Central Bay Reclamation and Development Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 252940, [April 5, 2022]

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Central Bay Reclamation and Development Corp. v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 252940, [April 5, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Property Reclamation; Inalienable lands of Public Domain; Quantum Meruit Principle in Void Government Contracts

Payment for services rendered on account of the government, although based on a void contract, may be granted on the basis of quantum meruit. The principle of quantum meruit allows recovery of an amount to the extent of the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered.

 

This case revolves around the nullification of an Amended Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) and Central Bay Reclamation and Development Corporation (Central Bay) regarding the acquisition of reclaimed lands. PRA entered an Amended JVA with Central Bay to develop reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" and reclaim submerged areas in Manila Bay. The Supreme Court nullified this agreement, citing violations of the Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable land of the public domain. Now, Central Bay sought reimbursement from PRA for costs incurred prior to the nullification, eventually agreeing to a Compromise Agreement transferring reclaimed land to Central Bay's qualified assignee to settle the money claims. The Commission on Audit (COA) disapproves of the Compromise Agreement, as it contravened the letter and intent of the constitutional ban against corporate ownership of land. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Thus, COA disallow Central Bay’s money claims. 

 

Whether the COA's disapproval of the Compromise Agreement and disallowance of other money claims were proper. 

Yes. The Supreme Court reiterated that the Compromise Agreement allowing Central Bay to assign the reclaimed land is void. It emphasized that the transfer of land to Central Bay's assignee granted Central Bay beneficial ownership violates the constitutional prohibition banning corporation to acquire alienable land of public domain. As the COA aptly observed, the qualified assignee mentioned in the Compromise Agreement can only acquire rights which Central Bay can lawfully exercise. However, Central Bay is a private corporation that cannot own land in the Philippines. Consequently, Central Bay cannot transfer ownership of any land to another party.

However, the Court held that Central Bay is not precluded to recover from PEA the costs incurred in implementing the agreement prior to its declaration of nullity on a quantum meruit basis. It is settled that payment for services rendered on account of the government, although based on a void contract, may be granted on the basis of quantum meruit. The principle of quantum meruit allows recovery of an amount to the extent of the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered, regardless of any agreement as to the value. Similarly, Central Bay may claim reimbursement for the actual costs it incurred in implementing the Amended JVA, provided that the claim is substantiated by supporting documents.

In sum, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it disapproved the Compromise Agreement and disallowed the money claims, except the amount of ₱714,937,790.29 that was properly established with documentary evidence. The Court reminds that a contract which violates the Constitution is void, and it will not permit to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.

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De Lima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 199972 & 206118, [August 15, 2022]

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DE LIMA V. COURT OF APPEALS

 G.R. Nos. 199972 & 206118, [August 15, 2022]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V 

Gambling licenses; Games and Amusement Board Regulatory Powers 

The Supreme Court ruled that Games and Amusements Board (GAB) had regulatory authority over Meridien's jai alai activities but clarified that it lacked authority within the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and Freeport (CSEZFP). Any enforcement of GAB’s powers and functions inside CSEZFP are enjoined as it were beyond their territorial jurisdiction.

 

Meridien Vista Gaming Corporation (Meridien) was granted a license by the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (CEZA) to conduct gaming operations, including jai alai, within the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and Freeport (CSEZFP). However, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) informed CEZA that it lacked the power to authorize jai alai operations without an express legislative franchise. CEZA later revoked the license, citing the absence of an express legislative franchise to authorize jai alai. Meanwhile, Games and Amusements Board (GAB) initiated an investigation into Meridien's jai alai betting stations outside CSEZFP without GAB permits. It discovered Meridien is operating jai alai off-frontons without a permit and issued a Cease-and-Desist Order (CDO). Meridien filed a Complaint for Injunction against the CDO, arguing that GAB had has no regulatory authority over them as they operate under a CEZA-given license. 

 

Whether or not GAB has regulatory authority over Meridien's gaming operations under the CEZA-given authority. 

The Supreme Court ruled that Games and Amusements Board (GAB) had regulatory authority over Meridien's jai alai activities but clarified that it lacked authority within the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and Freeport (CSEZFP). This meant that GAB’s Cease and Desist Order against Meridiens is only valid against its Jai-Alai off-fronton betting stations within Metro Manila and in certain parts of Rizal Province, and no such enforcement is to be validly implemented in Meridien's operations inside the CSEZFP. Any enforcement of GAB’s powers and functions inside CSEZFP are enjoined as it were beyond their territorial jurisdiction.

