Mohamed v. Republic, G.R. No. 220674, [December 2, 2021]

 CASE DIGEST

Mohamed v. Republic

 G.R. No. 220674, [December 2, 2021]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Citizenship; Naturalization Law; Refugee Convention

 

The right of an alien to become a citizen by naturalization is statutory, rather than a natural one, and it does not become vested until he establishes facts showing strict compliance with the law. The strict compliance with legal requirements in naturalization proceedings, ensures that the privilege of Philippine citizenship is granted only to those fully qualified under the law. 

 

Sefyan Abdelhakim Mohamed, a Sudanese national, married to Filipino citizen Lailanie N. Piano, applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization. Recognized as a convention refugee in 2005, Mohamed filed a Petition for Naturalization in 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. The RTC granted his application in 2009, and on September 24, 2012, the RTC allowed him to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed, contending that Mohamed failed to comply with the one-year period for filing the Declaration of Intention in compliance with the Revised Naturalization Law, which law provides, “one year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice, a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines.”. OSG points out that Mohamed's failure to comply with the required period in filing and that his premature oath rendered the naturalization void.

 

Whether or not Mohamed complies with the requirements for naturalization as required by the Revised Naturalization Law. 

NO. The Court held that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest, emphasizing strict construction in favor of the government. Under the Revised Naturalization Law, the declaration of intention must be filed one year prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization. The one-year period for the Declaration of Intention must be computed from the submission of the supplemental declaration in cases of substantial changes. In this case, Mohamed file such declaration of intention before the expiration of the one-year period; filing the petition a month after the supplemental declaration. Mohamed's failure to adhere to this timeframe constituted a jurisdictional defect.

Mohamed also failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law for purposes of naturalization. Discrepancies in the names declared by Mohamed and the lack of proper documentation for the character witnesses did not help his case. Mohamed also did not submit documentary evidence or medical certificate to prove that he is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable disease. Thus, the Court rejected arguments of substantial compliance, emphasizing the mandatory nature of legal requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.

The Court dismiss the petition for naturalization without prejudice, allowing Mohamed to refile. However, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, and the OSG was given a fresh one-year period for investigation, aligning with international commitments of the Philippines to facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees, under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

 

Whether or not the naturalization requirements are NOT to be applied strictissimi juris in view of the Philippines obligation as party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

NO. Regarding Mohamed's status as a convention refugee, the Court clarified that while the 1951 Refugee Convention aimed to expedite naturalization, it did not waive all legal requirements. Mohamed's premature oath administered before the OSG's appeal period expired, was declared void. Although the Philippines is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, this does not amount to a blanket waiver or relaxation of all the legal requirements for naturalization as mandated by the Revised Naturalization Law of the Philippines. 

CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT

Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan v. Commission on Elections En Banc, G.R. No. 225152, [October 5, 2021]

 CASE DIGEST

Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 225152, [October 5, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Election Law; Constitutionality of COMELEC resolution extending deadline submission of SOCE 

The Supreme Court En banc says the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the deadline of submission of the Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) beyond the 30-day period mandated by RA 7166 or the Synchronized Elections Law. The COMELEC has exceeded its delegated rule making authority which amounts to usurpation of legislative power.

 

A Petition for certiorari was filed by Partido Demokratiko Pilipino–Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) against the COMELEC. PDP-Laban challenged the COMELEC’S Resolution No. 10147, which extended the filing of Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) until June 30, 2016, despite being originally set at June 8,2016 which is thirty (30) days after the May 9, 2016 national elections. PDP-Laban argued that the COMELEC exceeded its limits and violated section 14 of RA 7166 due to the said order.

 

Whether or not the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10147 which extended the SOCE submission after the 2016 elections is unconstitutional. 

YES. The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot extend the deadline for submission by candidates of their Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE). Under section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 or the Synchronized Elections Law, candidates are required to file their full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election within 30 days after the conduct of election. The language in RA 7166, Section 14 is not ambiguous; the law is clear that SOCEs must be filed within 30 days after the latest polls. Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the SOCE deadline and exempted candidates and political parties from administrative liabilities in violation of the clear language of the law and legislative intent. The COMELEC likewise cannot conveniently invoke the exigency of public service to justify its actions. The COMELEC’s task is to administer the law, not supplant them. For these reasons, the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10147 is declared void for being repugnant to the law. Applying the doctrine of operative fact, however, the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the COMELEC’s Resolution shall be applied prospectively. Thus, the Statements of Contributions and Expenditures for the May 9, 2016 national and local elections that were submitted within the extended period (on or before June 30, 2016) are deemed timely filed. 

