REPUBLIC V. SERENO [G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018]

 CASE DIGEST

REPUBLIC V. SERENO

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

EN BANC, TIJAM J.

 

Quo Warranto Proceeding against Impeachable Official

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative, or criminal action, if otherwise.

 

The OSG 's quo warranto petition challenged respondent's right and title to the position of Chief Justice. He averred that in failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court, respondent could not be said to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that respondent's appointment as Chief Justice be declared void. 

She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be annulled absent any allegation of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition for quo warranto is time-barred; and that respondent was and is a person of proven integrity.

  

Whether the impeachable officials such as justices of Supreme Court can be ousted in office through a Quo Warranto Proceeding. 

YES. SC held that the Constitution in fact allows quo warranto actions against impeachable officers. No provision states that quo warranto cannot extend to non-elected impeachable officers. he authority to hear quo warranto petitions against appointive impeachable officers emanates from Section 5(1) of Article VIII which grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without qualification as to the class of public officers over whom the same may be exercised. The nature of quo warranto as a remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office. It is a remedy against the "unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. Quo warranto should be available to question the validity of appointments especially of impeachable officers since they occupy the upper echelons of government and are capable of wielding vast power and influence on matters of law and policy. 

Thus, SC nullified Maria Lourdes Sereno's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, finding that she never lawfully held the office due to a lack of integrity for failing to file certain required financial documents (SAL-N). As a result, she was ousted from the Supreme Court as Chief Justice. 

A quo warranto petition cannot remove someone from office. If a quo warranto petition succeeds, the target's very appointment is declared null and void ab initio, meaning, legally, Sereno was never Chief Justice at all, as her appointment has been declared illegitimate.

CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT

CARPIO-MORALES VS. CA [GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015]

 CASE DIGEST

CARPIO-MORALES VS. CA

GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

EN BANC, PERLAS-BERNABE

 

Re-election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.

The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect. There is no basis for saying that the election of an official to a new term fully absolves the official of any administrative liability arising from an offense committed during a prior term, since public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.

 

Ombudsman ordered the preventive suspension of Binay, Jr, Mayor of Makati, pending investigation as to his involvement in the alleged corruption in the Makati Parking Building Project. Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable since Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati and Phases III to V transpired during his first term. His re-election as mayor for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. Binay invokes condonation doctrine that all administrative irregularities committed during his previous term were already condoned by the fact of his re-election.

 

Does condonation through re-election operate to absolve an elective official from administrative liability arising from a previous term? 

PARTLY GRANTED. The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect starting April 12, 2016 (Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals attained finality). The condonation doctrine should be abandoned. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support it. It would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times. 

In fact the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. 

However, the Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application. It should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected.

 

Condonation Doctrine Concept

Condonation Doctrine, which applies only to administrative cases, (1) the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; (2) an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and (3) courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. 

Applicability: the condonation doctrine can still apply to pending administrative cases provided that the re-election is also before the abandonment.

CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT

Carlos v. Department of Finance [G.R. No. 225774. April 18, 2023]

 CASE DIGEST

Carlos v. Department of Finance

G.R. No. 225774. April 18, 2023

EN BANC, LEONEN J.

 

Liability of SALN violations; Due Process in error and omissions on SALNs

Compliance with the mandatory review under Republic Act No. 6713 is a prerequisite for holding public officials or employees liable for omissions or errors in their SALNs. This requires the government to notify individuals of any defects in their SALNs and provide them an opportunity to correct these defects. Without following this procedure, liability for SALN violations does not arise.

 

Carlos was initially hired as a Tax Specialist II on a contractual basis by the Department of Finance-One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center. He later received a permanent appointment as Tax Specialist I. Carlos was investigated for discrepancies between his Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) and his actual assets, including properties and loans. He was accused of failing to disclose various assets, obtaining dubious loans, and amassing wealth disproportionate to his income. The Office of the Ombudsman found him guilty of grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty.

