions furnished by psychiatrists or psychologists on the psychological temperament of parties are not indispensable. 

The evidence from Jennifer's testimony, corroborated by her friend Anarose and the expert psychologist, showed that Ferdinand's personality traits and behaviors rendered him unable to fulfill his marital obligations. Ferdinand's overdependence on his parents, lack of employment, and failure to assume responsibilities within the marriage were key indicators of his psychological incapacity. The court acknowledged these traits as deep-rooted and irreparable, leading to marriage breakdown. The court stressed that psychological incapacity is not about medical conditions but rather to an individual's inability to comprehend and fulfill essential marital obligations caused by dysfunctionality in a person's personality structure.

 

 

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Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives [G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]

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Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives

G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

EN BANC, CARPIO MORALES, J

 

Rules on Impeachment; Verba Legis Construction

Salus populi est suprema lex. The welfare of the people is the supreme law.

 

First impeachment complaint filed by Joseph Estrada on June2003 against Chief Justice Davide for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes”.

Second impeachment complaint on October 2003 signed by at least 1/3 of the members of the House of Representative in accordance with the Rules on Impeachment passed and promulgated by the Congress.

 

Whether filing of 2nd impeachment complaint unconstitutional as it violated the Section 5 Art. XI of the Constitution “no impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year”.

 

YES. The rule of impeachment adopted by the Congress is unconstitutional. The rule cannot contravene the Constitution – which is the fundamental law. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.

Clearly the 2nd complaint violates the constitutional prohibition against the impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within one year period.

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN [G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952]

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HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN

G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952

EN BANC, BENGZON, J.

 

Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. 

 

Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. owned an ice-plant factory with two deep water tanks for cooling. The tanks lacked fences or covers, and the factory premises were accessible. A boy, Mario Balandan, about 8 years old, entered the factory with friends to swim in a tank. Unfortunately, Mario drowned in the tank.

Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case.

NO. The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises”.

The doctrine states that if a dangerous object on one's premises could attract children to play with it, the owner must take precautions to prevent accidents, even if the children are trespassing.

But in this case, water tanks are not classified as attractive nuisances. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, like swimming pools and ponds, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. These are known hazards and children are presumed to understand the danger.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. T.A.N. Properties [G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008]

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. T.A.N. Properties

G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008

FIRST DIVISION, CARPIO, J.

 

Property; Land Titles; Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title; Proof of Alienable and Disposable Land under RA 11573 

The burden of proving land's alienable and disposable status lies with the applicant. Certifications from DENR are insufficient; DENR Secretary's approval and survey verification are necessary. 

 

The case involves an application for the registration of a land parcel filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. for Lot 10705-B, covering 56.4007 hectares in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Support its claim that land is alienable and disposable, TAN Properties submitted two certifications; certification from CENRO stating that the subject land as within the Alienable and Disposable Zone and certification from Forest Management Services of the DENR) which stated that the subect area falls within an alienable and disposable land.

Whether the land is alienable and disposable.

NO. The rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. Anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming otherwise.

In this case, TAN submitted two certifications issued by DENR. The certifications, however, are not sufficient.

A. CENRO – issues certificates of land classification status for areas below50 hectares. (It is the PENRO that issues certificates for lands covering 50hectares). Here, the area of the subject land covers over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

B. FMS-DENR - has no authority under DAO (DENR-Admin Order) to issue certificates of land classification.

 

Moreover, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that:

               i.    The DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.

              ii.    In addition, the applicant for land registration must (4) present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. TAN failed to do so. As the respondent failed to prove the land's alienable and disposable nature, its application for registration was denied.

 

 

Whether TAN or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorios possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner?

(Update: Under the new law, RA 11573 effective July 16, 2021 – the required period of possession is 20 years prior to the application of the petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title)

NO. The Court find’s TAN’s uncorroborated witness testimony insufficient to prove that TAN’s predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. Moreover, the tax declarations presented were only for the years starting1955. TAN did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945.

Doctrine allowing private corporations to apply for registration doesn't apply when land was not already private when acquired. In this case, TAN acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30years since 12 June 1945. Hence, TAN failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when it acquired it from Porting in 1997.

 

What is the required proof that Land is Alienable and Disposable under RA 11573:AN ACT IMPROVING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS FOR IMPERFECT LAND TITLES

Under the new law, for purposes of judicial confirmation of imperfect titles, a duly signed certification by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer that the land is part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain is sufficient proof that the land is alienable; and the certification shall state the applicable Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, Proclamations and the Land Classification Project Map Number covering the subject land.

If such documents has no available copy, present a sworn statement declaring that said land classification map is existing in the inventory of LC Map records of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is being used by the DENR as land classification map.

Moreover, said Geodetic Engineer shall be presented in the witness stand during trial and hearing of the Petition for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Titles.