Tan-Andal vs. Andal (G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021)

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Tan-Andal vs. Andal

(G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021)

EN BANC, J. LEONEN

EXPERT WITNESS NOT NEEDED IN PROVING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS LIBERALLY INTERPRETED; NEW GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CASES

In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married each other. Earlier in their marriage, Rosanna also observed Mario to be emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable, and psychologically imbalanced. Rosanna later learned that Mario was a drug addict. Rosanna filed a petition to have her marriage declared void on the ground that Mario was psychologically incapacitated. To prove her case, she presented a psychologist (Dr. Fonso Garcia) who, after interviewing Rosanna, Rosanna’s daughter, and Rosanna’s sister, concluded that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia did not interview Mario as the latter, despite invitation, refused an interview. In her assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to be suffering from Narcissistic Antisocial Personality Disorder.

Whether or not marriage is void due to psychological incapacity. (YES) 

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CASES

Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion is not required. As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

DRUG ADDICTION

That Drug addiction as a ground of legal separation will not prevent the court from voiding the marriage. So long as the party can demonstrate that the drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage, this should be enough to render the marriage void under Article 36 (Psychological Incapacity)

NEW SET OF GUIDELINES:

1. The burden of proof in proving psychological incapacity is still on the plaintiff. The Supreme Court however clarified that the quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence.

2. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert testimony. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse.

3. Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense;

4. As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

5. Juridical antecedence. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

6. The decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines has persuasive effect on nullity cases pending before secular courts

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REPUBLIC VS. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN [G.R. No. 170867 & 186941, December 04, 2018]

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REPUBLIC VS. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN

G.R. No. 170867 & 186941, December 04, 2018

EN BANC, LEONEN, J.

 

National Territory; Natural Resources belongs to the State

 

 

Province of Palawan not entitled in the proceeds of Camago-Malampaya natural gas project as natural resources belongs to the State. Sovereignty over the waters between and surrounding the archipelago, pertains to the coastal state, and not to the LGUs.

 

The national government entered a contract with a certain company. The contract entails the use of natural resources in Camago-Malampaya area which is approximately near the Municipality of Kalayaan, Palawan Province. It argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to said share under Section 290 of the Local Government Code. The National Government disputed the claim, arguing that since the gas fields were approximately 80 k.ms from Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the province and is within the national territory of the Philippines.

 

 

Is the reservoir within the territorial jurisdiction of Palawan so that it is entitled to 40% share of the proceeds?

 

NO.  The Supreme Court ruled that Palawan was not entitled to share in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project.

 

The SC held that there was no debate that the natural resource in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belongs to the State under the Regalian Doctrine, noting that Palawan’s claim is anchored not on ownership of the reservoir but on a revenue-sharing scheme, under Section 7, Article X of the 1986 Constitution and Section 290 of the LGC, that allows local government units (LGUs) to share in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth provided they are found within their respective areas.

 

Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law that creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical boundaries as fixed in its charter. The Court, however, found that existing laws do not include the Camago-Malampaya reservoir within the area or territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan. It stressed that “As defined in its organic law, the province of Palawan comprises merely of islands. The continental shelf, where the Camago-Malamapaya reservoir is located, was clearly not included in its territory.

 

 

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ATTY. ESMERO VS PRES. RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE [G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021]

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ATTY. ESMERO VS PRES. RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE

G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021

EN BANC, ZALAMEDA, J.

 

National Territory; President as the Guardian of the Philippine Archipelago 

The President is the guardian Philippine Archipelago. Ultimately, the decision of how best to address our disputes with China, be it military, diplomatically or legally, rest on his own discretion in this matter, accountable only to his country, in his political character, and to his own conscience.

 

This Petition for Mandamus. Petitioner Atty. Romeo M. Esmero seeks the issuance of a writ to compel respondent President Rodrigo R. Duterte  to comply with his constitutional duty to defend the national territory, which includes the West Philippine Sea, against China.

 

As the guardian of the Philippine Archipelago, can the President be required by a writ of mandamus to go to the UN or the ICJ to sue China for its incursions into our exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 

NO.  The petitioner has used Mandamus  to compel the President to act his duty to defend the State against intruders, but he failed to give a well-defined, clear, and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. The petitioner has failed to point any law that specifically requires the President to go to the United Nations or to the International Court of Justice to sue China for its incursions into our exclusive economic zone. Neither has he shown a clear and unmistakable constitutional or statutory provision which prescribes how the President is to respond to any threat (actual or imminent) from another State to our sovereignty or exercise of our sovereign rights. 

As the President has both ministerial and discretionary power, he can use either of them whenever he sees fit. Being the Head of the State, he is free to use his own discretion in this matter, accountable only to his country, in his political character, and to his own conscience.

 

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ALEXANDER V. SPOUSES ESCALONA [G.R. No. 256141, July 19, 2022]

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ALEXANDER V. SPOUSES ESCALONA

G.R. No. 256141, [July 19, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Conjugal properties; Alienation after the effectivity of Family Code; Spouse' Written Consent

 

Any alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code  requires the other spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the transaction, otherwise, the disposition is void. 

Spouses Jorge and Hilaria Escalona were married on November 14, 1960, or during the effectivity of the Civil Code, owned two unregistered parcels of land. During the effectivity of the Family Code, one was transferred to their son Reygan, through the consent of Jorge. Reygan then sold both parcels to Belinda Alexander, claiming validity on the assertion that Jorge exclusively owned the lots. 

The Escalonas contested the sale, alleging Reygan's lack of authority and Hilaria's non-consent. Escalonas filed a complaint for annulment of documents against Belinda and Reygan in the RTC, which dismissed the complaint as time-barred and upheld the contracts. On appeal they argue that prescription do not apply in action to nullify void contracts.

 

Whether action to nullify the transaction has already prescribed. 

NO. Any alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code requires the other spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the transaction, otherwise, the disposition is void. The action to nullify the void alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse, is imprescriptible.

 

Whether the alienation the land is void under Article 124 of the Family Code because it was made without Hilaria's consent. 

YES. The Court declared the transaction void and held that the applicable law is Article 124 of the Family Code, not Article 173 of the Civil Code, because the alienation of the conjugal property transpired after the effectivity of the Family Code even if the spouses were married under the Civil Code. Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code. The absence of the written consent of one spouse renders the alienation void. Consequently, Spouses Escalona remained the lawful owners of the land. The Court likewise agrees with the findings that Belinda can hardly qualify as a buyer in good faith as she merely stepped into the shoes of Reygan whose rights were anchored on ineffective instruments.

Summary of the applicable laws and jurisprudence in transactions involving alienation or encumbrance of conjugal properties:

(1) The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the wife's consent, made before the effectivity of the Family Code, is not void but merely voidable. The wife may file an action for annulment of contract within 10 years from the transaction; and 

(2) The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse, made after the effectivity of the Family Code is void. 

 

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SPOUSES VELARDE V. HEIRS OF CANDARI [G.R. No. 190057, October 17, 2022]

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SPOUSES VELARDE V. HEIRS OF CANDARI

G.R. No. 190057, [October 17, 2022]

SECOND DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Fraud; Quieting of Title; Accion Reivindicatoria 

Physical intrusion over the parcel of land is not a ground for quieting of title. An action that seeks to recover full possession of the properties as an element of their ownership, the action is deemed accion reivindicatoria.

 

The legal heirs of Isagani Velarde (petitioners) claimed ownership of parcels of land located in Aklan based on deeds of conveyances, including a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase executed by Concepcion Candari (Concepcion) in favor of Isagani. Concepcion later executed a Deed of Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights acknowledging Isagani's and the petitioners' ownership of the properties. After Isagani's death, Concepcion began asserting ownership and collected rents from the lands that clouds their title, prompting the heirs to file a complaint for quieting of title and damages. 

Concepcion denied the validity of the deeds, accused Isagani and the heirs of fraud, and asserted that she never sold or relinquished ownership of the properties. She claimed that Isagani was her lessee who held the tax declarations for safekeeping and payment of realty taxes. Whereas petitioner invoke the OCTs and TDs under their names, and argue that their legal title cannot be collaterally attacked in an action for quieting of title by unsupported allegations of fraud. 

 

Whether the action for quieting of title is proper. 

NO. Petitioners' complaint actually constitutes an accion reivindicatoria. Here, petitioners' cause of action is grounded upon their claims of ownership, which they argue to have been clouded by Concepcion's exercise of proprietary rights — instituting tenants and collecting rentals and products. What they perceive as clouds over their title were Concepcion's intrusive acts of dominion over the properties. Physical intrusion is not a ground for quieting of title. Ultimately, they seek to recover full possession of the properties as an element of their ownership, which was disturbed by Concepcion's physical intrusion. Thus, petitioners' claims and arguments clearly speak of an accion reivindicatoria — a suit to recover full possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. The true nature of the action is not determined by the caption of the pleading, but by the allegations it contain.

 

 

Whether the heirs of Isagani Velarde are the rightful owners of the disputed properties.

YES.  The Court held that the heirs of Isagani Velarde are the true and rightful owners entitled to the possession of the disputed properties. The Court rejected Concepcion's unfounded allegations of fraud, emphasizing that fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, which Concepcion failed to provide. The Court noted that the deeds of conveyances were duly executed and notarized, and Concepcion's claims lacked specificity and proof. Hence, as Isagani's heirs, petitioners are entitled to full ownership over the disputed properties.

 

 

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Bank of the Philippine Islands v. LCL Capital, Inc. [G.R. Nos. 243396 & 243409, September 14, 2021]

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Bank of the Philippine Islands v. LCL Capital, Inc.

G.R. Nos. 243396 & 243409, [September 14, 2021]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Foreclosure; Redemption price; Interest

 

Section 78 of the General Banking Act governs redemption price computation in cases where the mortgagee is a bank, which states that redemption price should include the principal loan amount, the stipulated interest rate, and foreclosure expenses.

 

 

In 1997, LCL Capital obtained a loan from Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC) secured by a real estate mortgage on two condominium units, with a 17% annual interest. When LCL failed to repay the loan, BPI, which had absorbed FEBTC, foreclosed on the properties and acquired them at a public auction. LCL contested the foreclosure, claiming it was premature and filed a case. The later court ruled that the consolidation of ownership by BPI was void, ordering the restoration of LCL's certificates of title, subject to the right of redemption. 

The parties now in disarray as to the proper computation of redemption price, particularly the interest rate to be applied (17% stipulated by the mortgage vs. 6% imposed by the court), the inclusion of real estate taxes in the redemption price. 

 

What should be the correct calculation of the redemption price in cases where the mortgagee is a bank? 

The Supreme Court ruled that in cases involving banking institutions like BPI, the computation of the redemption price should be based on Section 78 of the General Banking Act, and not the Rules of Court. As part of the redemption price, said law is explicit that the principal obligation shall earn interest at the rate specified in the mortgage contract. Thus, the Court affirms the imposition of interest rate at 17% per annum which the parties specified in the contract of loan and the mortgage deed.

Therefore, the redemption price shall consists of the principal obligation (P3,000,000.00) with the stipulated 17% interest rate, including foreclosure expenses, but excluding real estate taxes. Such real estate taxes must be paid by the party having actual possession and should not be included in the redemption price. The case was remanded to the trial court for an accurate computation of the redemption price based on these principles.

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RAMA V. SPOUSES NOGRA [G.R. No. 219556, September 14, 2021]

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RAMA V. SPOUSES NOGRA

 G.R. No. 219556 [September 14, 2021]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Right of Redemption; 30-day written notice requirement 

The written notice of sale is mandatory. For the right of legal pre-emption or redemption to be exercised, written notice by the seller is indispensable for the 30-day redemption period to commence.

 

The case involves a disputed property, an undivided portion of Lot No. 6034-C-2-H-4, registered under the Heirs of Felix Rama. Ricardo Rama sold his one-fourth undivided share to Spouses Nogra in 2001, but other co-owners, including Hermelina Rama, claim they were not aware of this sale until 2007 when it was revealed during barangay conciliation proceedings. Ricardo admitted the sale, but the copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale was only given to Rama on September 26, 2007. Rama attempted to redeem the property, but her offer was rejected by Spouses Nogra claiming that the right to redeem had lapsed. 

Rama filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Redemption, and Other Reliefs in 2007 and consigned the redemption price on October 16, 2007, asserting that a written notice was essential for the redemption period to start under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.

 

Whether Hermelina validly exercised her redemption right by the filing of the complaint before the RTC on October 16, 2007.

 

YES. The 30-day written notice requirement under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code is mandatory for the commencement of the redemption period. The Court has upheld the principle that even if a co-owner has actual knowledge of the sale, the written notice is still indispensable. In this case, there is no evidence of sufficient knowledge of the sale before Hermelina's receipt of the Deed of Absolute Sale on September 26, 2007. Hermelina's exercise of her redemption right by filing the complaint on October 16, 2007, and consigning the redemption price on October 26, 2007, falls within the 30-day period under Article 1623.

 

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