Examining the text of the assailed CDO, it covers only off-fronton betting stations of Meridien and evidently not the actual conduct and operation of jai alai games inside the CSEZFP. Clearly it was issued for the sole purpose of regulating the off-fronton betting stations outside the economic zone.  In accordance with the purpose of its issuance, the CDO remains to be intended only against off-frontons, was never directed against the holding of Jai Alai games in the CSEZFP. Therefore, CDO is valid.

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Metro Laundry Services v. The Commission Proper, G.R. No. 252411 (Resolution), [February 15, 2022]

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METRO LAUNDRY SERVICES V. THE COMMISSION PROPER

G.R. No. 252411 (Resolution), [February 15, 2022]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Money Claim against COA; Government acquired service under Void Contract; Payment based on Quantum Meruit 

 

Nullity of contract do not preclude payment of government liability based on quantum meruit. The Court partially granted Metro Laundry's petition, setting aside the COA's decision, and directed the COA to determine the reasonable amount for payment to Metro Laundry Services. It also emphasized that this ruling did not preclude any civil, criminal, or administrative actions against the officials responsible for the contract's irregularities. 

Metro Laundry Services won a public bidding to provide laundry services to Ospital ng Maynila Medical Center (OMMC) for the third and fourth quarters of 2010. The contract ended on December 31, 2010, but OMMC extended the services from January 1, 2011, to December 2011 without a written contract due to lack of funds. Metro Laundry's claim for payment was included in the City of Manila's budget for 2013, but remained unsettled despite various justifications and endorsements affirming the debt. The Commission on Audit (COA) eventually denied Metro Laundry's claim due to the irregularities in the extended contract. 

 

Whether the COA properly denied Metro Laundry's money claim due to the irregularities in the extended contract for laundry services provided to OMMC. 

NO. Here, Supreme Court acknowledged the irregularities in the contract, which violated procurement laws. However, it emphasized that the government, represented by OMMC and the City of Manila, acknowledged Metro Laundry's entitlement to payment for the services rendered despite the contract's invalidity.

Various jurisprudence held where compensation was granted to contractors even with void contracts based on quantum meruit. Quantum meruit refers to the reasonable value of services rendered, irrespective of the agreement's value. The Court held that Metro Laundry fulfilled its services without evidence of bad faith or collusion, and the government had benefitted from these services. While acknowledging the contract's nullity, the Court directed the COA to determine the reasonable value of the services provided by Metro Laundry. This determination would be based on evidence presented, considering the conflicting claims regarding the amount owed. The decision remanded the case to the COA for a post-audit to ascertain the precise amount Metro Laundry should receive. But this ruling did not preclude any civil, criminal, or administrative actions against the officials responsible for the contract's irregularities.

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Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052, [June 23, 2021]

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REPUBLIC V. MANEJA

G.R. No. 209052, [June 23, 2021]

SECOND, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Dismissal from Service; CSC Rule-making Powers; Administrative law; Finality of CSC Decisions 

The premature of a dismissal from the service entitles the employee to the payment of backwages, even if the employee is not fully exonerated on appeal. The decision of Civil Service Commission Regional Office is not immediately executory and in subject to review by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC has the power to classify offenses and impose corresponding penalties through its rule-making powers.

  

Lyn Galarrita Cutamora (Cutamora) authorized Eulalia T. Maneja, a Secondary School Teacher, to process her salary loan application with the Manila Teachers Mutual Aid System (MTMAS) for P68,000. Maneja processed the loan but deposited the net proceeds of P13,021 into her own account without Cutamora's endorsement and appropriated the amount. Cutamora filed a complaint against Maneja for dishonesty before the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 10 (CSCRO No. X). The CSCRO No. X found Maneja guilty and imposed the penalty of dismissal, which was implemented by the DepEd pending Maneja’s appeal. However, the CSC later modified the penalty to three months' suspension. Maneja then filed for back wages, and questions CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 for invalidly classifying offenses of dishonesty with corresponding penalties of dismissal. 

 

Whether CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, which classified offenses of dishonesty with corresponding penalties, is a valid exercise of the Civil Service Commission's rule-making powers. 

YES. The resolution classifying offenses of dishonesty with corresponding penalties is a valid exercise of the Civil Service Commission's rule-making powers. The CSC is a constitutionally created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. The CSC's rule-making power as a constitutional grant is an aspect of its independence as a constitutional commission. However, as an administrative agency, the rules that the CSC formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement. In this case, CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 does not contradict EO No. 292 (the law which the CSC seeks to enforce), rather it harmonizes with the law, and is within the CSC's constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency. Hence it is valid.