 

Whether or not Carlos was guilty of dishonesty for his alleged omissions and errors in his SALNs. 

No. The Court held that Carlos cannot be held liable for omissions or errors in his SALNs because the government failed to comply with the mandatory review and compliance procedure outlined in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6713. This procedure requires the government to inform the reporting individual of any defects in their SALNs and provide them an opportunity to correct these defects. Without following this procedure, liability for SALN violations does not arise. The Court emphasized that the review and compliance mechanism serves as a buffer against haphazard actions and affords public officials the opportunity to explain discrepancies. The Court also noted that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute violations of SALNs is not absolute and should be in line with the procedures set forth in Republic Act No. 6713. Therefore, the Court ruled that Carlos was not guilty of dishonesty and should not be penalized for the alleged SALN discrepancies.

CLICK FOR FULL TEXT

Pimentel v. Legal Education Board [G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, September 10, 2019]

 CASE DIGEST

Pimentel v. Legal Education Board

 G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, [September 10, 2019]

EN BANC, REYES J.

 

Academic Freedom of Educational Institution 

The Court struck down the specific provisions of PhiLSAT and faculty qualification requirements that it deemed unconstitutional. The strict pass-fail requirement of PhiLSAT and the faculty qualification requirements went beyond reasonable regulation and intruded on academic freedom. LEB’s regulatory power should be reasonable and should not unduly restrict the autonomy of educational institutions and the choices of students.

This case involves consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7662, known as the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993. The act established the Legal Education Board (LEB) and introduced the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) as a requirement for law school applicants. Petitioners primarily argued that these provisions violated academic freedom.

 

Whether the introduction of PhiLSAT and related provisions under R.A. No. 7662 infringe upon the academic freedom of law schools and applicants.

  

Yes. The Supreme Court held that R.A. No. 7662 did not encroach upon the Court's rule-making authority and that the state had the jurisdiction to regulate legal education in the interest of public welfare. However, certain provisions of PhiLSAT that excluded, restricted, and qualified admissions to law schools were deemed unconstitutional as they violated institutional academic freedom.

The Court found that the PhiLSAT, in its current form, impeded academic freedom by restricting law schools' discretion in admissions and, therefore, ruled certain PhiLSAT provisions unconstitutional. The Court also nullified certain LEB issuances that exceeded the powers granted under its charter. The Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education but with limitations to protect academic freedom of educational institutions. 

 

Violation of Academic Freedom: 

·        Interference with Admission Policies: The Court reasoned that PhiLSAT, as initially designed, imposed a pass-or-fail requirement for law school admission. This meant that law schools were restricted in admitting students solely based on their PhiLSAT scores. 

·        Restriction on Student Choice: academic freedom extends to students as well. The PhiLSAT, by imposing a rigid entrance exam requirement, limited the students' ability to choose their preferred law schools. 

·        Faculty Qualification Requirements: The law required that law professors have at least five years of practice or substantial experience in the field before they could teach. The Court found that this provision could limit the pool of qualified professors and limit the academic freedom of law schools to choose their faculty members.

 

 CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT

Macalintal vs. COMELEC [GR No. 263590, June 27, 2023]

 CASE DIGEST 

Macalintal vs. COMELEC

GR No. 263590, June 27, 2023

EN BANC, KHO, A.

 

Constitutionality of the postponement of the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections in October 2023 

The free and meaningful exercise of the right to vote requires the holding of genuine periodic elections which must be held at intervals which are not unduly long, which ensures that the authority of government continues to be based on the will of electors.

  

This is a consolidated petitions of Atty. Macalintal and of Atty. Alberto N. Hidalgo, assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act 11935 or “An Act Postponing the December 5, 2022 Barangay and SK Elections” and reschedule it to last Monday of October 2023.

  

Whether or not the issue has become moot and academic.