CLICK TO VIEW FULL TEXT

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal v. Panga-Vega, G.R. No. 228236 (Resolution), [January 27, 2021]

 CASE DIGEST

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal v. Panga-Vega

 G.R. No. 228236 (Resolution), [January 27, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

HRET Legal Capacity to Sue; Petition for Review against CSC decision to CA; CSC guidelines; OSG Legal Standing

 

The rules on maternity leave can be suppletorily applied to the Magna Carta of Women's special leave benefit. It emphasizes a liberal interpretation in favor of women's empowerment. Additionally, it affirms the expertise of administrative agencies like the CSC in matters within their jurisdiction which are accorded with great respect if not finality.

 

Atty. Daisy B. Panga-Vega, then Secretary of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), requested a 15-day special leave under the Magna Carta of Women to undergo hysterectomy. HRET approved the leave not exceeding two months. After one month, Panga-Vega informed HRET of her readiness to resume duties, presenting medical certificates. HRET directed her to consume the full leave due to an ongoing investigation on her alleged alteration and tampering a minutes of a meeting. Panga-Vega appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which ruled in her favor, granting her both commuted money value and salary for actual services. HRET filed a Petition for Review assailing the foregoing Decision and Resolution of the CSC. The HRET argues that the CSC should not have applied suppletorily the rules on maternity leave to the special leave benefit under RA No. 9710. It also contends that Panga-Vega did not sufficiently comply with the "CSC Guidelines on the Availment of the Special Leave Benefits for Women Under RA No. 9710.

  

Whether the HRET, as the petitioner, has the legal capacity to initiate the case.

 NO. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) lacked the authority to initiate the case due to the absence of explicit authorization from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the absence of a conflicting position. Under the law, OSG was constituted as the office tasked to represent the Government and its officers in the Court in which the Government, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity is a party. The OSG, however, may be excused from representing the Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities when there is an express authorization by the OSG, naming therein the legal officers who are being deputized in cases involving their respective offices, subject to its supervision and control, or when the OSG takes a position different from that of the agency it is duty bound to represent.

A perusal of the records shows that there was no express authorization by the OSG naming the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the HRET as its deputized legal officers in filing this petition. There was also no proof, let alone an allegation, that the OSG took a position different from the HRET in this case. Thus, HRET had the no legal capacity to initiate the case and the Court has dismissed the petition.

 

Whether Panga-Vega complied with CSC Guidelines for her return to work.

YES. The Court accorded finality to the CSC's findings that Panga-Vega sufficiently complied with the CSC Guidelines, acknowledging the CSC's expertise. The Court suppletory applied the rules on maternity leave to the special leave benefit under the Magna Carta of Women, considering its purpose to protect women's health and welfare. A liberal interpretation was favored, asserting that the fundamental objective of RA No. 9710 is to protect the health and welfare of women. In examining the compliance of Atty. Daisy B. Panga-Vega with Civil Service Commission (CSC) Guidelines for her return to work, the Court deferred to the findings of the CSC, acknowledging its specialized knowledge and expertise in administrative matters. The Court emphasized the adequacy of Panga-Vega's compliance with the CSC Guidelines, particularly regarding the requisite medical certificate, and accorded finality to the CSC's determination. Therefore, her return to work was deemed appropriate.

CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT

Sobrejuanite-Flores v. Pilando, Jr., G.R. No. 251816, [November 23, 2021]

 CASE DIGEST

SOBREJUANITE-FLORES V. PILANDO, JR.

G.R. No. 251816, [November 23, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Licensure Examination; Exemption to qualified Psychologist; Equal Protection Clause; Constitutionality of RA 10029

 

The Court held that RA No. 10029 satisfied the completeness test and sufficient standard test which renders valid the delegation of legislative powers. The completion of at least 100 hours of updating workshops and training programs under Section 16(c) of the IRR of RA No. 10029 is not oppressive and not unreasonable.

 

On May 7, 2015, Florentina Sobrejuanite-Flores applied for registration as a psychologist without examination but the Board of Psychology (BOP) rejected her application on the ground that she had insufficient work experience and had not updated her professional education. Aggrieved, Florentina appealed to the PRC, which also denied her appeal for her failure to substantiate her claim that she worked as a psychologist for a minimum accumulated period of 10 years and for her failure to update her professional education. She elevated her case to the CA, but her appeal was also denied. A petition for review certiorari filed by Florentina assailing the decision finding that she was not qualified to avail the exemption, or to register with as psychologist without examination pursuant to the assailed Section 16(c) provisions of the IRR of RA No. 10029.

 

Whether or the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 10029, or the Philippine Psychology Act of 2009 is unconstitutional.