 

Whether Maneja is entitled to backwages despite not being fully exonerated.

YES. Maneja is entitled to backwages due to the premature execution of the CSCRO No. X decision. The premature execution, while Maneja's appeal was pending, rendered her suspension unjustified. The decision executed was not yet final and executory, making her dismissal illegal. Citing precedent, the court ruled that premature execution of dismissal could warrant an award of back salaries, even if the employee was not completely exonerated from the charges. Maneja's dismissal was unjustified due to the premature execution of CSCRO No. X's decision. Accordingly, Maneja is entitled to backwages.

 

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PNOC-Exploration Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244461, [September 28, 2021]

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PNOC-EXPLORATION CORP. V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 244461 [September 28, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Prohibition of Hiring Private Counsels by GOCC and its exceptions; Conformitity of OSG; COA's written concurrence on disbursment of legal fees

 

As a rule, a government agency is provided by law with a legal officer or office who or which can handle its legal requirements or cases in courts. It may not be allowed to hire the services of private lawyers for a fee, chargeable against public funds, unless exceptional or extraordinary circumstances obtain with the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit secured before the employment of a private lawyer or law firm. 

 

PNOC-Exploration Corporation (PNOC-EC) engaged in a dispute with Wilson International Trading Private Limited over demurrage charges and losses amounting to US$1,392,064.53 regarding a steam coal purchase. Wilson initiated arbitration in Singapore, prompting PNOC-EC to seek legal representation in the arbitration proceedings.

PNOC-EC, facing the urgent need for an international legal counsel experienced in arbitration and Singapore law, engaged Baker Botts LLP without securing prior written concurrence from the Commission on Audit (COA). COA suspended the legal fees paid to Baker Botts due to the lack of COA's written concurrence and required PNOC-EC to settle or face disallowance of the amount paid. PNOC-EC post-facto requested COA's written concurrence, but it was denied for being filed more than a year after engaging Baker Botts. 

 

Whether the COA gravely abused its discretion in denying PNOC-EC's belated request for COA's written concurrence in hiring private counsels and the suspension of legal fees. 

NO. Government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) are generally prohibited from hiring private counsels, but exceptions exist under COA Circulars 86-255 and 95-011, requiring written concurrence from the COA in exceptional cases. COA Circular 2021-003, recognizing the impracticality of rigid compliance in urgent situations, exempts GOCCs from the written concurrence requirement under certain conditions. The case was remanded to COA for determination whether PNOC-EC meets the criterion for such exemption, since COA was still in its "initial review" of the retainer agreement when the request for concurrence was denied. The propriety of exempting PNOC-EC from the written concurrence requirement entails the evaluation of purely factual and evidentiary matters, not available on record and beyond the purview of this judicial review.

On the suspension of legal fees, the Court held that compliance or non-compliance with COA's written concurrence is not the sole factor in determining disallowance of legal fees, and liabilities arising from disallowance are subject to post-audit based on existing rules and regulations. The COA Chairperson Aguinaldo mandates for a further post-audit to ascertain the proper disallowance and liabilities.

Therefore, the petition was dismissed without prejudice to COA's determination of exempting PNOC-Exploration Corporation from the written concurrence requirement and conducting a post-audit in accordance with COA Circular 2021-003.

 

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BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN V. WENLE G.R. No. 242957 [February 28, 2023]

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BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN V. WENLE

G.R. No. 242957, [February 28, 2023]

EN BANC, GESMUNDO, C.J.

 

Summary Deportation Order; Due Process in Deportation Proceedings; Powers of Bureau of Immigration over Undersirable Alien 

Being legally detained by virtue of the valid Summary Deportation Order issued by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration is not an arbitrary arrest and is not illegal. The alleged lack of notice and hearing before the issuance of the Summary Deportation Order does not render the Summary Deportation Order and his confinement void for violation of due process. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings, such as deportation proceedings, is the opportunity to be heard.

 

This case involves an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Resolution dated October 22, 2018, which declared null and void the Summary Deportation Order (SDO) issued by the Bureau of Immigration's Board of Commissioners. The SDO was issued against Yuan Wenle, a Chinese national, and companion Chinese nationals. The RTC, in a habeas corpus proceeding, ruled that the SDO did not accord due process to aliens. 

