Calleja v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 252578. December 07, 2021]

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Calleja v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 252578. December 07, 2021

EN BANC, CARANDANG J.

 

Constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)

 “Facial challenge” used by the petitions to nullify the ATA cannot invalidate the entire law because a facial challenge can be used only in “free speech” case. Hence, the law cannot be declared unconstitutional in its entirety, only in its parts involving free speech.

 

This Court resolves thirty-seven (37) separate petitions all challenging and assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 11479 (R.A. No. 11479), otherwise known as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (ATA). Signed by President Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte) on July 3, 2020. Despite the legislature’s efforts to pass the law, petitioners primarily assailed the validity and constitutionality of the ATA. Petitioners asserted that Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA, due to their perceived facial vagueness and overbreadth that “purportedly repress free speech.” Furthermore, it is argued that the unconstitutionality of the definition of the word “terrorism” and its variants will leave it with “nothing to sustain its existence.” 

Following the passage of the ATA, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has commenced the crafting of the law’s implementing rules and regulations (IRR) in August 2020. Succeeding this, the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) has automatically adopted the list of designated terrorists by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The ATC has also taken grave measures to implement the ATA, which include designating CPP/NPA and other sixteen (16) organizations associated with the Islamic State and “other Daesh-affiliated groups in the Philippines,” ten (10) individuals for their alleged membership in extremist groups, and nineteen (19) other individuals due to their alleged ties with the CPP/NPA, all as terrorists. Similarly, AMLC also issued Sanction Freeze Orders against the CPP/NPA and the Daesh-affiliated groups. Likewise, the ATC issued several resolutions wherein several individuals were designated as terrorists for their alleged membership in extremist groups and/or alleged ties with the CPP/NPA.

 

 

Should facial challenge or applied challenge be used in analyzing the ATA.

 

YES. Facial challenge is "an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities." Jurisprudence also dictates that facial challenges on legislative acts are permissible only if they curtail the freedom of speech and its cognate rights based on overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The Court grants due course to these consolidated petitions as challenges only in relation to the provisions of the ATA which involve and raise chilling effects on freedom of expression and its cognate rights in the context of actual and not mere hypothetical facts.

  

Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 11479 was declared unconstitutional.

Said proviso invaded areas of protected freedoms and is void for vagueness as it has a chilling effect on an average person. Before the protester can speak, he must first guess whether his speech would be interpreted as a terrorist act pursuant to Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 11479 and whether he might be indicted, arrested, and/or detained for it. The clause likewise shifts the burden to the accused in explaining his intent. It would then allow for law enforcers to take an “arrest now, explain later” approach in the application of the ATA to protesters and dissenters. The vagueness of such provision would likely result in an arbitrary flexing of the government muscle which is equally aversive to due process.

 

 Rule 4.4. of the ATA's IRR or the "Not Intended Clause" is unconstitutional

“Terrorism shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work and so on which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger [a] person's life or to create a serious risk to public safety.”

The “Not Intended” clause of Section 4’s proviso is unconstitutional under the (1) strict scrutiny test, (2) void for vagueness, and (3) overbreadth doctrines.  The Court struck down the "Not Intended Clause" as unconstitutional and categorically affirmed that all individuals, in accordance with Section 4 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, are free to protest, dissent, advocate, peaceably assemble to petition the government for redress of grievances, or otherwise exercise their civil and political rights, without fear of being prosecuted as terrorists under the ATA.

The ”Not Intended Clause” also failed the strict scrutiny test. The said test can additionally be used to determine the validity of the clause, being a government regulation of speech. Thus, applying this test, the government has the burden of proving that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Even if a compelling state interest exists, a governmental action would not pass the strict scrutiny test if the interest could be achieved in an alternative way that is equally effective yet without violating the freedom of expression and its allied rights.

   

Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 11479 on the second mode of designation was declared unconstitutional.

It is not the least restrictive means to achieve such a purpose. This mode of designation does not pass the strict scrutiny test and is equally overboard. It is not the least restrictive means to achieve such a purpose. Because this measure has the unintended consequence of stifling free speech and related rights, it should not be implemented based on a decision made by an executive body that lacks adequate criteria and safeguards. In conclusion, the second manner of designation fails to withstand strict scrutiny and overbreadth for the reasons indicated, and is thus illegal.