NO. The Supreme Court held that the case has not been rendered moot to preclude the exercise by this court of its judicial review power because RA 11935’s transgression on the people’s right of suffrage is continuing and did not cease upon the lapse of the December 5, 2022 election schedule. Thus, despite the intervening expiration of the previous election date, the case undoubtedly presents an actual case or controversy that justifies the continued exercise by this court of its judicial review power.

 

Whether or not the postponement of Barangay and SK Election is unconstitutional.

YES. The Supreme Court en banc exercised its inherent power to check and balance the legislative powers of Congress, the executive branch, and the Commission on Elections (Comelec). The Supreme Court has nullified the law that authorized the postponement of the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections in October 2023. Postponement unduly deprives the people of their fundamental power to decide on whether to retain or to change the incumbents who have overstayed in office for the longest time.

The Supreme Court declared that the free and meaningful exercise of the right to vote, as protected and guaranteed by the Constitution, requires the holding of genuine periodic elections which must be held at intervals which are not unduly long, and which ensure that the authority of government continues to be based on the free expression of the will of electors. The right of suffrage is one of the most fundamental and vital rights of the people. COMELEC cannot just negate that basic right.

 

Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to postpone elections on a nationwide basis.

NO. This power lies with the Congress pursuant to (i) its plenary power to legislate, and (ii) its power to fix the term of office of barangay officials under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution. As such, the Congress did not unconstitutionally encroach on the power of Comelec to administer elections when it enacted RA 11935. Neither did the provision for “hold-over” capacity amount to an unconstitutional “legislative appointment.”

 

SALIENT POINTS OF THIS LANDMARK DECISION:

 1.    Fundamental Right to Vote: The Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to vote, as protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. Genuine periodic elections held at reasonable intervals are essential for the free and meaningful exercise of this right. Prolonged postponements unduly deprive the people of their power to decide on the retention or replacement of incumbents.

2. Congressional Power and Role of COMELEC: The Supreme Court clarified that Comelec does not possess the authority to postpone elections on a nationwide basis. Such power resides with Congress, pursuant to its legislative and administrative authority under the Constitution. Congress did not unconstitutionally encroach on COMELEC'S powers when it enacted RA 11935.

3. Ongoing Transgression of Rights: The Court held that the case remained relevant and justiciable despite the expiration of the previous election date. RA 11935's infringement on the people's right of suffrage continued, justifying judicial review.

4.    Unnecessary Means Employed by Congress: The Supreme Court criticized the means employed by Congress as unreasonably unnecessary to achieve the government's goals. Transferring budget allocations from COMELEC to the executive branch violated the constitutional prohibition against such appropriations transfers.

5.    Future Elections: The Court mandated that the succeeding Barangay and SK elections should be held on the first Monday of December 2025 and every three years thereafter, as stipulated in RA 11462. However, Congress retains the authority to further amend RA 9164 (as amended), the law governing synchronized elections.

6.    Guidelines and Principles: The Supreme Court established guidelines and principles for government actions seeking to postpone elections. These guidelines were intended to guide the bench, bar, and the public and emphasized the importance of adhering to the principles of suffrage

 

Calleja v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 252578. December 07, 2021]

 CASE DIGEST

Calleja v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 252578. December 07, 2021

EN BANC, CARANDANG J.

 

Constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)

 “Facial challenge” used by the petitions to nullify the ATA cannot invalidate the entire law because a facial challenge can be used only in “free speech” case. Hence, the law cannot be declared unconstitutional in its entirety, only in its parts involving free speech.

 

This Court resolves thirty-seven (37) separate petitions all challenging and assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 11479 (R.A. No. 11479), otherwise known as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (ATA). Signed by President Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte) on July 3, 2020. Despite the legislature’s efforts to pass the law, petitioners primarily assailed the validity and constitutionality of the ATA. Petitioners asserted that Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA, due to their perceived facial vagueness and overbreadth that “purportedly repress free speech.” Furthermore, it is argued that the unconstitutionality of the definition of the word “terrorism” and its variants will leave it with “nothing to sustain its existence.” 