The background includes a request from the Chinese Embassy for assistance in arresting and deporting the individuals based on cancelled Chinese passports. The Bureau issued a Charge Sheet, a Watchlist Order, and subsequently, the SDO. Respondent Yuan Wenle filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that the SDO was issued without notice and hearing, making his arrest arbitrary and illegal. The RTC granted the petition, declaring the SDO null and void for being issued without due process. The Bureau, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking to reverse the RTC's decision. 

 

Whether a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a proper remedy to assail a decision or final order of the RTC in habeas corpus cases.

NO. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which explicitly allows petitions for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, limited to questions of law. The Court emphasized that the RTC lacked jurisdiction in entertaining pleas against a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) in a habeas corpus proceeding, as the power to deport aliens is vested in the President through the Bureau of Immigration. This is obvious in deportation proceedings, where the president or the Bureau of Immigration, in order to complete or execute our immigration policies, is given the power to issue arrest warrants for purposes of carrying out a final order of deportation. It is impossible to deport an undesirable alien without first gaining custody of the alien's person.

All told, the Petition for Habeas Corpus was moot and academic, respondent Wenle having been detained by virtue of a legal process. The trial court, therefore, should have denied the Petition. Therefore, SC nullifies the decision of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16 in R-MNL-18-10197-SP for seriously erring in assuming jurisdiction over the habeas corpus case and in invalidating the July 26, 2018 Summary Deportation Order.

 

Whether the Summary Departure Order (SDO) issued by the Bureau against respondent is void for violating due process.

NO. Section 37(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 (CA No. 613), which grants the Commissioner of Immigration the authority to issue warrants of arrest for the purpose of deportation. The Court recognized that an SDO essentially functions as a warrant issued by an administrative body.

In this case, respondent Yuan Wenle was being legally detained by virtue of the valid Summary Deportation Order issued by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration. The alleged lack of notice and hearing before the issuance of the Summary Deportation Order does not render the Summary Deportation Order and his confinement void for violation of due process.

It is undisputed that on July 17, 2018, respondent Wenle was charged before the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, the body with jurisdiction over deportation cases. Nine days later, or on July 26, 2018, a Summary Deportation Order was subsequently issued against respondent Wenle, and only then was he arrested pursuant to the deportation order. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings, such as deportation proceedings, is the opportunity to be heard, which was undisputedly given to respondent Wenle. Wenle was not deprived of his right to due process. He was amply afforded an opportunity to be heard during the proceedings in his petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, SDO issued by the Bureau did not violates the petitioner’s right to due process.

 

 

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TAÑADA, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. No. 217012, [March 1, 2016]

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TAÑADA, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

 G.R. No. 217012, [March 1, 2016]

EN BANC, CARPIO, J.

 

HRET Jurisdiction; Nuisance Candidate

 

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disclaiming jurisdiction over the protest filed by herein petitioner Wigberto "Toby" R. Tañada, Jr. (Wigberto). the HRET lacks the authority to rule on whether or not Alvin John is indeed a nuisance candidate. The latte is not considered a "Member" of Congress, as a non-member of Congress, the HRET could not therefore assume jurisdiction over the issues concerning his eligibility, e.g. the issue on whether he is a nuisance candidate.

 

Wigberto "Toby" R. Tañada, Jr. (Wigberto) filed an election protest ad cautelam before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) contesting the 2013 election results for the Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Quezon. Wigberto's protest stemmed from the 2013 elections where three candidates, including himself, contested the position. For the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, the name of candidate Alvin John remained in the ballots. After the canvass of the votes, the following results indicated that Tan was the winning candidate, to wit: Tan (84,782), Tañada, Wigberto (80,698) and Tañada, Alvin John (7,038). The Quezon PBOC then proclaimed Tan as the winning candidate.  

He filed petitions with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking the cancellation of Alvin John's Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), on the basis of his material misrepresentations under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but not on being a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC dismissed the petitions, but later, on Wigberto's motion for reconsideration, cancelled Alvin John's CoC based on Section 78. While Wigberto's petition for certiorari was still pending in the Supreme Court, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the action of the COMELEC Second Division annulling Tan's proclamation. However, Tan had by then taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation moot. 

Wigberto, after the election, filed an election protest before the HRET, alleging fraud in the fielding of Alvin John as a nuisance candidate, resulting in the miscounting of votes. The HRET dismissed the protest, asserting it lacked jurisdiction to declare Alvin John a nuisance candidate. 

 

Whether or not HRET had jurisdiction to declare Alvin John a nuisance candidate. 