 

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OCHOA VS. ALANO [G.R. NO. 167459, January 26, 2011]

OCHOA VS. ALANO

G.R. NO. 167459,  January 26, 2011

FIRST DIVISION, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J

 

Psychological Incapacity of Any Party (Art. 36, Family Code)

 

Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa sought the nullity of his marriage to Bona J. Alano due to her psychological incapacity to fulfill marital obligations. Bona had engaged in extramarital affairs throughout their marriage, which continued even when they lived together. In 1987, while Jose was incarcerated, he confronted Bona about rumors of her affair with his driver, which both admitted. They separated, and their child lived with Bona until 1994 when she went to live with Jose. A psychiatrist's evaluation concluded that Bona suffered from histrionic personality disorder, which was attributed to her family history.

 

Whether Psychological Incapacity is clearly established to declare marriage as null and void.

 

NO. The SC said that the totality of Bona’s acts did not constitute psychological incapacity and that there was inadequate evidence that her “defects” were already present at the inception or prior to the marriage. The persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage. Therefore, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the requisite of “juridical antecedence”. The evaluation report by Dr. Rondain was gathered from Jose and witnesses. These was no personal exam conducted on the respondent. The alleged spouse’s psychological incapacity was fed by only one side, similar to hearsay.

 

 

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Lim vs. Lim [G.R. No. 176464 February 24, 2010]

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Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 176464

February 24, 2010

THIRD DIVISION, NACHURA, J

 

Psychological Incapacity of Any Party (Art. 36, Family Code) 

In order for a marriage to be declared null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity, certain criteria of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability must be met.

 

Edward Lim and Maria Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim got married in 1979 after a brief courtship. They lived with Edward's family in Makati and had three children. Their marriage faced turmoil, including an embarrassing incident involving Edward and his mother’s caregiver. In 1990, Cheryl left Edward and filed a support case against him. In 1999, Edward sought the nullity of their marriage on the grounds of both parties' psychological incapacity. He later included his psychological incapacity in his amended petition. Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist, provided a psychiatric report diagnosing both parties with personality disorders, while Cheryl waived her right to present evidence.

 

Is the marriage between Edward and Cheryl null and void due to their psychological incapacity? 

NO. The marriage is not null and void. Psychological incapacity for the annulment of a marriage requires the incapacity to be grave, have juridical antecedence, and be incurable. In this case, the psychiatric report presented lacks specific links between the parties' acts and the criteria for the diagnosed personality disorders. Additionally, the report was unsupported by proper psychological tests. A judge must base rulings on law and jurisprudence, and the expert opinion, unsupported by tests, cannot prevent the judge from making factual findings. Therefore, the marriage remains valid.

  

Criterion of Psychological Incapacity:

 1.    Gravity: The psychological incapacity must be serious or grave, rendering a party incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.

2.    Juridical Antecedence: The psychological incapacity should have existed prior to the marriage, although it may only become evident after the marriage has taken place.

3.     Incurability: The psychological incapacity must be permanent and incurable. It should be deeply ingrained in the individual's personality structure and beyond the means of correction or treatment.

 

 

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Georfo vs. Republic [G.R. No. 246933, March 6, 2023]

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Georfo vs. Republic 

(G.R. No. 246933, March 6, 2023)

SECOND DIVISION, LEONEN J.

Psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not an illness which has to be medically or clinically identified.

Agnes and Joe-Ar got married after a brief courtship and had a son. Their marriage quickly deteriorated due to conflict, infidelity, and abuse. Agnes filed for the nullity of their marriage, claiming Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerong, a clinical psychologist, provided an expert opinion, citing Joe-Ar's narcissistic personality disorder and other issues as causes of incapacity. Joe-Ar’s sister also testify regarding his abusive behavior, as she once saw how Joe-ar and his family mistreated Agnes. 

Was there sufficient evidence to prove Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity as the basis for the nullity of the marriage?

YES. In proving psychological incapacity doesn't necessitate a psychiatric examination and that it's based on legal standards, not medical diagnoses. The totality of evidence, including expert opinions, testimonies, and behavior patterns, can establish psychological incapacity. The court ruled that Agnes had successfully proven Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerong's psychological assessment, based on testimonies from Agnes and her sister, supported this claim. The court emphasized that psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not a specific illness, and psychiatric evaluation is no longer a requirement. Therefore, their marriage was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

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Tan-Andal vs. Andal (G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021)

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Tan-Andal vs. Andal

(G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021)

EN BANC, J. LEONEN

EXPERT WITNESS NOT NEEDED IN PROVING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS LIBERALLY INTERPRETED; NEW GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CASES

In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married each other. Earlier in their marriage, Rosanna also observed Mario to be emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable, and psychologically imbalanced. Rosanna later learned that Mario was a drug addict. Rosanna filed a petition to have her marriage declared void on the ground that Mario was psychologically incapacitated. To prove her case, she presented a psychologist (Dr. Fonso Garcia) who, after interviewing Rosanna, Rosanna’s daughter, and Rosanna’s sister, concluded that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia did not interview Mario as the latter, despite invitation, refused an interview. In her assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to be suffering from Narcissistic Antisocial Personality Disorder.