Following the passage of the ATA, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has commenced the crafting of the law’s implementing rules and regulations (IRR) in August 2020. Succeeding this, the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) has automatically adopted the list of designated terrorists by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The ATC has also taken grave measures to implement the ATA, which include designating CPP/NPA and other sixteen (16) organizations associated with the Islamic State and “other Daesh-affiliated groups in the Philippines,” ten (10) individuals for their alleged membership in extremist groups, and nineteen (19) other individuals due to their alleged ties with the CPP/NPA, all as terrorists. Similarly, AMLC also issued Sanction Freeze Orders against the CPP/NPA and the Daesh-affiliated groups. Likewise, the ATC issued several resolutions wherein several individuals were designated as terrorists for their alleged membership in extremist groups and/or alleged ties with the CPP/NPA.

 

 

Should facial challenge or applied challenge be used in analyzing the ATA.

 

YES. Facial challenge is "an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities." Jurisprudence also dictates that facial challenges on legislative acts are permissible only if they curtail the freedom of speech and its cognate rights based on overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The Court grants due course to these consolidated petitions as challenges only in relation to the provisions of the ATA which involve and raise chilling effects on freedom of expression and its cognate rights in the context of actual and not mere hypothetical facts.

  

Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 11479 was declared unconstitutional.

Said proviso invaded areas of protected freedoms and is void for vagueness as it has a chilling effect on an average person. Before the protester can speak, he must first guess whether his speech would be interpreted as a terrorist act pursuant to Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 11479 and whether he might be indicted, arrested, and/or detained for it. The clause likewise shifts the burden to the accused in explaining his intent. It would then allow for law enforcers to take an “arrest now, explain later” approach in the application of the ATA to protesters and dissenters. The vagueness of such provision would likely result in an arbitrary flexing of the government muscle which is equally aversive to due process.

 

 Rule 4.4. of the ATA's IRR or the "Not Intended Clause" is unconstitutional

“Terrorism shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work and so on which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger [a] person's life or to create a serious risk to public safety.”

The “Not Intended” clause of Section 4’s proviso is unconstitutional under the (1) strict scrutiny test, (2) void for vagueness, and (3) overbreadth doctrines.  The Court struck down the "Not Intended Clause" as unconstitutional and categorically affirmed that all individuals, in accordance with Section 4 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, are free to protest, dissent, advocate, peaceably assemble to petition the government for redress of grievances, or otherwise exercise their civil and political rights, without fear of being prosecuted as terrorists under the ATA.

The ”Not Intended Clause” also failed the strict scrutiny test. The said test can additionally be used to determine the validity of the clause, being a government regulation of speech. Thus, applying this test, the government has the burden of proving that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Even if a compelling state interest exists, a governmental action would not pass the strict scrutiny test if the interest could be achieved in an alternative way that is equally effective yet without violating the freedom of expression and its allied rights.

   

Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 11479 on the second mode of designation was declared unconstitutional.

It is not the least restrictive means to achieve such a purpose. This mode of designation does not pass the strict scrutiny test and is equally overboard. It is not the least restrictive means to achieve such a purpose. Because this measure has the unintended consequence of stifling free speech and related rights, it should not be implemented based on a decision made by an executive body that lacks adequate criteria and safeguards. In conclusion, the second manner of designation fails to withstand strict scrutiny and overbreadth for the reasons indicated, and is thus illegal.

 

 CLICK TO VIEW FULL TEXT

 

 

 

 

 

OCHOA VS. ALANO [G.R. NO. 167459, January 26, 2011]

OCHOA VS. ALANO

G.R. NO. 167459,  January 26, 2011

FIRST DIVISION, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J

 

Psychological Incapacity of Any Party (Art. 36, Family Code)

 

Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa sought the nullity of his marriage to Bona J. Alano due to her psychological incapacity to fulfill marital obligations. Bona had engaged in extramarital affairs throughout their marriage, which continued even when they lived together. In 1987, while Jose was incarcerated, he confronted Bona about rumors of her affair with his driver, which both admitted. They separated, and their child lived with Bona until 1994 when she went to live with Jose. A psychiatrist's evaluation concluded that Bona suffered from histrionic personality disorder, which was attributed to her family history.