NO. The Supreme Court found that the HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring that it lacked jurisdiction to determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. Wigberto committed procedural errors by filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Banc's ruling, which is expressly prohibited by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The ruling had become final and executory, barring him from raising the issue in another forum. If Wigberto had timely filed a petition before the Supreme Court to question Alvin John's nuisance candidacy, the Court could have assumed jurisdiction. The COMELEC En Banc's resolution on Alvin John's alleged nuisance candidacy had already become final and executory by the time Wigberto filed his petition before the Supreme Court.

The SC reasoned that it appears that Wigberto's petition challenging Alvin John's nuisance candidacy filed before the HRET, and now before this Court, is a mere afterthought. It was only after Tan was proclaimed a winner that Wigberto renewed his zeal in pursuing Alvin John's alleged nuisance candidacy. It is not enough for Wigberto to have Alvin John's COC cancelled, because the effect of such cancellation only leads to stray votes. Alvin John must also be declared a nuisance candidate, because only then will Alvin John's votes be credited to Wigberto.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed Wigberto's petition, affirming the HRET's Resolutions and emphasizing the importance of timely and proper legal procedures in election cases.

 

 

 

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 Concurring Opinion, Jose Portugal Perez, [J]

Mohamed v. Republic, G.R. No. 220674, [December 2, 2021]

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Mohamed v. Republic

 G.R. No. 220674, [December 2, 2021]

FIRST DIVISION, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Citizenship; Naturalization Law; Refugee Convention

 

The right of an alien to become a citizen by naturalization is statutory, rather than a natural one, and it does not become vested until he establishes facts showing strict compliance with the law. The strict compliance with legal requirements in naturalization proceedings, ensures that the privilege of Philippine citizenship is granted only to those fully qualified under the law. 

 

Sefyan Abdelhakim Mohamed, a Sudanese national, married to Filipino citizen Lailanie N. Piano, applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization. Recognized as a convention refugee in 2005, Mohamed filed a Petition for Naturalization in 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. The RTC granted his application in 2009, and on September 24, 2012, the RTC allowed him to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed, contending that Mohamed failed to comply with the one-year period for filing the Declaration of Intention in compliance with the Revised Naturalization Law, which law provides, “one year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice, a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines.”. OSG points out that Mohamed's failure to comply with the required period in filing and that his premature oath rendered the naturalization void.

 

Whether or not Mohamed complies with the requirements for naturalization as required by the Revised Naturalization Law. 

NO. The Court held that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest, emphasizing strict construction in favor of the government. Under the Revised Naturalization Law, the declaration of intention must be filed one year prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization. The one-year period for the Declaration of Intention must be computed from the submission of the supplemental declaration in cases of substantial changes. In this case, Mohamed file such declaration of intention before the expiration of the one-year period; filing the petition a month after the supplemental declaration. Mohamed's failure to adhere to this timeframe constituted a jurisdictional defect.

Mohamed also failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law for purposes of naturalization. Discrepancies in the names declared by Mohamed and the lack of proper documentation for the character witnesses did not help his case. Mohamed also did not submit documentary evidence or medical certificate to prove that he is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable disease. Thus, the Court rejected arguments of substantial compliance, emphasizing the mandatory nature of legal requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.

The Court dismiss the petition for naturalization without prejudice, allowing Mohamed to refile. However, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, and the OSG was given a fresh one-year period for investigation, aligning with international commitments of the Philippines to facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees, under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

 

Whether or not the naturalization requirements are NOT to be applied strictissimi juris in view of the Philippines obligation as party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

NO. Regarding Mohamed's status as a convention refugee, the Court clarified that while the 1951 Refugee Convention aimed to expedite naturalization, it did not waive all legal requirements. Mohamed's premature oath administered before the OSG's appeal period expired, was declared void. Although the Philippines is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, this does not amount to a blanket waiver or relaxation of all the legal requirements for naturalization as mandated by the Revised Naturalization Law of the Philippines. 

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Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan v. Commission on Elections En Banc, G.R. No. 225152, [October 5, 2021]

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Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 225152, [October 5, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

Election Law; Constitutionality of COMELEC resolution extending deadline submission of SOCE 

The Supreme Court En banc says the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the deadline of submission of the Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) beyond the 30-day period mandated by RA 7166 or the Synchronized Elections Law. The COMELEC has exceeded its delegated rule making authority which amounts to usurpation of legislative power.

