Sunday, August 27, 2023

Dedicatoria v. Dedicatoria [G.R. No. 250618, July 20, 2022]

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Dedicatoria v. Dedicatoria

 G.R. No. 250618, [July 20, 2022]

SECOND DIVISION , LOPEZ, M.V.

 

Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; Psychological Incapacity 

Psychological incapacity as a ground to consider a marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code, is not a medical, but a legal concept. It is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder in a strict medical sense, although one's clinical mental or personality disorder can be its root cause. Psychological incapacity should be assessed based on clear and convincing evidence rather than rigid medical criteria. 

 

Jennifer and Ferdinand got married in 1995. Jennifer later filed for nullity of their marriage, claiming that Ferdinand's psychological incapacity caused their marriage to fail. During trial, Jennifer testified that she noticed how irresponsible, immature, insensitive, self-centred, and dependent on his parents Ferdinand was. Despite their marriage, Ferdinand continued to reside with his parents, who provided for his needs, rendering him jobless and reliant on them. She also presented testimonies from witnesses and a clinical psychologist's evaluation, which diagnosed Ferdinand with Dependent Personality Disorder. This disorder made him immature, irresponsible, and unable to fulfill his marital duties rooted in his upbringing, primarily characterized by overdependence on his parents and a lack of personal responsibility.

  

Whether there is enough evidence to prove Ferdinand's psychological incapacity as grounds to void the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

  

YES. The court ruled in favor of Jennifer, declaring the marriage null and void. Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity is a legal concept and does not necessarily require a clinical diagnosis. Its existence does not demand strict medical criteria but relies on clear and convincing evidence. The court rejected the notion that both spouses need to be examined by a psychologist for the diagnosis to be reliable. Instead, psychological incapacity should be assessed based on the totality of clear and convincing evidence rather than rigid medical criteria. Such that expert opinions furnished by psychiatrists or psychologists on the psychological temperament of parties are not indispensable. 

The evidence from Jennifer's testimony, corroborated by her friend Anarose and the expert psychologist, showed that Ferdinand's personality traits and behaviors rendered him unable to fulfill his marital obligations. Ferdinand's overdependence on his parents, lack of employment, and failure to assume responsibilities within the marriage were key indicators of his psychological incapacity. The court acknowledged these traits as deep-rooted and irreparable, leading to marriage breakdown. The court stressed that psychological incapacity is not about medical conditions but rather to an individual's inability to comprehend and fulfill essential marital obligations caused by dysfunctionality in a person's personality structure.

 

 

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Saturday, August 26, 2023

Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives [G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]

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Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives

G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

EN BANC, CARPIO MORALES, J

 

Rules on Impeachment; Verba Legis Construction

Salus populi est suprema lex. The welfare of the people is the supreme law.

 

First impeachment complaint filed by Joseph Estrada on June2003 against Chief Justice Davide for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes”.

Second impeachment complaint on October 2003 signed by at least 1/3 of the members of the House of Representative in accordance with the Rules on Impeachment passed and promulgated by the Congress.

 

Whether filing of 2nd impeachment complaint unconstitutional as it violated the Section 5 Art. XI of the Constitution “no impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year”.

 

YES. The rule of impeachment adopted by the Congress is unconstitutional. The rule cannot contravene the Constitution – which is the fundamental law. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.

Clearly the 2nd complaint violates the constitutional prohibition against the impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within one year period.




HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN [G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952]

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HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN

G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952

EN BANC, BENGZON, J.

 

Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. 

 

Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. owned an ice-plant factory with two deep water tanks for cooling. The tanks lacked fences or covers, and the factory premises were accessible. A boy, Mario Balandan, about 8 years old, entered the factory with friends to swim in a tank. Unfortunately, Mario drowned in the tank.


Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case.

NO. The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises”.

The doctrine states that if a dangerous object on one's premises could attract children to play with it, the owner must take precautions to prevent accidents, even if the children are trespassing.