 

Whether Psychological Incapacity is clearly established to declare marriage as null and void.

 

NO. The SC said that the totality of Bona’s acts did not constitute psychological incapacity and that there was inadequate evidence that her “defects” were already present at the inception or prior to the marriage. The persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage. Therefore, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the requisite of “juridical antecedence”. The evaluation report by Dr. Rondain was gathered from Jose and witnesses. These was no personal exam conducted on the respondent. The alleged spouse’s psychological incapacity was fed by only one side, similar to hearsay.

 

 

 CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT

 

 

 

  

Lim vs. Lim [G.R. No. 176464 February 24, 2010]

 CASE DIGEST

Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 176464

February 24, 2010

THIRD DIVISION, NACHURA, J

 

Psychological Incapacity of Any Party (Art. 36, Family Code) 

In order for a marriage to be declared null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity, certain criteria of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability must be met.

 

Edward Lim and Maria Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim got married in 1979 after a brief courtship. They lived with Edward's family in Makati and had three children. Their marriage faced turmoil, including an embarrassing incident involving Edward and his mother’s caregiver. In 1990, Cheryl left Edward and filed a support case against him. In 1999, Edward sought the nullity of their marriage on the grounds of both parties' psychological incapacity. He later included his psychological incapacity in his amended petition. Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist, provided a psychiatric report diagnosing both parties with personality disorders, while Cheryl waived her right to present evidence.

 

Is the marriage between Edward and Cheryl null and void due to their psychological incapacity? 

NO. The marriage is not null and void. Psychological incapacity for the annulment of a marriage requires the incapacity to be grave, have juridical antecedence, and be incurable. In this case, the psychiatric report presented lacks specific links between the parties' acts and the criteria for the diagnosed personality disorders. Additionally, the report was unsupported by proper psychological tests. A judge must base rulings on law and jurisprudence, and the expert opinion, unsupported by tests, cannot prevent the judge from making factual findings. Therefore, the marriage remains valid.

  

Criterion of Psychological Incapacity:

 1.    Gravity: The psychological incapacity must be serious or grave, rendering a party incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.

2.    Juridical Antecedence: The psychological incapacity should have existed prior to the marriage, although it may only become evident after the marriage has taken place.

3.     Incurability: The psychological incapacity must be permanent and incurable. It should be deeply ingrained in the individual's personality structure and beyond the means of correction or treatment.

 

 

 CLICK TO READ FULL TEXT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Georfo vs. Republic [G.R. No. 246933, March 6, 2023]

 CASE DIGEST

Georfo vs. Republic 

(G.R. No. 246933, March 6, 2023)

SECOND DIVISION, LEONEN J.

Psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not an illness which has to be medically or clinically identified.

Agnes and Joe-Ar got married after a brief courtship and had a son. Their marriage quickly deteriorated due to conflict, infidelity, and abuse. Agnes filed for the nullity of their marriage, claiming Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerong, a clinical psychologist, provided an expert opinion, citing Joe-Ar's narcissistic personality disorder and other issues as causes of incapacity. Joe-Ar’s sister also testify regarding his abusive behavior, as she once saw how Joe-ar and his family mistreated Agnes. 

Was there sufficient evidence to prove Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity as the basis for the nullity of the marriage?

YES. In proving psychological incapacity doesn't necessitate a psychiatric examination and that it's based on legal standards, not medical diagnoses. The totality of evidence, including expert opinions, testimonies, and behavior patterns, can establish psychological incapacity. The court ruled that Agnes had successfully proven Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerong's psychological assessment, based on testimonies from Agnes and her sister, supported this claim. The court emphasized that psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not a specific illness, and psychiatric evaluation is no longer a requirement. Therefore, their marriage was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

CLICK TO VIEW FULL TEXT