 

A Petition for certiorari was filed by Partido Demokratiko Pilipino–Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) against the COMELEC. PDP-Laban challenged the COMELEC’S Resolution No. 10147, which extended the filing of Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) until June 30, 2016, despite being originally set at June 8,2016 which is thirty (30) days after the May 9, 2016 national elections. PDP-Laban argued that the COMELEC exceeded its limits and violated section 14 of RA 7166 due to the said order.

 

Whether or not the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10147 which extended the SOCE submission after the 2016 elections is unconstitutional. 

YES. The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot extend the deadline for submission by candidates of their Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE). Under section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 or the Synchronized Elections Law, candidates are required to file their full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election within 30 days after the conduct of election. The language in RA 7166, Section 14 is not ambiguous; the law is clear that SOCEs must be filed within 30 days after the latest polls. Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the SOCE deadline and exempted candidates and political parties from administrative liabilities in violation of the clear language of the law and legislative intent. The COMELEC likewise cannot conveniently invoke the exigency of public service to justify its actions. The COMELEC’s task is to administer the law, not supplant them. For these reasons, the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10147 is declared void for being repugnant to the law. Applying the doctrine of operative fact, however, the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the COMELEC’s Resolution shall be applied prospectively. Thus, the Statements of Contributions and Expenditures for the May 9, 2016 national and local elections that were submitted within the extended period (on or before June 30, 2016) are deemed timely filed. 

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House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal v. Panga-Vega, G.R. No. 228236 (Resolution), [January 27, 2021]

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House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal v. Panga-Vega

 G.R. No. 228236 (Resolution), [January 27, 2021]

EN BANC, LOPEZ, M.V

 

HRET Legal Capacity to Sue; Petition for Review against CSC decision to CA; CSC guidelines; OSG Legal Standing

 

The rules on maternity leave can be suppletorily applied to the Magna Carta of Women's special leave benefit. It emphasizes a liberal interpretation in favor of women's empowerment. Additionally, it affirms the expertise of administrative agencies like the CSC in matters within their jurisdiction which are accorded with great respect if not finality.

 

Atty. Daisy B. Panga-Vega, then Secretary of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), requested a 15-day special leave under the Magna Carta of Women to undergo hysterectomy. HRET approved the leave not exceeding two months. After one month, Panga-Vega informed HRET of her readiness to resume duties, presenting medical certificates. HRET directed her to consume the full leave due to an ongoing investigation on her alleged alteration and tampering a minutes of a meeting. Panga-Vega appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which ruled in her favor, granting her both commuted money value and salary for actual services. HRET filed a Petition for Review assailing the foregoing Decision and Resolution of the CSC. The HRET argues that the CSC should not have applied suppletorily the rules on maternity leave to the special leave benefit under RA No. 9710. It also contends that Panga-Vega did not sufficiently comply with the "CSC Guidelines on the Availment of the Special Leave Benefits for Women Under RA No. 9710.

  

Whether the HRET, as the petitioner, has the legal capacity to initiate the case.

 NO. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) lacked the authority to initiate the case due to the absence of explicit authorization from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the absence of a conflicting position. Under the law, OSG was constituted as the office tasked to represent the Government and its officers in the Court in which the Government, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity is a party. The OSG, however, may be excused from representing the Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities when there is an express authorization by the OSG, naming therein the legal officers who are being deputized in cases involving their respective offices, subject to its supervision and control, or when the OSG takes a position different from that of the agency it is duty bound to represent.

A perusal of the records shows that there was no express authorization by the OSG naming the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the HRET as its deputized legal officers in filing this petition. There was also no proof, let alone an allegation, that the OSG took a position different from the HRET in this case. Thus, HRET had the no legal capacity to initiate the case and the Court has dismissed the petition.

 

Whether Panga-Vega complied with CSC Guidelines for her return to work.

YES. The Court accorded finality to the CSC's findings that Panga-Vega sufficiently complied with the CSC Guidelines, acknowledging the CSC's expertise. The Court suppletory applied the rules on maternity leave to the special leave benefit under the Magna Carta of Women, considering its purpose to protect women's health and welfare. A liberal interpretation was favored, asserting that the fundamental objective of RA No. 9710 is to protect the health and welfare of women. In examining the compliance of Atty. Daisy B. Panga-Vega with Civil Service Commission (CSC) Guidelines for her return to work, the Court deferred to the findings of the CSC, acknowledging its specialized knowledge and expertise in administrative matters. The Court emphasized the adequacy of Panga-Vega's compliance with the CSC Guidelines, particularly regarding the requisite medical certificate, and accorded finality to the CSC's determination. Therefore, her return to work was deemed appropriate.

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