But in this case, water tanks are not classified as attractive nuisances. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, like swimming pools and ponds, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. These are known hazards and children are presumed to understand the danger.



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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. T.A.N. Properties [G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008]

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. T.A.N. Properties

G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008

FIRST DIVISION, CARPIO, J.

 

Property; Land Titles; Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title; Proof of Alienable and Disposable Land under RA 11573 

The burden of proving land's alienable and disposable status lies with the applicant. Certifications from DENR are insufficient; DENR Secretary's approval and survey verification are necessary. 

 

The case involves an application for the registration of a land parcel filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. for Lot 10705-B, covering 56.4007 hectares in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Support its claim that land is alienable and disposable, TAN Properties submitted two certifications; certification from CENRO stating that the subject land as within the Alienable and Disposable Zone and certification from Forest Management Services of the DENR) which stated that the subect area falls within an alienable and disposable land.


Whether the land is alienable and disposable.

NO. The rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. Anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming otherwise.

In this case, TAN submitted two certifications issued by DENR. The certifications, however, are not sufficient.

A. CENRO – issues certificates of land classification status for areas below50 hectares. (It is the PENRO that issues certificates for lands covering 50hectares). Here, the area of the subject land covers over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

B. FMS-DENR - has no authority under DAO (DENR-Admin Order) to issue certificates of land classification.

 

Moreover, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that:

               i.    The DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.

              ii.    In addition, the applicant for land registration must (4) present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. TAN failed to do so. As the respondent failed to prove the land's alienable and disposable nature, its application for registration was denied.

 

 

Whether TAN or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorios possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner?

(Update: Under the new law, RA 11573 effective July 16, 2021 – the required period of possession is 20 years prior to the application of the petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title)

NO. The Court find’s TAN’s uncorroborated witness testimony insufficient to prove that TAN’s predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. Moreover, the tax declarations presented were only for the years starting1955. TAN did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945.

Doctrine allowing private corporations to apply for registration doesn't apply when land was not already private when acquired. In this case, TAN acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30years since 12 June 1945. Hence, TAN failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when it acquired it from Porting in 1997.

 

What is the required proof that Land is Alienable and Disposable under RA 11573:AN ACT IMPROVING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS FOR IMPERFECT LAND TITLES

Under the new law, for purposes of judicial confirmation of imperfect titles, a duly signed certification by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer that the land is part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain is sufficient proof that the land is alienable; and the certification shall state the applicable Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, Proclamations and the Land Classification Project Map Number covering the subject land.

If such documents has no available copy, present a sworn statement declaring that said land classification map is existing in the inventory of LC Map records of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is being used by the DENR as land classification map.

Moreover, said Geodetic Engineer shall be presented in the witness stand during trial and hearing of the Petition for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Titles.

 

 

 

AQUINO V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN [G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014]

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AQUINO V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN

G.R. No. 211356  [September 29, 2014]

THIRD DIVISION, VELASCO, JR.

 

Property; Nuisance; Demolition of Property in “no build zone”

LGC authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

 

Crisostomo Aquino is the president of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). The company applied for a zoning compliance for the construction of a three-story hotel on a parcel of land in Boracay Island. Despite already operating a resort in the area, the application was denied due to the proposed construction site being within the "no build zone" as per a municipal ordinance. The municipal government issued a Cease and Desist Order and later, Executive Order No. 10 was issued, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove's hotel. Aquino argued that proper judicial proceedings should have been conducted before the demolition and that the municipality lacks jurisdiction over the forestland area. Aquino filed to certiorari petition on the validity of EO10 and the acts of concerned municipality.


Whether the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10, that leads to the demolition of Hotel Property valid, absent prior judicial proceedings.

 

YES. It finds that the hotel was not a nuisance per se, but a nuisance per accidens due to its location. The mayor's power to order the demolition of illegal constructions is upheld, since the property was clearly build under a “no build zone”. In establishing no build zone through a municipal ordinance, the LGU effectively decided that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No build zones are intended for the protection of the public because the stability of the ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of water.

Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.

 

 

Whether the respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions?

YES. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. Moreover, the LGC authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel. Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

 


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Rana v. Wong [G.R. No. 192861-62. June 30, 2014]

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Rana v. Wong

G.R. No. 192861-62. [June 30, 2014]

SECOND DIVISION, PERLAS-BERNABE

 

Property; Nuisance; Abatement of Nuisance

Unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it cannot be summarily abated.

 

Teresita Lee Wong and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong co-own a residential land in Cebu City. Across the road, Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the road and backfilled near the property of Spouses Wilson and Rosario Uy, without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling materials.

This led to a legal case where Wong, et al., claimed the actions of Sps. Rana constituted a nuisance affecting road access and safety, through a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with Damages against Sps. Rana before the RTC. The RTC ruled that the backfilling was a nuisance. The backfilling done by Sps. Rana on their property exerted pressure on the perimeter fence of the Uy property, thereby constituting a nuisance. The Court of Appeals upheld these rulings.

 

Whether the elevated and cemented road portion created by Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana considered a nuisance per se.

  

NO. The court discusses the legal definitions of nuisances and clarifies that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it cannot be summarily abated. The court rules that the elevated road portion is not a nuisance per se, as it does not inherently endanger health, safety, or obstruct passage, and thus, its demolition was unwarranted.  Consequently, its summary abatement without judicial permission is not justified. 

The court also addresses the subject backfilling, deeming it a nuisance and ordering Linda Rana to construct a retaining wall to rectify the issue.

 

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Thursday, August 24, 2023

SAN FELIX v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [G.R. No. 198404, October 14, 2019]

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SAN FELIX v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 198404, October 14, 2019

THIRD DIVISION, HERNANDO J.

 

Powers, Function and Jurisdiction of Civil Service Commission 

DOCTRINE: CSC's role as the central personnel agency responsible for upholding the integrity of the civil service system and maintaining the merit and rewards system. The case establishes that the CSC's jurisdiction extends to matters of integrity, honesty, and misconduct within the civil service, regardless of changes in specific examination administration authority.

 

San Felix was accused of allowing another person to take a police officer exam in his place, leading to the CSC's imposition of penalties. The CSC found San Felix guilty of dishonesty for allegedly allowing someone else to take a police officer examination on his behalf and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service along with other related penalties. San Felix contested this, claiming that the CSC lacked jurisdiction to conduct investigations and render administrative decisions due to a law transferring examination authority to the National Police Commission (NPC). The petition concerns the legal challenge against the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the Civil Service Commission's (CSC) findings against Melvin G. San Felix.

 

Whether the Civil Service Commission (CSC) retains jurisdiction to conduct investigations and render administrative decisions based on alleged anomalies in police entrance and promotional examinations after the creation of the National Police Commission (NPC).

 

YES. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) retains authority and jurisdiction to investigate anomalies and irregularities in civil service examinations and impose appropriate sanctions. The court found that the CSC has the power to administer the merit system and carry out measures to ensure the integrity of the civil service, including investigations related to examination fraud. Although a law transferred examination authority for police officers to the National Police Commission (NPC), the CSC's jurisdiction remained for investigations involving integrity and falsification of information in personal data sheets. The court held that the petitioner's act of dishonesty by allowing someone else to take an examination for him and making false statements on his personal data sheet warranted disciplinary action, as it was in violation of the merit and rewards system. Therefore, the court upheld the CSC's jurisdiction and its decision to impose sanctions on the petitioner.

 

 

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Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. vs. Edward King, G.R. No. 145901, December 15, 2005

 CASE DIGEST Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. vs. Edward King G.R. No. 145901, December 15, 2005 THIRD DIVISION, CORONA J.     C...