Whether or not marriage is void due to psychological incapacity. (YES) 

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CASES

Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion is not required. As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

DRUG ADDICTION

That Drug addiction as a ground of legal separation will not prevent the court from voiding the marriage. So long as the party can demonstrate that the drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage, this should be enough to render the marriage void under Article 36 (Psychological Incapacity)

NEW SET OF GUIDELINES:

1. The burden of proof in proving psychological incapacity is still on the plaintiff. The Supreme Court however clarified that the quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence.

2. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert testimony. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse.

3. Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense;

4. As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

5. Juridical antecedence. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

6. The decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines has persuasive effect on nullity cases pending before secular courts

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REPUBLIC VS. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN [G.R. No. 170867 & 186941, December 04, 2018]

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REPUBLIC VS. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN

G.R. No. 170867 & 186941, December 04, 2018

EN BANC, LEONEN, J.

 

National Territory; Natural Resources belongs to the State

 

 

Province of Palawan not entitled in the proceeds of Camago-Malampaya natural gas project as natural resources belongs to the State. Sovereignty over the waters between and surrounding the archipelago, pertains to the coastal state, and not to the LGUs.

 

The national government entered a contract with a certain company. The contract entails the use of natural resources in Camago-Malampaya area which is approximately near the Municipality of Kalayaan, Palawan Province. It argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to said share under Section 290 of the Local Government Code. The National Government disputed the claim, arguing that since the gas fields were approximately 80 k.ms from Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the province and is within the national territory of the Philippines.

 

 

Is the reservoir within the territorial jurisdiction of Palawan so that it is entitled to 40% share of the proceeds?

 

NO.  The Supreme Court ruled that Palawan was not entitled to share in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project.

 

The SC held that there was no debate that the natural resource in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belongs to the State under the Regalian Doctrine, noting that Palawan’s claim is anchored not on ownership of the reservoir but on a revenue-sharing scheme, under Section 7, Article X of the 1986 Constitution and Section 290 of the LGC, that allows local government units (LGUs) to share in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth provided they are found within their respective areas.

 

Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law that creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical boundaries as fixed in its charter. The Court, however, found that existing laws do not include the Camago-Malampaya reservoir within the area or territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan. It stressed that “As defined in its organic law, the province of Palawan comprises merely of islands. The continental shelf, where the Camago-Malamapaya reservoir is located, was clearly not included in its territory.

 

 

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ATTY. ESMERO VS PRES. RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE [G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021]

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ATTY. ESMERO VS PRES. RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE

G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021

EN BANC, ZALAMEDA, J.

 

National Territory; President as the Guardian of the Philippine Archipelago 

The President is the guardian Philippine Archipelago. Ultimately, the decision of how best to address our disputes with China, be it military, diplomatically or legally, rest on his own discretion in this matter, accountable only to his country, in his political character, and to his own conscience.

 

This Petition for Mandamus. Petitioner Atty. Romeo M. Esmero seeks the issuance of a writ to compel respondent President Rodrigo R. Duterte  to comply with his constitutional duty to defend the national territory, which includes the West Philippine Sea, against China.

 

As the guardian of the Philippine Archipelago, can the President be required by a writ of mandamus to go to the UN or the ICJ to sue China for its incursions into our exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 

NO.  The petitioner has used Mandamus  to compel the President to act his duty to defend the State against intruders, but he failed to give a well-defined, clear, and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. The petitioner has failed to point any law that specifically requires the President to go to the United Nations or to the International Court of Justice to sue China for its incursions into our exclusive economic zone. Neither has he shown a clear and unmistakable constitutional or statutory provision which prescribes how the President is to respond to any threat (actual or imminent) from another State to our sovereignty or exercise of our sovereign rights. 

As the President has both ministerial and discretionary power, he can use either of them whenever he sees fit. Being the Head of the State, he is free to use his own discretion in this matter, accountable only to his country, in his political character, and to his own conscience.

 

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