 

NO. SC Upholds Validity of Sec. 16(c) of the Rules Implementing the Philippine Psychology Act. The assailed provision granted a period for practitioners to register as psychologists without examination and crafted sufficient standards on who may avail the exemption measured in terms of educational attainment and work experience. Specifically, the law provides that applicants who have Bachelor’s Degree in Psychology may be registered without examination if they accumulated a “minimum of ten (10) years of work experience in the practice of psychology as a psychology” and “updated their professional education in various psychology-related functions.”

The Supreme Court finds no constitutional violation to pronounce void Section 16(c) of the IRR of RA No. 10029. The said law satisfied the completeness test and sufficient standard test which renders valid the delegation of legislative powers. The Court noted that the completion of at least 100 hours of updating workshops and training programs under Section 16(c) of the IRR of RA No. 10029 can hardly be considered oppressive, as argued by Florentina. Furthermore, the Court held that the same requirement emanates from the valid exercise of police power to prescribe regulations that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare of the people, and thus a valid exercise of the State’s police power.

Aside from not finding any constitutional violation, the Court agreed with the CA, the PRC, and the Board of Psychology (BOP), that petitioner Florentina is not qualified to avail of the exemption. It noted that Florentina’s claim that she worked since 1980 as a school psychologist, counselling psychologist, industrial psychologist, and migrant psychologist was unsubstantiated. Records revealed that Florentina started working as a psychologist only in March 2004 or for a period of six years and two months from the effectivity of the law on June 2, 2010. Hence, she was not qualified to avail of the exemption as stated in the assailed Section 16(c), of the IRR of RA 10029.

CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT

Ampatuan v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 252007, [December 7, 2021]

 CASE DIGEST

AMPATUAN V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 252007, [December 7, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Powers of COA;Commission on Audit Notice of Disallowances; petition for Review;  Liability of Public Officers

Mere position of a superior public officer is insufficient to establish civil liability for disallowed expenditures. Holding a public officer personally liable for civil liability for disallowances requires a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, which was absent in this case.

 

The case pertains to a Petition for Certiorari filed by Zaldy Uy Ampatuan challenging the Commission on Audit's (COA) Resolution dated August 15, 2019. The COA conducted a special audit of the Office of the Regional Governor in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao for the period of January 2008 to September 2009. Following the audit, Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. ORG-12-002-MDS/LF (08 & 09) was issued, disallowing disbursements totaling ₱79,162,435.00. The petitioner, who was the Regional Governor, was held personally liable for his alleged failure to monitor the transactions. Petitioner was faulted for his alleged failure to monitor the acts of his subordinates who perpetrated the unlawful disbursements. Plainly, civil liability was imposed upon petitioner for his alleged failure to ensure that all resources of the government are managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition.

 

Whether or not there is legal basis for holding a public officer personally liable for disallowed expenditures.

NO. The primary legal basis for the ruling lies in the requirement that civil liability for disallowed expenditures necessitates a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of the public officer. Under the legal provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, it explicitly state that expenditures of government funds in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found directly liable. Solidary liability for illegal expenditures falls on the official or employee authorizing or making the payment, or taking part therein, and every person receiving such payment.

In this case, the Court finds no legal and evidentiary bases to support a finding of liability in the Notice of Disallowances (ND) against petitioner. Verily, the sole proposition that an official is the head of the audited agency does not suffice to hold him personally liable for disallowances on account of his subordinate's actions. Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of an agency. The court emphasized that the mere position of the public officer is insufficient to establish personal liability for Notice of Disallowances. An officer's liability depends on the wrong committed and not solely on their position. It is important therefore, to establish direct participation and knowledge of the public officer in the disallowed transaction to impute liability – which absent in this case.

Hence the court granted the petition, setting aside the COA's Resolution.

 

 

 CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT

 

Matobato, Sr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 229265 & 229624 [February 15, 2022]

 CASE DIGEST

MATOBATO, SR. V. PEOPLE

 G.R. Nos. 229265 & 229624, [February 15, 2022]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Law on Public Officers; Three-fold Liability rule; Sandiganbayan; Public Funds; Municipal Treasurer 

Under the "threefold liability rule," the wrongful acts or omissions of public officers may give rise to civil, criminal, and administrative liabilities. The dismissal of the criminal action does not extinguish the civil liability if (1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (2) the court declares that the liability is civil only; and (3) that the civil liability does not arise from the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The quantum of proof          to establish civil liability is preponderance of evidence only. Corollarily, public officers could still be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party notwithstanding their acquittal.

 

The Municipality of Pantukan authorized its Treasurer, Silvino Matobato, Sr., to transfer funds to Davao Cooperative Bank (DCB) based on a resolution. DCB suffered insolvency, and the municipality couldn't withdraw the funds. The Commission on Audit (COA) recommended criminal and administrative charges. Silvino, along with Sangguniang Bayan members Walter Bucao and Cirila Engbino, faced charges for violating RA No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan acquitted them due to insufficient evidence for criminal liability but found them civilly liable for the municipality's unrecovered funds.

 

Whether Silvino, Walter, and Cirila can be held civilly liable despite their acquittal on criminal charges.

YES. The court affirms the Sandiganbayan's decision, holding Silvino, Walter, and Cirila civilly and solidarily liable. Their acquittal on criminal charges doesn't extinguish civil liability, which the law requires only preponderance of evidence. It pertains to evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Here, the required quantum of proof was met to sustain the Sandiganbayan's findings on the civil liability of Silvino, Walter, and Cirila.

Silvino's negligence in depositing funds without due diligence and the others' reliance on verbal assurances without further scrutiny breached their duties. Silvino did not establish any precautionary or contingent measure to protect the financial interests of the Municipality of Pantukan from the whiplash of DCB's insolvency. It is likewise the Municipal Treasurer's duty to ensure that these funds are safe guarded, but Silvino failed to comply with these duties. On the part of Walter and Cirila, as Sangguniang Bayan members, they failed to require and examined the audited financial statements of DCB. Their negligence paves to their indispensable participations in the transfer of funds to DCB.

On this point, the Court reminds that public funds, like public office, are founded on public trust. How the public funds are managed and how they are safely kept reflect on the ability of the government to keep inviolate its fiduciary duty to the people. Therefore, Silvino, Walter, and Cirila are held civilly and solidarily liable to indemnify the Municipality of Pantukan.

 

 

 CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT OF THE CASE

De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, [March 22, 2022]

 CASE DIGEST

DE ALBAN V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 243968, [March 22, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Election Law; Nuisance Candidate; Senatorial Candidate Qualification 

The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the COMELEC's authority to refuse to give due course to or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of a nuisance candidate, under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). However, the court emphasizes that this authority must be exercised in accordance with procedural due process, and the COMELEC must provide a fair and reasonable opportunity for the candidate to clarify their position and present evidence in their defense.

  

Angelo Castro De Alban filed a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for senator in the May 13, 2019, elections as an independent candidate. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law Department, motu proprio, filed a petition to declare him a nuisance candidate, alleging lack of bona fide intent, financial capacity, and political machinery. COMELEC First Division declared De Alban a nuisance candidate, emphasizing his failure to establish financial capacity. The COMELEC En Banc upheld this decision, stating the need for evidence of a solid financial capacity for a nationwide campaign. 

 

Whether or not COMELEC's authority, under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), to motu proprio refuse due course to or cancel the CoC of a nuisance candidate is not unconstitutional. 

YES. The Court declares the case moot due to the conclusion of the 2019 elections. However, exceptions apply, and the case falls under the fourth exception since issues related to nuisance candidates are capable of repetition in future elections, yet evading review. In this case, the Court affirms COMELEC's authority to motu proprio refuse due course to or cancel the CoC of nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the OEC, emphasizing that the OEC governs all elections of public officers, including senators. The Court also rejects the argument that RA No. 6646 impliedly repealed Section 69 of the OEC, affirming the coexistence of both laws. COMELEC's motu proprio authority remains intact. Lastly, the Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 69, OEC rejecting De Alban's claim that it violates due process and the equal protection clause. The Court emphasizes the importance of preventing confusion and frustration in the electoral process. Therefore, the provisions of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code are not unconstitutional.

 

Whether or not COMELEC has gravely abused its discretion in declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate.

YES. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)'s motu proprio authority under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) is subject to procedural due process requirements. In this case, the COMELEC abused its discretion by declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate based on an incorrect interpretation of the law and a lack of substantial evidence. The COMELEC's motu proprio authority under Section 69 of the OEC must not result in the denial of the candidates' opportunity to be heard, which must be construed as a chance to explain one's side. The Court underscores that due process requires a fair opportunity for candidates to present evidence and disputes the COMELEC's premature dismissal of De Alban's capacity to wage a nationwide campaign.

In this case, the Court criticizes the COMELEC's reliance on general allegations without specifying the acts or circumstances indicating De Alban's lack of bona fide intention to run. It rejects the notion that financial capacity alone justifies declaring a candidate a nuisance, emphasizing the absence of legal requirements for financial qualifications in Senatorial Elections. Financial capacity to sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign, cannot be used, by itself, to declare a candidate as nuisance.  In the same vein, the Court finds that non-membership in a political party or being unknown nationwide, or the low probability of success do not by themselves equate to the absence of bona fide intention to run for public office.

The Court reminds the COMELEC that the candidate's bona fide intention to run for public office is neither subject to any property qualifications nor dependent upon membership in a political party, popularity, or degree of success in the elections. Therefore, while upholding the constitutionality of COMELEC's authority under Section 69, the Court sets aside the COMELEC's resolution declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate.

 

 

 

 CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT